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Abstract
Femininity Under Threat:
How Women Respond to Feedback about Their Physical Appearance
Natalie Markowitz Wittlin
2021
In recent decades, it has become increasingly normative—at times, even desirable—
for women to possess traditionally masculine personality traits. The pressure on women to
maintain a feminine physical appearance, however, has not waned. Past research has
demonstrated that unlike men, women do not experience distress when their psychological
gender stereotypicality has been threatened. This does not mean, however, that they are
immune from the harms of gender stereotypicality threats altogether. In this dissertation, I
explore the possibility that women experience distress when their physical femininity has been
threatened.
In Chapter 1, I lay the foundation for my empirical work. I provide an overview of
the constructs at the center of this dissertation: gender stereotypes, gender identity, gender
stereotypicality threats, and identity invalidation. Further, I highlight three major gaps in the
existing literature on gender stereotypicality threats: attention to women, consideration of
physical appearances, and exploration of underlying mechanisms.
In Chapter 2, I present four studies that test my hypothesis that physical femininity
threats are distressing for women. I find that women experience anxiety and reduced selfesteem in response to information indicating that their appearance is less feminine than
average (versus more feminine than average). Further, I find that these effects are not simply
the result of women interpreting this information to mean they are unattractive. I also find
that these effects are indeed domain specific, such that physical, but not psychological,
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threats produce anxiety and reduced self-esteem in women. In men, in contrast, masculinity
threats produce anxiety across domains. Finally, I find preliminary evidence that identity
invalidation—and specifically, a discrepancy between the feedback one received and one’s
internal sense of self—can help to explain the effects of gender stereotypicality threats on
both anxiety and self-esteem.
In Chapter 3, I describe the unique contributions of these studies to the psychology
of gender and propose three directions for future research. I suggest that additional studies
be conducted to explore the null effects of psychological femininity threats. Additionally, I
propose that future research approach the subject of femininity threats from an
intersectional perspective, considering whether and how experiences with these threats differ
between dominant and minoritized social group members. Finally, I highlight the importance
of considering the broader consequences of femininity threats, both for women who have
been threatened and for people in general.
In sum, this dissertation explores a highly consequential phenomenon that has been
largely overlooked in the literature: femininity threats. In doing so, it highlights unique ways
in which gender stereotypes can harm women and paves the way for further research on this
phenomenon, as well as interventions to mitigate its harm.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
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In 1985, Anne Hopkins sued the accounting firm Price Waterhouse, her former
employer, for denying her partnership. Partners at the firm had referred to Hopkins as
“macho” and had suggested that she might be considered for promotion if she were to
“walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her
hair styled, and wear jewelry" (Fiske et al., 1991, p. 1117; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
1989). Hopkins argued, and with input from prominent social psychologists, the U.S.
Supreme Court agreed that this denial constituted sex discrimination, as it was driven by
Hopkins’ non-adherence to gender stereotypes. Although this landmark Supreme Court
decision occurred over thirty years ago, if women in the twenty-first century are to be liked
and considered adequately feminine, they are still expected to maintain a feminine physical
appearance. Indeed, in 2019, media reports revealed that Ernst & Young, another large
accounting firm, had held a workshop in which female employees were encouraged to come
to work with a “good haircut, manicured nails, and well-cut attire that complements [their]
body type” (Peck, 2019). Furthermore, since Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, other courts
have ruled that employers can legally fire female employees for not adhering to genderspecific dress and grooming codes that require them to wear their hair down, style it, and
wear makeup (Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 2002). Despite women’s increased
presence in traditionally masculine spheres and roles (England et al., 2020; Geiger & Parker,
2018; Parker et al., 2017), the mandate for women to appear hegemonically physically
feminine—that is, in accordance with Eurocentric conceptualizations of femininity (Collins,
2004), to have light, smooth, and hairless skin, a slim build, long, silky hair, and a youthful
appearance—has clearly persisted. As a consequence of this mandate, women who do not
live up to—or who believe they do not live up—these standards of physical femininity may
experience acute psychological distress.

3
In this dissertation, I examine psychological consequences of threats to women’s
physical femininity. In this introductory chapter, I provide a brief overview of the
psychological constructs that are central to this dissertation: gender stereotypes, gender
identity, gender stereotypicality threats, and identity invalidation. I also highlight areas in
need of reconsideration and additional attention. Further, I make the case that research on
gender stereotypicality threats has been limited by its inattention to women, to physical
appearances, and to the mechanisms by which these threats translate into psychological
distress. I assert that a comprehensive understanding of the consequences of gender
stereotypicality threats requires attention to all three.
At times, different bodies of literature use different terms to describe related or even
identical constructs and phenomena. Likewise, different literatures sometimes use the same
term to describe constructs and phenomena that are theoretically distinct from one another.
Thus, to limit confusion and ensure conceptual clarity throughout this dissertation, in this
chapter, I indicate which terms I will be using and describe how they overlap with and differ
from similar and related terms. An overview of all of the terms defined in this chapter is
presented in Table 1.2. This table is meant to serve as a reference should readers wish to
refer back to the definitions provided in this chapter.
Gender Stereotypes
The studies presented in this dissertation examine psychological responses to
feedback about one’s gender stereotypicality. Here, I situate these studies within current
understandings of gender stereotypes and describe one important limitation of the existing
literature on this topic: inattention to physical appearances.

4
Defining Gender Stereotypes
The term gender stereotypes refers, broadly, to people’s beliefs about the attributes of
females and males1,2 (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1979, 1981; Prentice & Carranza, 2002;
Rosenkrantz et al., 1968). It does not, however, refer to people’s definitions of what it means
to be female or male, which tend to refer to genitals and/or chromosomes (Schudson et al.,
2019). Although stereotypes are often described as expectations about members of a group
(Swim & Hyers, 2009. p. 411), it is perhaps more accurate to describe them as beliefs about
groups that inform expectations about individual members of those groups (Dovidio et al.,
2010).
Gender stereotypes comprise not only descriptive elements—that is, beliefs about what
women (and girls) and men (and boys) are like—but also injunctive elements—that is, beliefs
about what women and men should be like (in the case of prescriptive stereotypes) and should not
be like (in the case of proscriptive stereotypes) (e.g., Burgess & Borgida, 1999; Heilman, 2001;
Eagly & Karau, 2002; Fiske & Stevens, 1993; Prentice & Carranza, 2002). Descriptive and
injunctive stereotypes are largely but not entirely overlapping (Koenig, 2019; Prentice &
Carranza, 2002).
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Although many psychologists reserve the terms “female” and “male” for references to
biological sex (Muehlenhard & Peterson, 2011), in this dissertation I use them to refer to
gender. In doing so, I ensure inclusivity of individuals who identify as “women,” “men,”
“girls,” “boys,” and “guys,” which is particularly important when studying young women,
who may identify as “girls” (Chrisler, 2013). Accordingly, I use the terms “female” and
“male” not only as adjectives (as in “female participants” and “male participants”) but also as
nouns (American Psychological Association, 2020). This decision has precedent in the
literature (Hyde, 2005).
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The term gender stereotypes could theoretically refer to beliefs about cisgender women/girls,
cisgender men/boys, transgender women/girls, transgender men/boys, and nonbinary
individuals. It is typically used more narrowly, however, to refer to beliefs about cisgender
women/girls and cisgender men/boys.
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When discussing gender stereotypes throughout this dissertation, I use the terms
feminine and femininity to refer to characteristics that are descriptively and/or prescriptively
stereotypical of women (and which are also often self-reported by women more than men;
Bem, 1974; Spence et al., 1975). Correspondingly, I use the terms masculine and masculinity to
refer to characteristics that are stereotypical of men (and which are also often self-reported
by men more than women; Bem, 1974; Spence et al., 1975). These definitions align with
Bem’s (1974) description of feminine characteristics as those “judged to be more desirable
[in American society]3 for a woman than a man” and masculine characteristics as those
“judged to be more desirable in American society for a man than for a woman” (pp. 155156). Understandings of the terms feminine and masculine vary considerably, however, among
lay people (Schudson et al., 2019) and psychologists (Constantinople, 1973; Spence, 1984)
alike. As Spence (1984) explains, they can be used in (a) the “empirical” sense—as labels for
characteristics associated with and prescribed for members of one gender group or the other
(p. 66) or (b) the “theoretical” sense—to refer to a perhaps undefinable, “fundamental
property or aspect of the individual’s self-concept that is not directly observable” (p. 90).
When using these terms in the context of gender stereotypes, I use them in the empirical
sense.
Descriptive (though not necessarily prescriptive) gender stereotypes are often
conceptualized as inherently comparative (Prentice & Carranza, 2002). In other words,
characteristics are classified as feminine if women are thought to possess them at higher
rates than men, whereas they are classified as masculine if men are thought to possess them
at higher rates than women (Prentice & Carranza, 2002). Notably, however, generic beliefs
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The empirical research presented in this dissertation was indeed conducted in—and
primarily informed by other research conducted in—the United States.
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(e.g., “Men are intelligent,” “Women are emotional”) seem to be more central than statistical
beliefs (e.g., “Men are more likely than women to be intelligent”) to the cognitive structure
of descriptive stereotypes, as they are more predictive of expectations about individual
women and men (Hammond & Cimpian, 2017). Therefore, women being more likely than
men to report a particular characteristic (e.g., Bem, 1974; Spence et al., 1975) is not an
indication that the stereotype that women possess that characteristic is accurate (since
stereotypes are largely cognitively represented as “women possess this characteristic” rather
than “women are more likely than men to possess this characteristic”). It is also not an
indication that the belief that women possess that characteristic is not a stereotype (Swim,
1994). This point is important in the context of the research presented in this dissertation,
which focuses on physical gender stereotypes, because some would likely argue that women
and men indeed look different from one another. Average differences between women and
men on a particular characteristic, however, do not prevent that characteristic from being a
stereotype.
Descriptive gender stereotypes are also largely bipolar (Biernat, 1991; Foushee et al.,
1979; Spence, 1984); in other words, adults tend to conceptualize femininity and masculinity
as two ends of a single spectrum—or, in other words, as polar opposites. As described in
Chapter 2, the manipulations used in this dissertation capitalize on this lay understanding of
femininity and masculinity.
Distinguishing Gender Stereotypes
The term gender stereotypes is closely related to several other terms, including gender
prototypes, sex (or gender) roles, gender norms, and sex-typed characteristics. Each of these terms,
however, has a slightly different meaning. To clarify the logic behind my decision to frame
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this dissertation in terms of stereotypes, here, I define each of these terms and distinguish it
from gender stereotypes.
Gender prototypes refers to mental representations of highly typical or representative
instances of a gender category (Brewer et al., 1981; Helgeson, 1994; Smith & Zarate, 1990).
Whereas prototypicality can be thought of as existing along a single dimension, degree of
prototypicality, stereotypicality can be thought of as existing along two dimensions, degree
and direction of stereotypicality. For example, if being kind is part of what it means to be a
prototypical woman, then both unusually kind and unusually unkind women are nonprototypical. If being kind is part of what it means to be a stereotypical woman, on the other
hand, then unusually kind women are highly stereotypical, whereas unusually unkind women
are counter-stereotypical. Because in this dissertation I am interested in comparing women’s
responses to feedback indicating that they are high in femininity (and low in masculinity)
versus high in masculinity (and low in femininity), I frame this work in terms of gender
stereotypes, rather than prototypes.
The term social roles is typically used to refer to sets of shared expectations about
people with a specific social position or in a specific social category (Eagly & Karau, 2002;
Gouldner, 1957). Examples of social roles include friend, parent, co-worker, boss, teacher,
lawyer, construction worker, and nurse. Sex (or gender) roles are specific types of social roles
thought to stem from women’s and men’s uneven occupation of other social roles (Eagly &
Karau, 2002). More specifically, a sex (or gender) role refers to the collection of stereotypes
associated with one gender or the other (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Putting effort into one’s
appearance, for example, is a gender stereotype and constitutes one element of the female
gender role; it does not, however, constitute the female gender role in its entirety
(Broverman et al., 1972; Prentice & Carranza, 2002).
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The term social norms refers to “rules and standards that are understood by members
of a group, and that guide and/or constrain social behavior without the force of laws”
(Cialdini & Trost, 1998, p. 152). Both the term gender stereotypes and the term gender norms have
been used to refer to both descriptive and prescriptive beliefs about women, men, girls, and
boys; thus, they can be considered synonymous and used interchangeably (Diekman &
Goodfriend, 2006). In the context of gender norms, however, the term normative is
sometimes used to refer exclusively to prescriptive stereotypes (Eagly, 1987, p. 13).
Additionally, in line with the above definition of social norms, the term gender norms could be
understood to refer specifically to behaviors and not to other components of gender
stereotypes. Therefore, in this dissertation, I refrain from using this term.
Finally, the term sex-typed has several different meanings: (a) prescriptively
stereotypical of one gender group or the other (as in “sex-typed norms” or “sex-typed
standards;” Wood et al., 1997); (b) possessing characteristics that are prescriptively
stereotypical of one’s gender group and not possessing characteristics that are prescriptively
stereotypical of the other primary gender group (as in “sex-typed women” and “sex-typed
men;” Bem, 1974; Spence & Helmreich, 1980); and (c) aligned with a particular gender
identity, a term that will be discussed below (as in “sex-typed behaviors;” Bailey & Zucker,
1995). Therefore, although in some cases the terms sex-typed and stereotypical can be used
interchangeably (e.g., communality is a sex-typed trait or a trait that is stereotypical of
women), to avoid any confusion, throughout this dissertation, I solely use the term
stereotypical.
Gender Stereotypes and Physical Appearance
Research on gender stereotypes has been limited by its prioritization of certain
domains. It has focused largely on personality traits—with competence, agency, and
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instrumentality constituting masculine stereotypes and warmth, expressiveness, and
communality constituting feminine stereotypes (Broverman et al., 1972; Rosenkrantz et al.,
1968; Heilman, 2001, 2012), as well as on cognitive ability—with math ability constituting a
masculine stereotype and verbal ability constituting a feminine stereotype (Cejka & Eagly,
1999; Eccles et al., 1990; Nosek et al., 2009). Gender stereotypes, however, are
multidimensional and include not only beliefs about people’s psychological traits but also
beliefs about their physical appearances (Cejka & Eagly, 1999; Deaux & Lewis, 1983, 1984;
Helgeson, 1994; Kagan, 1964). Indeed, women and men are thought to be more physically
than psychologically different (Deaux & Lewis, 1984). And in studies on lay understandings of
femininity and masculinity, physical attributes are often mentioned more frequently than
personality traits, cognitive abilities, roles, speech, movement, and behavior (Myers &
Gonda, 1982; Spence & Sawin, 1985; but see Helgeson, 1994).
The inattention to physical appearance in research on gender stereotypes may have
led researchers to overlook important consequences of these stereotypes—especially for
women. Evidence suggests that physical appearances are more central to conceptualizations
of femininity in women than masculinity in men. In one study, for example, in which
participants were asked what characteristics come to mind when they think of a “very
feminine woman” or “very masculine man,” descriptions of feminine women included a
greater proportion of physical descriptors than descriptions of masculine men did (Spence &
Sawin, 1985). When asked about a feminine woman, 54% of women and 45% of men
mentioned physical attributes. When asked about a masculine man, on the other hand, only
37% of women and 29% of men mentioned physical attributes. Similarly, when participants
in another study were asked which characteristics they associate with being a feminine
female, nearly half of the descriptors used referred to “physical attributes and mannerisms”
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(Aube et al., 1995). When asked which characteristics they associate with being a masculine
female (38%), masculine male (34%), or feminine male (41%), however, participants
included fewer physical descriptors and instead focused more on personality traits, role
behaviors (i.e., activities within the family and the home), and interests. Results from one
study deviated from this pattern, finding that physical appearance is more central to how
people think about masculinity in women than femininity in men and women and masculinity
in men (Helgeson, 1994). Still, this study is consistent with the others in that participants
mentioned appearances more when describing stereotypicality (or rather counterstereotypicality) in women than stereotypicality in men.
The frequent neglect of physical appearance in research on gender stereotypes might
help to explain why psychologists have generally concluded that women are given more
leeway to be masculine than men are given to be feminine (Kimmel, 2004, p. 147-148;
Thompson & Pleck, 1986). It indeed seems to be the case that within the domains of
personality traits, role behaviors, and occupations, counter-stereotypicality is judged more
harshly in males than it is in females (Feinman, 1981; Koenig, 2019; Martin, 1990; McCreary,
1994; Sirin et al., 2004)—or, in other words, that whereas men and boys are subjected to a
clear and pervasive anti-femininity mandate, women and girls are not subjected to a
comparable anti-masculinity mandate. And this asymmetry may exist at least in part because
masculinity is more highly valued and higher-status than femininity is (Feinman, 1981; Parker
et al., 2017). Within the domain of physical appearance, however, counter-stereotypicality
may not be judged more harshly in males than it is in females. In fact, physical stereotypicality
may be particularly prized and counter-stereotypicality particularly discouraged in women.
Although research on gender stereotypes has often overlooked physical appearances,
when appearances have been attended to, the focus has typically been on psychological or
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behavioral investment in appearances, rather than appearances themselves. For example, in
their studies of prescriptive gender stereotypes, Prentice and Carranza (2002) found that
paying attention to one’s appearances is generally considered desirable but that it is
considered more desirable for women than people in general and less desirable for men than
people in general. Additionally, research has suggested that physical attractiveness may
constitute a particularly strong prescription for women. In a 2017 nationally representative
survey of U.S. adults, for example, participants were asked “what traits society values most in
men and women” (Parker et al., 2017). In reference to women, the plurality of responses
(35%) focused on what the authors classified as physical attractiveness, whereas in reference
to men, the plurality (33%) focused on honesty and morality. Furthermore, 71% of
participants said that women face a lot of pressure to be physically attractive, whereas only
27% said that men face such pressure.
The large overlap between that which is considered physically attractive in women
and that which is considered physically feminine (Keating, 1985; Penton-Voak et al., 2004;
Rhodes et al., 2000; Rhodes et al., 2003) suggests that physically feminine features (e.g.,
hairless skin, an unpronounced brow ridge and jawline, and large lips; Rhodes, 2006) are
highly prescribed for women. Indeed, the most common “beautification” practices in which
women engage—eyebrow shaping, body and facial hair removal, use of anti-aging creams,
and application of eye and lip makeup—increase physical femininity and reduce physical
masculinity (Russell, 2010). The apparent emphasis on physical stereotypicality in women
may help to explain why even though women, but not men, are increasingly identifying with
counter-stereotypical personality traits and decreasingly identifying with stereotypical
personality traits (Donnelly & Twenge, 2017; Twenge, 1997), women report that it is very
important for them to be viewed as “womanly or feminine” to a greater extent than men
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report that it is very important for them to be viewed as “manly or masculine” (20% versus
9%; Parker et al., 2017).
A full understanding of the consequences of prescriptive gender stereotypes requires
consideration of the pressure on women to appear physically feminine—and in particular, on
what happens when women believe they have failed to live up to ideals of physical
femininity. This question is the focus on the studies presented in Chapter 2. Furthermore, an
understanding of what happens in these instances requires consideration of the extent to
which women experience threats to their gender stereotypicality as threats to their identity.
In the next section of this chapter, I therefore provide a brief introduction to the
psychological construct of gender identity and clarify how I will use this term throughout the
remainder of the dissertation.
Gender Identity
In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I examine the relationship between feedback about
one’s gender stereotypicality and beliefs about one’s identity. In particular, I investigate the
effect of this feedback on both the strength of one’s gender identity and the sense that one’s
identity is being denied. Here, I lay out existing understandings of the construct of gender
identity, clarify how I will use this term throughout the dissertation, and describe the
relationship between gender identity and physical appearance.
Defining Gender Identity
In its broadest sense, gender identity refers to “the quality and strength of the cognitive
connections...that a person makes between the self and a gender category” (Tobin et al.,
2010). Definitions and understandings of this term, however, vary (Wood & Eagly, 2015).
Gender identity has been used to refer, in whole or in part, to all of the following:
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i.

children’s “membership knowledge”—or awareness of the gender category
to which they belong by virtue of their genitals and thus assigned sex (Bussey
& Bandura, 1999; Egan & Perry, 2001; Kohlberg, 1966, p. 103; Tobin et al.,
2010)

ii.

identification with a gender category, often determined by an alignment
between one’s internal sense of self and an individual understanding of what
membership in that category entails (i.e., self-categorization; Factor &
Rothblum, 2008; Kuper et al., 2012; Spence, 1993; Spence & Sawin, 1985;
Tate, 2014; Tate et al., 2014);

iii.

identification with other people of one’s gender group (Becker & Wagner,
2009; Gurin & Townsend, 1986);

iv.

centrality of gender membership to one’s overall sense of self (Ashmore et
al., 2004; Becker & Wagner, 2009; Gurin & Townsend, 1986; Tobin et al.,
2010) (i.e., gender identity centrality; Rogers et al., 2015 or gender identification;
Schmader, 2002);

v.

felt pressure (internal and/or external) to conform to gender stereotypes
(Egan & Perry, 2001; Tobin et al., 2010; Witt & Wood, 2010);

vi.

self-perceived gender typicality, or adherence to gender stereotypes (Gurin &
Townsend, 1986; Tobin et al., 2010; Martin et al., 2017; Witt & Wood, 2010;
in the tradition of Bem, 1974 and Spence et al., 1974, 1975);

vii.

identification with femininity and/or masculinity, determined by an
alignment between one’s internal sense of self and one’s individual
understanding of these constructs (Constantinople, 1973; Oswald &
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Lindstedt, 2006; Spence, 1984; Spence, 1993; Spence & Buckner, 2000;
Spence & Sawin, 1985).
Whereas the first three conceptualizations of gender identity refer to identification as
female or male, the latter three refer to identification as feminine or masculine. Throughout
this dissertation, I therefore use the term gender identity to refer to a two-dimensional
construct consisting of: (a) one’s internal sense of femaleness or maleness; and (b) one’s
internal sense of femininity and masculinity.4 Here, following the final conceptualization of
gender identity listed above, I use the terms femininity and masculinity in the “theoretical,”
rather than the “empirical” sense (Spence, 1984)—that is, to refer to an element of one’s
sense of self that is “incapable of being put into words” (Spence, 1984, p. 80) and whose
meaning can vary from person to person.
Although identification with a gender category is frequently operationalized as a
categorical variable (with individuals identifying as either female or male or nonbinary, etc.), in
this dissertation I operationalize it as a continuous variable representing the degree of one’s
internal identification with a gender category. This operationalization allows for
differentiation among individuals with a shared gender self-categorization (Tate, 2014), as
well as potential contextual malleability—or, in this dissertation, the ability to shift in
response to feedback about one’s gender stereotypicality. This operationalization is also
consistent with research that assesses gender identity using an implicit association task
(Ashmore et al., 2004; Olson et al., 2015). I similarly operationalize identification with
femininity and masculinity as continuous variables (Wood & Eagly, 2009).

4

When assessing participants’ gender category membership at the beginning of the empirical
studies, however, I ask them to report their “gender identity” as female, male, nonbinary, or
“other,” in line with a basic self-categorization approach to measuring gender identity.
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The two dimensions of gender identity described above may, in fact, be redundant
with one another in cisgender individuals (that is, individuals who identify with the sex
assigned to them at birth). It may also be the case that when asked about their internal sense
of femaleness, maleness, femininity, and masculinity, cisgender women and men understand
the former two terms as referring to their fundamental self-concept and the latter two as
referring to their adherence to gender stereotypes. However, cisgender individuals’
interpretation of these terms—and the extent to which they overlap—likely vary from
person to person. Thus, when assessing gender identity, I ask participants to report on both
their internal femaleness (or maleness) and their internal femininity and masculinity.
Furthermore, I intentionally avoid defining female, male, femininity, and masculinity for
participants and remain agnostic as to their interpretations of these terms. This approach is
consistent with theorizing that understands gender identity to represent “a sense of belonging
to an abstract category of persons in the world irrespective of social similarities to them that
is likely difficult to articulate” (Tate et al., 2014).
Gender Identity and Physical Appearance
Although physical appearance is a key component of gender stereotypes (Deaux &
Lewis, 1984) and femininity in particular (Parker et al., 2017; Spence & Sawin, 1985), its
relevance to gender identity is less clear—and thus explored in Chapter 2. In their study that
demonstrated that physical attributes are central to descriptive gender stereotypes—and
femininity in particular—Spence and Sawin (1985) found that such attributes are actually not
particularly central to gender identities. In this study, participants were asked, “When you
think in terms of being a woman (man) and your own femininity (masculinity), what defines
your womanhood (manhood) as far as your own self-image is concerned?” The plurality of
male participants (26%) spontaneously mentioned their role as a provider, whereas only 5%
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spontaneously mentioned physical attributes. A near majority of female participants (46.5%)
spontaneously mentioned their role as a wife or mother, whereas only 8% spontaneously
mentioned physical attributes. However, the participants in this study were members of
married couples with young children and therefore might have been more focused on family
roles than the average woman or man would have been. Similarly, in their study of the
relationship between participants’ physical attributes, as coded by an outside observer, and
gender identity, Aube and colleagues’ (1995) found that gender identity was not associated
with physical femininity among women. It was, however, associated with physical masculinity
among men, such that those who identified as more masculine were also rated as more
physically masculine (according to physical gender stereotypes). Together, the results from
these two studies suggest that physical appearance may be more central to stereotypes about
women than women’s gender identities.
Not all studies, however, have suggested that this discrepancy exists. Twenge (1999)
asked women and men to self-report on their personality traits, occupational interests,
interest in sports, femininity of physical appearance, number of friends of each gender,
number of sex partners, attitudes towards women and feminism, and finally, femininity and
masculinity (each measured using a single item). They found that among women, the
measure most closely related to global femininity, other than global masculinity (which was
negatively correlated with femininity), was “feminine-valued appearance behaviors,” which
consisted of “spending time on appearance, wearing perfume or cologne, having long hair,
owning a large number of shoes, wearing jewelry, and wearing earrings in both ears.”
If physical appearances are central to women’s gender identities, as Twenge’s (1999)
work suggests, information suggesting that a woman is not physically feminine might
influence her overall sense of self. If, on the other hand, physical appearances are central to
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gender stereotypicality—especially femininity—but not women’s gender identities, as Spence
and Sawin’s (1985) and Aube and colleagues’ (1995) work suggests, women might experience
information suggesting that they are not physically feminine as discordant with their internal
sense of self—particularly if they identify as highly globally feminine. In other words, women
might experience physical gender stereotypicality threats as a form of identity invalidation.
This possibility, and these key constructs, are discussed in more depth in the following
section.
Gender Stereotypicality Threats and Identity Invalidation
Chapter 2 of this dissertation examines the consequences of gender stereotypicality
threats for women. Here, I describe how this research fills gaps in the literature on both the
negative consequences of gender stereotypes for women and the psychological effects of
gender stereotypicality threats.
How Gender Stereotypes Harm Women
Gender stereotypes can harm women through their effects on both others’
impressions of women and women’s impressions of themselves. They can also be harmful
both when women are thought to possess stereotypical characteristics (and/or lack counterstereotypical characteristics) and when they are thought to lack stereotypical characteristics
(and/or possess counter-stereotypical characteristics). In other words, the types of situations
in which gender stereotypes harm women can be divided into four categories (see Table 1.1):
(a) situations in which others believe a woman possesses stereotypical characteristics
(and/or lacks counter-stereotypical characteristics);
(b) situations in which others believe a woman lacks stereotypical characteristics
(and/or possesses counter-stereotypical characteristics);
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(c) situations in which a woman believes she possesses stereotypical characteristics
(and/or lacks counter-stereotypical characteristics); and
(d) situations in which a woman believes she lacks stereotypical characteristics
(and/or possesses counter-stereotypical characteristics).
Whereas situations (a) and (c) result from descriptive stereotypes (which inform perceptions
of women), situations (b) and (d) result from prescriptive stereotypes (which inform
evaluations of women).
Table 1.1
Situations in which stereotypes harm women
Stereotype-congruent
impressions

Stereotype-incongruent
impressions

External (Others’
impressions of women)

(a) Lack of fit / role
incongruity (Eagly & Karau,
2002; Heilman, 1983)

(b) Backlash (Eagly & Karau,
2002; Rudman & Glick, 2001)

Internal (Women’s
impressions of themselves)

(c) Stereotype threat (Spencer
et al., 1999)

(d) Femininity threat
(Dissertation)

A great deal of research has examined the first three types of situations. When
women are assumed to possess stereotypical characteristics and/or lack counter-stereotypical
characteristics—particularly in the workplace—they are often seen as “lacking fit” with the
positions they seek and therefore denied career advancement opportunities (Eagly & Karau,
2002; Heilman, 1983). When women are thought to lack stereotypical characteristics and/or
possess counter-stereotypical characteristics, they often experience backlash, which similarly
limits the likelihood that they will be hired or promoted (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Rudman &
Glick, 2001). Finally, when women attempt to perform well in a domain in which they are
stereotyped as untalented (e.g., math), they often experience stereotype threat—or a concern
that they will confirm this negative stereotype, which can lead to underperformance (Spencer
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et al., 1999). Minimal research, however, has examined the final category: situations in which
women believe they lack stereotypical characteristics and/or possess counter-stereotypical
characteristics. Chapter 2 of this dissertation begins to fill this gap in the literature by
examining women’s psychological responses to this type of situation.
Gender Stereotypicality Threats
Situations that suggest that a person does not possess characteristics that are
expected of members of their gender group and instead possesses characteristics that are
expected of members of the other primary gender group have been referred to as gender
identity threats5(Sinclair & Carlsson, 2013; Willer et al., 2013), gender role threats (Bosson et al.,
2009), and [gender] prototypicality threats (Alonso, 2018; Maass et al., 2003; Schmitt &
Branscombe, 2001). In this dissertation, however, I refer to them as gender stereotypicality
threats. I opt not to use the term gender identity threats in the context of my research because, as
discussed later in this section, a threat to one’s gender stereotypicality may—but does not
necessarily—serve as a threat to one’s gender identity. And indeed, determining whether
gender stereotypicality threats affect identity is one aim of this dissertation. Additionally, I
opt not to use the term gender role threats because, as discussed earlier, physical appearances
may or may not constitute an element of gender roles and certainly do not constitute the
entirety of these roles. Finally, I opt not to use the term [gender] prototypicality threats because in

5

Note that the term threat has at times been used to refer to the stress, anxiety, fear, and/or
discomfort that may result from particular situations, in which case these situations may be
referred to as threat inductions, rather than as threats (Branscombe et al., 1999). The term has
also been used to refer to situations with which people do not believe they have the
necessary resources to cope (Mendes et al., 2002). Here, however, I use it simply to refer to
situations that may produce stress, anxiety, fear, and/or discomfort and with which people
may or may not believe they have the necessary resources to cope.
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these studies, all participants receive feedback indicating that they are atypical—but that they
are atypical in either a stereotypical or counter-stereotypical direction.
There is no perfect term to describe these sorts of threats. In most studies that
explore this phenomenon, participants are informed that there is some dimension on which
women and men differ. They are then told that their score on an assessment of that
dimension is either more gender-congruent (in the affirmation condition) or less gendercongruent (in the threat condition) than the average person in their gender group. In other
words, in the affirmation condition, they are told that they are more different from gender
outgroup members than most gender ingroup members are. In the threat condition, they are
told that they are more similar to gender outgroup members than most gender ingroup
members are. (See Figures 1.1 and 1.2 for examples from the studies reported in this
dissertation.)
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Figure 1.1. Example of affirming feedback
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Figure 1.2. Example of threatening feedback
Because descriptive gender stereotypes represent beliefs about what women and men are
like—and how they differ, situations indicating that a person is lower than the average
gender ingroup member on a dimension that ingroup members are typically higher than
outgroup members on can be understood as a threat to that person’s gender stereotypicality.
(And situations indicating that a person is higher than the average gender ingroup member
on a dimension that ingroup members are typically higher than outgroup members on can be
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understood as an affirmation of that person’s gender stereotypicality.) Accordingly,
throughout this dissertation, I refer to these situations as gender stereotypicality threats—or, more
simply, as femininity threats for women and masculinity threats for men.6
Beyond Masculinity Threats
In addition to filling a gap in the literature on how gender stereotypes hurt women,
this dissertation also challenges prevailing understandings of whom gender stereotypicality
threats harm. Over the past fifteen years, research on masculinity threat has abounded. An
APA PsycINFO search for “masculinity threat” in peer-reviewed journal articles published
through 2020 produces 155 results, all but one of which (Babl, 1979) were published after
2006. A search for “femininity threat,” on the other hand, produces a mere 2 results
(Gordon & Glass, 1970; António et al., 2017). Similarly, Google Scholar searches, which
include publications outside the field of psychology, produce 750 results for “masculinity
threat” and only 21 for “femininity threat.” Clearly, whereas men’s responses to gender
stereotypicality threats has become a topic of great interest, women’s responses to such
threats have been all but ignored.

6

The concept of gender stereotypicality threat is closely related but not identical to the concept of
gender role stress. Gender role stress refers to the stress experienced in situations that are thought
to be more stressful for one gender group than another (Eisler & Skidmore, 1987; Gillespie
& Eisler, 1992)—or, in other words, to the stress associated with being a member of a
particular gender group. Although gender stereotypicality threats can trigger gender role stress (e.g.,
being told that one is “sweet” might be more stressful for men than women), so too can
other situations (such as expressing vulnerable emotions, which might be more stressful for
men than for women, or thinking that one is being followed, which might be more stressful
for women than for men; Eisler & Skidmore, 1987; Gillespie & Eisler, 1992). Additionally,
although gender stereotypicality threats can produce stress, they do not necessarily produce
stress. Finally, the term gender role stress tends to refer to one’s experiences across a variety of
situations, rather than one’s response to a specific situation. Therefore, throughout the
remainder of this dissertation I focus on gender stereotypicality threats and the psychological
consequences thereof, rather than on gender role stress more broadly.
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Fully explaining this asymmetry would require a deep dive into the history of the
psychology of gender, which is outside the scope of this dissertation. Here, however, I
provide a very brief overview of this history to situate this dissertation within the overall
trajectory of research on gender stereotypicality threats.
Research and theorizing on the psychology of women emerged in the 1970s in
response to concerns about androcentrism and other gender biases that had plagued the field
of psychology since its inception (Deaux, 1985; Eagly et al., 2012). Marking the psychology
of women as just that—the psychology of women, however, has the potential to reinforce the
androcentric understanding of men as normative, neutral, and generic and women as
marked, gendered, and other (Bailey et al., 2019; Parlee, 1975). In the following decades,
researchers therefore increasingly recognized the importance of studying men as men—as
gendered, rather than neutral, people (Cochran, 2010; Peretz, 2016).
The psychological study of men and masculinity was firmly established in the 90s,
when the first issues of Journal of Men’s Studies, Masculinities (which became Men and
Masculinities), and Psychology of Men & Masculinity (which became Psychology of Men &
Masculinities) were published and when the American Psychological Association’s Society for
the Psychological Study of Men and Masculinity (Division 51) was founded (Cochran, 2010).
This solidification of men as men as a discrete and important object of psychological inquiry
largely coincided with a broader shift in the social sciences and humanities from “women’s
studies” to “gender studies” (or “women’s and gender studies;” Richardson & Robinson,
1994).
Research on the psychology of men and masculinity has continued to grow since the
90s, and an APA PsycINFO search for “masculinity” as a key concept in peer-reviewed
journals reveals that it is currently in its heyday. This search produces 63 results for all years
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through 1960, 233 for 1961-1980, 557 for 1981-2000, and 4147 for 2001-2020 (compared to
55, 257, 507, and 1333, respectively, for “femininity”). Given this trend in the field, it is not
surprising that research on gender stereotypicality threats has focused primarily on threats to
men’s masculinity, rather than threats to women’s femininity. This asymmetry was also likely
reinforced by the 2008 finding that men, but not women, experience anxiety in response to
threats to their gender stereotypicality (Vandello et al., 2008). The heightened attention to
the psychology of men and masculinity, however, may have come at a cost.
Shining a light on the experiences of dominant group members (in this case, men) as
dominant group members—and thus eliminating the practice of considering dominant group
members to be neutral—is a critical element of any effort to make psychology more
equitable and comprehensive. Investigating the experiences of subordinated group members
(in this case, women), however, also remains vital. In other words, fully understanding the
psychology of gender requires research focused on the experiences of men, as well as
research focused on the experiences of women. And fully understanding the psychology of
gender stereotypicality threats requires research on masculinity threats, as well as research on
femininity threats. The large majority of research on this phenomenon, however, has
focused on the former. Chapter 2 of this dissertation begins to remedy the asymmetry in the
literature on gender stereotypicality threats by focusing specifically on women’s responses to
femininity threats.
Chapter 2 also examines mechanisms by which gender stereotypicality threats might
produce negative psychological consequences. Understanding these mechanisms is critical to
truly understanding the effects of gender stereotypicality threats on both women and men.
Specifically, in the final study of Chapter 2, I test whether women and men interpret threats
to their gender stereotypicality as threats to their gender identity—that is, as identity
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invalidation—and whether this sense of identity invalidation can help to explain the broader
effects of these threats. In other words, I test whether gender stereotypicality threats indeed
feel like gender identity threats when gender identity is understood as one’s internal sense of
femaleness/maleness, femininity, and masculinity.
Identity Invalidation
Identity invalidation refers to the rejection, denial, or lack of recognition of one’s
internal sense of self or one’s membership in a social group of which one considers oneself a
part (Campbell & Troyer, 2007; Cheryan & Monin, 2005; Franco & O’Brien, 2018).
Although the term identity denial is more common in the literature, I use invalidation to
encompass both identity denial (e.g., “You are not a woman;” Albuja, Sanchez et al., 2019)
and more subtle forms of invalidation, such as identity questioning (e.g., “Are you sure you’re a
woman?”; Albuja, Sanchez et al., 2019). Identity invalidation can have negative psychological
consequences (Cheryan & Monin, 2005), especially when the invalidated identity is central to
one’s overall sense of self (Bosson et al., 2012; McLemore, 2018; Prewitt-Freilino et al.,
2012). For example, American Indian adults who outsiders perceive as belonging to another
race (not American Indian) experience higher rates of depression and suicidality than those
who are recognized as American Indian (Campbell & Troyer, 2007). Multiracial individuals
who are forced to indicate a single racial identity on a demographic form show lower selfesteem than those who are allowed to select multiple racial identities (Townsend et al., 2009).
Biracial (White and another race) individuals report stress after their White identity is denied
(Albuja, Gaither, et al., 2019). And bicultural (Asian American) individuals whose American
identity is denied experience heightened levels of stress, as indicated by both self-report and
cortisol reactivity (Albuja, Gaither, et al., 2019).
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Identity invalidation is a form of social identity threat, a relatively broad construct that
refers to any situation that puts one’s social identity (e.g., gender, race, religious group, etc.)
in jeopardy (Reese et al., 2014) and that includes categorization threats (when one wants to be
thought of as individual but is instead thought of in terms of one’s group membership),
distinctiveness threats (when one believes another group is “too” similar to one’s ingroup),
threats to the value of social identity (when one’s ingroup is disparaged), and acceptance threats (when
one is thought not to be a member of one’s ingroup) (Branscombe et al., 1999). Notably, in
some instances of acceptance threat, an individual’s group membership is not denied outright;
rather, that individual may simply be thought of as an atypical group member (Branscombe
et al., 1999). Although acceptance threat was originally conceptualized as an intragroup
phenomenon (perpetrated by ingroup members), both ingroup and outgroup members can
threaten one’s group membership. Additionally, although identity invalidation has previously
been classified as a form of categorization threat (Townsend et al., 2009), it does not typically
involve thinking of a person as a group member, rather than an individual. Rather, it
involves not thinking of a person as a member—or a typical member—of a particular group.
I therefore assert that identity invalidation falls into the category of acceptance threat (Scaptura &
Boyle, 2020)—regardless of whether the perpetrator is an ingroup or outgroup member.
As mentioned earlier, although little work on femininity threats exists, research that
has looked at such threats—and that has compared them to masculinity threats—suggests
that gender stereotypicality threats are more consequential (i.e., psychologically distressing)
for men than women. Although both women and men experience fear of backlash
(repercussions for nonconformity to gender stereotypes) and reduced self-esteem in
response to psychological gender stereotypicality threats, these effects are stronger and more
consistent for men than women (Rudman et al., 2007; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004).
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Additionally, men, but not women, experience anxiety in response to psychological gender
stereotypicality threats (Vandello et al., 2008)—a disparity that has been attributed to a
concept called precarious manhood (Vandello & Bosson, 2013). According to the theory of
precarious manhood, manhood is a social status that must constantly be striven for, achieved,
and maintained through actions, whereas womanhood is a physical status that once obtained,
is permanent (Weaver et al., 2010).
However, women not being as negatively affected as men are by psychological
gender stereotypicality threats does not necessarily mean that women are not as negatively
affected as men are by all types of gender stereotypicality threats. Rather, as tested in Chapter
2, women and men might simply experience anxiety in response to gender stereotypicality
threats in distinct domains. If when it comes to other people, but not oneself (as discussed
earlier), femininity is defined largely in terms of physical appearance and masculinity largely
in terms of behaviors and social roles, then one would expect women to experience threats
to their physical femininity as threats to their identity and men to experience threats to their
psychological masculinity as threats to their identity. In other words, if physical femininity is
a core component of judgments of women’s overall femininity, as the evidence suggests,
then if a woman identifies as feminine but does not have a feminine physical appearance, there
will likely be a discrepancy between how feminine she is evaluated as and how feminine she
feels. Similarly, if psychological masculinity is a core component of judgments of men’s
overall masculinity, then if a man identifies as masculine but does not have a masculine
personality, there will likely be a discrepancy between how masculine he is evaluated as and
how masculine he feels. Given the research on consequences of identity invalidation (Albuja,
Gaither, et al., 2019), these discrepancies will likely produce anxiety and reduced self-esteem.
The final study in Chapter 2 of this dissertation investigates this prediction by examining
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whether physical, but not psychological, gender stereotypicality threats produce a feeling of
identity invalidation and therefore increased anxiety and reduced self-esteem in women
whereas psychological, but not physical, gender stereotypicality threats produce a sense of
identity invalidation and therefore increased anxiety and reduced self-esteem in men.
Summary
In this chapter, I have laid the groundwork for my dissertation research on women’s
responses to physical femininity threats by clarifying key terms and mapping out the
landscape of existing research on gender stereotypes, gender identity, identity invalidation,
and physical appearance. Further, I have suggested that research on gender stereotypicality
threats should broaden its scope to include threats to women’s physical gender stereotypicality
and deepen its contribution by examining the mechanisms by which these threats may
produce psychological distress.
The majority of literature on gender stereotypes has focused on personality traits,
social roles, and occupations and has revealed that within these domains, masculinity is
prescribed (and femininity proscribed) for men and boys to a greater extent than femininity
is prescribed (and masculinity proscribed) for women and girls. Accordingly, when men—
but not women—receive feedback that they are counter-stereotypical, they experience stress
and anxiety.
In this chapter, I have suggested that consideration of an often-neglected domain of
gender stereotypes—physical appearance—could lead to a re-evaluation of this discrepancy
between women and men. Physical appearances, I have suggested, are more central to lay
conceptions of women’s femininity than men’s masculinity. Furthermore, women are
expected to appear and are valued for appearing physically feminine. Accordingly, women
may become distressed when their physical—but not their psychological—femininity has
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been threatened. I have also suggested that women and men alike may experience identity
invalidation when their gender stereotypicality has been threatened and that this felt
discrepancy between internal identity and external feedback may help to explain experiences
of increased anxiety and reduced self-esteem in the wake of such threats.
Overview of Dissertation
In this dissertation, I present four experimental studies. The goal of these studies,
presented in Chapter 2, was to: (a) examine women’s psychological responses to physical
femininity threats; (b) determine whether women and men experience psychological distress
in response to threats to their gender stereotypicality within distinct—or overlapping—
domains; and (c) determine whether felt identity invalidation can help to explain why threats
to gender stereotypicality cause psychological distress in the form of increased anxiety and
reduced self-esteem.
Across these four studies, I found that: (a) women experience increased anxiety and
reduced self-esteem in response to threats to their physical femininity, as compared to
affirmations of their physical femininity; (b) whereas men experience anxiety in response to
masculinity threats, compared to affirmations, across the domains of physical appearance
and personality, women only experience anxiety in response to femininity threats, compared
to affirmations, within the domain of physical appearance; and (c) felt identity invalidation—
in the form of a discrepancy between an external evaluation of one’s gender stereotypicality
and one’s internal identity—mediates the observed relationships between gender
stereotypicality feedback and both anxiety and self-esteem.
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, I explore the theoretical and practical implications
of this work and highlight key directions for future research. Overall, this dissertation
highlights the importance of centering the experiences of women in psychological research.
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Women may not experience distress in response to the exact same types of gender
stereotypicality threats that men do; this does not mean, however, that they do not
experience distress in response to any types of gender stereotypicality threats. Additionally,
this work highlights the need for more research on the content and consequences of gender
stereotypes within a frequently neglected domain: physical appearance. Finally, these studies
indicate that psychological research on gender and physical appearance ought to move
beyond its traditional focus on attractiveness and examine other facets of appearance,
including gender stereotypicality, that may be highly consequential for both women’s and
men’s psychological well-being.
Table 1.2
Key Terms
feminine (as used when
discussing gender
stereotypes)

descriptively or prescriptively stereotypical of women
and/or girls

femininity (as used when
discussing gender
stereotypes)

Possession of an individual characteristic or set of
characteristics that are descriptively or prescriptively
stereotypical of women and/or girls

gender identity

“the quality and strength of the cognitive
connections...that a person makes between the self and a
gender category” (Tobin et al., 2010); as used here, a twodimensional construct consisting of: (a) one’s internal
sense of one’s femaleness and maleness; and (b) one’s
internal sense of one’s femininity and masculinity.

gender prototype

a mental representation of a highly typical or
representative instance of a gender category (Brewer et
al., 1981; Helgeson, 1994; Smith & Zarate, 1990)

gender norms

prescriptive (and potentially descriptive) beliefs about
women, men, girls, and boys; can be used to refer
specifically to beliefs about behaviors

gender role stress

the stress experienced in situations that are thought to be
more stressful for one gender group than another (Eisler
& Skidmore, 1987; Gillespie & Eisler, 1992)—or, in other
words, to the stress associated with being a member of a
particular gender group
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gender stereotypes

“consensual beliefs about the differing characteristics of
men and women in our society” (Rosenkrantz et al.,
1968, p. 287)

gender stereotypicality threats

situations that suggest that a person is counterstereotypical—that is, non-adherent to descriptive and/or
injunctive beliefs about their gender group and instead
adherent to descriptive and/or injunctive beliefs about
the other primary gender group; sometimes referred to as
gender identity threats (Sinclair & Carlsson, 2013; Willer et
al., 2013) or gender role threats (Bosson et al., 2009)

identity invalidation

the rejection, denial, or lack of recognition of one’s
internal sense of self or one’s membership in a social
group of which one considers oneself a part (Campbell &
Troyer, 2007; Cheryan & Monin, 2005; Franco &
O’Brien, 2018); also known as identity denial

masculine (as used when
discussing gender
stereotypes)

descriptively or prescriptively stereotypical of men
and/or boys

masculinity (as used when
discussing gender
stereotypes)

Possession of an individual characteristic or set of
characteristics that are descriptively or prescriptively
stereotypical of men and/or boys

precarious manhood

manhood as a social status that must constantly be
striven for, achieved, and maintained through actions
(Vandello & Bosson, 2013; Weaver et al., 2010)

sex (or gender) role

the collection of stereotypes associated with one gender
or the other (Eagly & Karau, 2002)

sex-typed

(a) possessing characteristics that are prescriptively
stereotypical of one’s gender group and not possessing
characteristics that are prescriptively stereotypical of the
other primary gender group (Bem, 1974; Spence &
Helmreich, 1980); (b) aligned with a particular gender
identity (Bailey & Zucker, 1995); or (c) normative or
expected of or associated with one gender or the other
(Wood et al., 1997)

social identity threat

a relatively broad construct that refers to any situation
that puts one’s social identity (e.g., gender, race, religious
group, etc.) in jeopardy (Reese et al., 2014) and that
includes categorization threats (when one wants to be
thought of as individual but is instead thought of in terms
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of one’s group membership), distinctiveness threat (when
one believes another group is “too” similar to one’s
ingroup), threats to the value of social identity (when one’s
ingroup is disparaged), and acceptance threats (when one is
not thought to be a member of one’s ingroup, likely
because they are a non-prototypical member)
(Branscombe et al., 1999)
social norms

“rules and standards that are understood by members of
a group, and that guide and/or constrain social behavior
without the force of laws” (Cialdini & Trost, 1998, p.
152)

social roles

“set[s] of expectations oriented toward people who
occupy a certain ‘position’ in a social system or group”
(Gouldner, 1957, p. 282)

stereotype

a generalized belief about a group of people (Ashmore &
Del Boca, 1979, 1981)
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Chapter 2: Women’s Psychological Responses to Physical Femininity Threats:
Increased Anxiety, Reduced Self-Esteem

This chapter is adapted from a manuscript in preparation by Wittlin, N. M., LaFrance, M.,
Dovidio, J. F., & Richeson, J. A.
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Abstract
Across four experiments (N = 2494 after exclusions), the authors found that cisgender
women experience higher levels of anxiety (Studies 1a, 1c, and 2) and lower levels of selfesteem (Studies 1c and 2) in response to feedback indicating that their physical appearance is
less feminine than average (i.e., physical femininity threats) than feedback indicating that
their physical appearance is more feminine than average (i.e., physical femininity
affirmations). Feedback on the femininity of their personality had no effect on anxiety or
self-esteem (Study 2). Physical femininity feedback had an effect on anxiety and self-esteem
even when physical attractiveness was affirmed (in the case of anxiety; Study 1a) and even
when controlling for self-perceived physical attractiveness (in the case of both anxiety and
self-esteem; Studies 1a and 1c), indicating that the observed effects of physical femininity
feedback on anxiety and self-esteem were not simply a result of this feedback being
interpreted as physical attractiveness feedback. Cisgender men, unlike women, experienced
increased anxiety—but not reduced self-esteem—in response to threats to their masculinity
across the domains of physical appearance and personality, though this effect was stronger
within the domain of physical appearance (Study 2). A discrepancy between the results one
received and one’s beliefs about oneself mediated the effects of feedback on both anxiety
and self-esteem, in the case of women, and on anxiety, in the case of men (Study 2).
Together, these results highlight the need to center physical appearance in research on
gender stereotyping and its consequences.

Keywords: anxiety, femininity, invalidation, self-esteem, stereotypes
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“Look like a lady; act like a man; work like a dog.” This was the final message of a
1990 Fortune magazine piece on how gender discrimination has impeded women’s ascent up
the corporate ladder (Fierman, 1990). In recent decades, several books and articles have
advised women to engage in traditionally masculine behaviors if they want to succeed (e.g.,
Sandberg, 2013; Teague Moreno, 2019), and indeed, women are increasingly participating in
traditionally masculine activities (Haines et al., 2016), pursuing degrees in traditionally
masculine fields (Haines et al., 2016), and self-identifying with stereotypically masculine traits
(Donnelly & Twenge, 2017), which are generally highly valued and often considered sexually
attractive (Cejka & Eagly, 1999; Feinman, 1981; Rudman & Glick, 1999; Schudson et al.,
2018). Women are also decreasingly self-identifying with stereotypically feminine traits
(Donnelly & Twenge, 2017). Furthermore, there is some evidence that associations between
women and traditionally feminine personality traits weakened over the course of the 20th
century (Bhatia & Bhatia, 2020; but see Eagly et al., 2020). Perhaps as a consequence of the
high status of masculine personality traits and the increasing acceptance of these traits in
women, whereas men, on average, have been shown to experience anxiety in response to
threats to their psychological gender stereotypicality (i.e., information suggesting that
psychologically they are gender counter-stereotypical7), women, on average, have not

7

Throughout this manuscript, we use the term “counter-stereotypicality,” rather than “nonstereotypicality,” to refer to characteristics that sit in opposition to those that are expected of
members of a social group. A person can be “non-stereotypical” by virtue of lacking
characteristics that are expected of members of one’s social group or possessing
characteristics that sit in opposition to those that are expected of members of a social group.
“Counter-stereotypicality” refers solely to the latter. Within the context of gender, which is
generally viewed as highly bipolar (with femininity on one end and masculinity on the other;
Biernat, 1991), “counter-stereotypicality” refers to femininity in men and masculinity in
women. Precedent for drawing a distinction between “non-stereotypicality” and “counterstereotypicality” can be found in early gender research that distinguished between individuals
who were “cross-typed” (i.e., counter-stereotypical) and individuals who were
“undifferentiated” (i.e., non-stereotypical but not counter-stereotypical; Bem, 1981).
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(Vandello et al., 2008). Additionally, although both men and women experience reduced
explicit self-esteem and increased fear of backlash after succeeding on a cross-sex-typed test,
as compared to a sex-typed test, these effects have been stronger and more reliable for men
than they have been for women (Rudman et al., 2007; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004). The
objective of the current research was to examine women’s psychological responses to threats
to their gender stereotypicality within a novel domain—physical appearance—and, in doing
so, to interrogate the prevailing understanding of gender stereotypicality threats as primarily
affecting men, broaden the scope of inquiries into the consequences of gender stereotypes,
and shed light on a possible underexamined contributor to negative psychological outcomes
in women.
As the guidance in Fortune magazine suggests, even though behaving in a more
counter-stereotypical, masculine manner has become increasingly (albeit not yet completely)
normative for women, the same has not been true for physical counter-stereotypicality.
Historically, physical appearance has had a major influence on how women are judged
(Burton et al., 1995), and this standard remains prominent today (Fairygodboss; Girlguiding,
2013; Univia, 2019). The physical appearances of women in fields ranging from sports to
politics remain highly scrutinized, and women who have a more masculine physical
appearance are not only perceived as unattractive but are also criticized, mocked, and
censured because they are deemed inadequately physically feminine by virtue of their
muscularity, facial or body hair, or clothing (Chalabi, 2017; Clemente, 2016; Jespersen v.
Harrah's Operating Co., 2006; Kendall, 2015). Physical appearance constitutes an important
domain of gender stereotypes (i.e., of beliefs about what women and men are like and should
be like; Deaux & Lewis, 1984; Cejka & Eagly, 1999), and indeed, “males and females are
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viewed as more different on physical dimensions than they are on psychological dimensions”
(Deaux & Lewis, 1984, p. 1003).
Nonetheless, studies on responses to gender stereotypicality threats have primarily
threatened psychological gender stereotypicality. They have provided participants with false
feedback about their “gender identity” (defined to participants as their “psychological
masculinity or femininity;” J. Vandello, personal communication, January 24, 2017), “selfconcept” (Dahl et al., 2015), or simply their masculinity or femininity based on a “gender
knowledge test” (e.g., Dahl et al., 2015; Rudman et al., 2007; Vandello et al., 2008), “gender
identity survey” (the Bem Sex Role Inventory; Bem, 1974; Willer et al., 2013), personality test
(e.g., Hunt et al., 2016; Konopka et al., 2019; Parent et al., 2018), and/or inventory of
interests (Frederick et al., 2017) or consumer preferences (Cheryan et al., 2015). In these
studies, all participants typically receive feedback indicating they are somewhat atypical—that
is, different from the average person in their gender group—but whereas those in the threat
condition receive feedback indicating that they are counter-stereotypically atypical, those in the
affirmation condition receive feedback indicating that they are stereotypically atypical. In a few
other studies, participants have received false feedback about their physical gender
stereotypicality—for example, their strength and testosterone levels (Cheryan et al., 2015;
Kosakowska-Berezecka et al., 2016). To our knowledge, however, no studies to date have
provided participants with false feedback on the gender stereotypicality of their physical
appearances. Furthermore, the majority of these studies have focused exclusively on men’s
responses to masculinity threats (for some exceptions, see Rudman et al., 2007; Rudman &
Fairchild, 2004; Vandello et al., 2008) and not on women’s responses to femininity threats.
There are several reasons to believe that women would find threats to the femininity
of their physical appearances particularly anxiety-provoking. First, evidence suggests that
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physical appearance constitutes the domain of femininity that is most salient when people
consider whether a woman is feminine overall (Spence & Sawin, 1985; Aube et al., 1995; but
see Helgeson, 1994). Indeed, some theorists have asserted that physical appearance is not
merely an important component of the female gender role but indeed its very essence—with
society positioning women as objects to be seen and defining them by their “to-be-lookedat-ness” (Mulvey, 1999, p. 837; Fredrickson et al., 1998). Correspondingly, fears related to
physical appearance have been conceptualized as a key element of feminine gender role
stress (Gillespie & Eisler, 1992). Additionally, when women are asked to complete the openended sentence, “As a woman,” they mention physical appearances more than any other
aspect of their experiences (other than gender-based discrimination, which is mentioned at
comparable rates; Shea et al., 2014). And when people hear someone say that another person
is or is not a “real woman,” they tend to believe the speaker is referring to something about
that person’s physical appearance (J. Bosson, personal communication, February 9, 2021).
Furthermore, in visual sex categorization tasks, only highly feminized faces and bodies are
consistently categorized as female (e.g., Armann & Bülthoff, 2012; Davidenko, 2007;
Johnson et al., 2012), suggesting that women, more so than men, must be highly gender
stereotypical be categorized accurately. Finally, masculine-looking women, compared to
feminine-looking women, masculine-looking men, and feminine-looking men, are described
in overwhelmingly negative terms (Sutherland et al., 2015), suggesting that women must look
sufficiently feminine to be judged positively.
The pervasiveness of grooming among women—and the specific types of grooming
that women tend to engage in—provides evidence that women are, indeed, invested in
appearing physically feminine and therefore that threats to their physical femininity would
likely induce anxiety. Women’s grooming constitutes not only “beauty work” (Kwan &
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Trautner, 2009)—that is, labor intended to enhance physical attractiveness—but also
femininity work (Chrisler, 2013)— that is, labor intended to enhance physical femininity.
Facial characteristics that are more common in women than men—including high contrast
between features and skin, smooth skin, and a lack of facial hair (Rhodes, 2006; Russell,
2009)—are also generally considered attractive in women (Penton-Voak et al., 2004; Rhodes
et al., 2000). Thus, when women remove facial hair and apply lipstick and eye makeup, they
enhance their physical femininity. And indeed, the majority of women regularly use
cosmetics, skin care products, and hair styling products, and up to 96% engage in some form
of body hair removal (Harris Poll , 2014; Tiggemann & Hodgson, 2008; Toerien et al., 2005).
Given that physical appearances constitute a key facet of femininity and womanhood, that
having a highly feminine physical appearance is required for categorization as female, and
that women invest heavily in cosmetic application and hair removal, even though threats to
psychological femininity have not been shown to provoke anxiety in women, threats to
physical femininity might.
The goal of the current research was to determine whether women experience
greater anxiety in response to threats to the femininity of their physical appearances than
affirmations of the femininity of their physical appearances, as well as whether physical
femininity threats are particularly anxiety-inducing for women who consider their gender to
be a core part of their overall sense of self and women who do not believe they have control
over how feminine they look. We were also interested in whether women experience lower
self-esteem in response to threats to the femininity of their physical appearances than
affirmations of the femininity of their physical appearances. State anxiety and state selfesteem are moderately to highly negatively correlated (Besser et al., 2008; Heatherton &
Polivy, 1991), and the same situations can threaten both (Spielberger, 1972, p. 490). They are
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conceptually distinct, however, with the former representing an emotional response to a
stimulus and the latter representing an attitude toward the self (Beck et al., 2005, p. 9;
Rosenberg, 1962). A secondary goal of the current research was to determine whether
physical femininity threats are distinguishable from physical attractiveness threats—that is,
whether women find physical femininity threats anxiety-provoking even when their physical
attractiveness has been affirmed. A tertiary goal was to determine whether the sense that
one’s identity (as a woman, as female, as feminine, and/or overall) or sense of self is being
denied (Cheryan & Monin, 2005) could help to explain the predicted effect of physical
femininity threats on anxiety and potentially self-esteem among women. In other words, we
were interested in identity invalidation as a potential mechanism underlying the predicted
relationships between gender stereotypicality feedback and both anxiety and self-esteem. A
final goal was to examine whether men, too, experience anxiety in response to threats to the
masculinity of their appearances. By examining women’s responses to physical femininity
threats (and, in the final study, men’s responses to physical masculinity threats), we aimed to
shed light on potentially harmful consequences of gender stereotypes within the domain of
physical appearance.
The Current Research
Because past work has demonstrated that unlike men, women do not experience
anxiety in response to threats to their psychological gender stereotypicality (Vandello et al.,
2008) and because the general consensus within the field of psychology seems to be that
masculinity is prescribed for men to a greater extent than femininity is prescribed for women
(Sirin et al., 2004), the majority of research on gender stereotypicality threats has focused on
masculinity threats and on consequences of the pressure on men to eschew femininity and
embody ideals of traditional masculinity (e.g., Caswell et al., 2014; Himmelstein et al., 2018;
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Kramer et al., 2017). As a result, this body of research may have missed out on important
ways in which prescriptive gender stereotypes constrain and harm women. We cannot
assume that women do not experience anxiety in response to any sorts of gender
stereotypicality threats simply because they do not experience anxiety in response to the
sorts of threats that have produced anxiety in men. Such an assumption can lead us to
overlook unique elements of women’s experiences and to fail to consider the full range of
risks that prescriptive gender stereotypes may present. Determining whether women are
indeed vulnerable to psychological harm stemming from physical gender stereotypicality
threats can help to provide a more comprehensive understanding of both the content and
consequences of gender stereotypes.
The aim of the current set of studies was therefore to examine women’s
psychological responses to feedback indicating that they are—or are not—feminine in
physical appearance. We predicted that women who were told their physical appearance was
less feminine than the average female in their age group would experience more anxiety than
women who were told their physical appearance was more feminine than the average female
in their age group (i.e., also atypical, but in a stereotype-congruent way) (Studies 1a-c & 2),
regardless of whether or not they were told that their physical appearance was more
attractive than the average female in their age group (Studies 1a & 1b) and even when
accounting for self-perceived physical attractiveness (Studies 1a-c). We also predicted that,
consistent with past literature, women who were told their personality was less feminine than
the average female in their age group would not experience more anxiety than women who
were told their personality was more feminine than the average female in their age group but
that men who were told their personality was less masculine than the average male in their
age group would experience more anxiety than men who were told their personality was more
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masculine than the average male in their age group (Study 2). Finally, we anticipated that a
feeling of identity invalidation would help to explain the predicted effects of feedback about
one’s gender stereotypicality (i.e., femininity for women and masculinity for men) on anxiety
(Study 2). We also explored the effects of gender stereotypicality feedback on self-esteem
and several other relevant variables. We only pre-registered formal hypotheses for anxiety,
however, as our principal goal was to determine whether receiving information suggesting
that one is physically gender counter-stereotypical would produce anxiety in women, just as
receiving information suggesting that one is psychologically gender counter-stereotypical has
been shown to produce anxiety in men (Vandello et al., 2008).
Studies 1a, 1b, and 1c
The primary purpose of Studies 1a-c was to determine whether cisgender women
(i.e., women who were assigned to the female sex at birth) experience more anxiety in
response to feedback indicating that they are less physically feminine than average compared
with feedback indicating that they are more physically feminine than average. Study 1a tested
this question. Study 1b sought to assess the robustness of the effect observed in Study 1a
with a slightly different experimental set-up. Study 1c sought to reconcile the inconsistent
results of Studies 1a and 1b.
In all three studies, participants were told that their physical appearance would be
assessed by novel image analysis software. After uploading photographs of themselves, they
received feedback on their physical femininity. The feedback on their physical femininity was
threatening (i.e., indicated that they were less feminine than average), affirming (i.e., indicated
that they were more feminine than average), or, in Studies 1a and 1b, absent. Studies on
masculinity and femininity threat typically include only a threat and an affirmation condition.
However, in Studies 1a and 1b, we included a feedback absent condition, which served as a
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control group, to examine whether the predicted effect of physical femininity feedback on
anxiety was driven by participants whose femininity was threatened or those whose
femininity was affirmed.
Participants then reported their current levels of anxiety. We predicted that women
who were told that their physical appearance was less feminine than average (i.e., those
whose physical femininity was threatened) would experience higher levels of state anxiety
than those who were told their physical appearance was more feminine than average (i.e.,
those whose physical femininity was affirmed).
A secondary goal of these studies was to determine whether the predicted effect of
physical femininity feedback on state anxiety was the result of women interpreting threats to
their physical femininity as threats to their physical attractiveness. For women, physical
femininity is considered a key component of—and thus highly predictive of—physical
attractiveness (Penton-Voak et al., 2004; Rhodes et al., 2000), and physical attractiveness
constitutes a gender-intensified prescriptive stereotype for women—that is, a characteristic
that is valued in members of both major gender groups but in members of one gender group
in particular (Parker et al., 2017; Prentice & Carranza, 2002). Furthermore, the large majority
of women in the U.S., but only a minority of men, say they face intense pressure to appear
physically attractive (Parker et al., 2017). Thus, it is theoretically possible that women would
experience anxiety in response to feedback indicating that they are less physically feminine
than average because they would interpret this feedback as indicating that they are less
physically attractive than average and would find the latter anxiety-provoking. However, given
that in addition to attractiveness, gender conformity per se is heavily prescribed (e.g.,
Rudman, 1998) and gender nonconformity censured (Rudman et al., 2012), we did not
expect that to be the case. Rather, we expected physical femininity threats to be anxiety-
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provoking for women independent of any threats to attractiveness that they might be
thought to represent.
We addressed the possibility that physical femininity threats would be anxietyprovoking to women because they would be interpreted as physical attractiveness threats in
three ways. First, in Studies 1a and 1b, we manipulated physical attractiveness feedback, such
that participants were randomly assigned to receive affirming feedback or no feedback on
their physical attractiveness. We expected physical femininity threats in and of themselves to
be anxiety-inducing and therefore hypothesized that women would experience anxiety in
response to threats to their physical femininity even when their physical attractiveness was
affirmed. However, if physical femininity threats are anxiety-inducing because they represent
physical attractiveness threats, we would expect to see an interaction between physical
femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback, such that women would only
experience anxiety in response to physical femininity threats when their physical
attractiveness was not affirmed. Second, in all three studies, we examined whether physical
femininity feedback had an effect on self-perceived physical attractiveness. Third, in all three
studies we controlled for participants’ self-perceived physical attractiveness.
We also sought to explore the possibility that cisgender women would experience
not only anxiety but also reduced self-esteem in response to threats to their physical
femininity, as compared to affirmations of their physical femininity. In past research, men
have experienced lower levels of explicit self-esteem after succeeding in a gender counterstereotypical, as compared to a gender stereotypical, domain (Rudman et al., 2007).
Additionally, threats to physical femininity could be interpreted as threats to identity —that is,
not solely as information that one is not feminine in a very particular way (in terms of their
looks) but that they are not feminine or even female on the inside, at their core. And past
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work has suggested that identity invalidation (i.e., rejection of one’s membership in a group
of which one considers oneself a part; Cheryan & Monin, 2005) may produce reductions in
self-esteem (Garr-Schultz & Gardner, 2019; Townsend et al., 2009). Thus, we examined
whether women who were told that their physical appearance was less feminine than average
would experience lower levels of state self-esteem than women who were told their physical
appearance was more feminine than average. We considered this aim exploratory, as we had
a stronger theoretical rationale for predicting that physical femininity threats would produce
anxiety than that they would reduce self-esteem but were interested in exploring both
potential outcomes.
Finally, we were interested in potential moderators of the predicted effect of physical
femininity feedback on state anxiety, as well as additional psychological outcomes, beyond
anxiety and self-esteem, that threats to physical femininity might produce. In Study 1a, we
considered the possibility that threats to physical femininity would be more anxietyprovoking for women who consider their gender to be a key facet of their overall sense of
self than those who do not and less anxiety-provoking for women who believe their
femininity is controllable than those who do not. In other words, we examined whether
gender identity centrality (Rogers et al., 2015) and perceived controllability of femininity
moderated the predicted effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety. In Study 1c,
we considered the possibility that to cope with threats to their femininity, women who
received feedback indicating that they were less physically feminine than average would: (a)
make more external, situational attributions for their results than women who received
feedback indicating that they were more physically feminine than average (Blaine & Crocker,
1993; Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Kinderman & Bentall, 2000); (b) downplay the
importance of their results (Frey & Stahlberg, 1986; Kashima & Triandis, 1986); and (c)
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downplay the centrality of femininity to their overall sense of self (Aronson et al., 1995; Frey
& Stahlberg, 1986).
Study 1a
The purpose of Study 1a was to establish the basic predicted phenomenon that
cisgender women would experience higher levels of state anxiety in response to threats to
their physical femininity than affirmations of their physical femininity.
Method
Participants and Design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six
conditions in a 3 (physical femininity feedback: affirmation, control, threat) x 2 (physical
attractiveness feedback: affirmation, control) design. Participants were recruited through
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and paid $1.00 for their participation.
Because we had no specific predictions about effect size, we powered this study to
detect an effect of f = 0.2, which is the average effect size for social psychology studies
(Richard et al., 2003). An a priori power analysis (G*Power 3.1; Faul et al., 2007) indicated
that to detect an interaction between physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness
feedback with 80% power and α of .05, a sample of 244 participants would be needed. Based
on previous studies with MTurk samples, we estimated that 15% of participants would fail
the attention checks and thus recruited 287 participants. An additional nine participants
ended up completing the study for a total sample size of 296.
Eighty participants were excluded because they did not identify as a cisgender female
(n=12)8, did not upload a valid photograph (i.e., did not upload a photograph or uploaded a

8

In all studies, participants were asked to report the sex they were assigned at birth, on their
original birth certificate, and their gender identity. We chose to exclude transgender
individuals from these studies primarily for ethical reasons. As with all studies that involve
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photograph without any woman or with more than one woman in it; n=7), failed one or
more attention checks (which required them to accurately recall whether their results
indicated that their physical appearance was [a] more or less feminine than the average
female in their age group—or whether they did not receive feedback on the femininity of
their physical appearance and [b] more or less attractive than the average female in their age
group—or whether they did not receive feedback on their attractiveness; n=61), and/or
indicated that they intended some of their responses as jokes (n=4). Thus, we were left with
a sample size of 216 (Mage = 37.13, SD = 11.96; 86.11% heterosexual; 81.02% White; 6.94%
Black; 2.31% Hispanic or Latina; 1.39% East Asian; 0.46% Native Hawaiian or Pacific
Islander; 7.88% other or multiracial/ethnic). Because the final sample size was smaller than
intended, we conducted a sensitivity power analysis (G*Power 3.1; Faul et al., 2007), which

deception and potentially upsetting feedback, we conducted a cost-benefit analysis to
determine whether the knowledge gained from these studies would outweigh any potential
harms to participants. In the case of transgender individuals, for whom experiences with
identity denial (in the form of misgendering) are relatively common and often detrimental to
psychological wellbeing (McLemore, 2018), we determined that it would not. Furthermore,
transgender women’s desire to possess a feminine physical appearance, though not universal
(Nieder et al. 2019; Spade, 2003), has already been documented (Anderson et al., 2020;
Sevelius, 2013). Many transgender women undergo medical procedures, including some that
are costly and/or risky, to increase the femininity of their appearance, including their body
shape, facial structure, and amount of facial and body hair (Grant et al., 2011; Kelly et al.,
2020; Plemons, 2017; White Hughto et al., 2015). And transgender women report that these
procedures increase the alignment between their external appearance and internal sense of
self (Dubov & Fraenkel, 2018; Owen-Smith et al., 2018). Thus, we did not believe including
transgender women in this sample could be justified. Further, at a practical level, the sorts of
femininity threats that transgender women tend to experience are often different not only in
degree but also in kind from the sorts of femininity threats that cisgender women tend to
experience. Threats to cisgender women’s femininity generally take the form of
stereotypicality or prototypicality threats; they indicate that a woman is not “woman-like” in
the way most women are or in the way women ought to be. Threats to transgender women’s
femininity, on the other hand, often suggest that a woman is not only insufficiently “womanlike” but also that in a very literal sense, she is not a woman. Thus, our interest in
stereotypicality threats, rather than true denial of category membership, also informed our
decision to focus on cisgender individuals in the current studies. All transgender individuals
who enrolled in these studies were paid for their time.
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indicated that we were powered to detect an effect of f = 0.21 (with 80% power and α =
.05).
Procedure. After reading the consent form, answering a series of question to
confirm that they had carefully read the form, and agreeing to participate, participants were
instructed to upload a photograph of themselves. They were told that the photograph would
be analyzed by software that they would be given more information about later on.
Specifically, they were instructed to upload a color photograph of their face in which they
were directly facing the camera and had a neutral facial expression and both eyes open. They
were then instructed to center the photograph. After uploading the photograph, participants
were told that their photograph was being analyzed.
Participants were then presented with information about a fictitious “data consulting
and software development firm” that was partnering with researchers in the departments of
psychology and computer science to beta-test a new image analysis software. They were told
that the software uses a neural network to assess the masculinity/femininity and
attractiveness of one’s facial appearance, compared to the appearances of others in one’s
gender and age group. To maximize consistency in participants’ understandings of femininity
and masculinity, we provided them with lists of the facial features that allegedly play the
greatest role in determining the perceived masculinity/femininity of one’s appearance. These
features (masculine: coarse skin texture, pronounced jawline, pronounced cheekbones,
pronounced brow ridges, thin lips, small eyes, facial hair; feminine: smooth skin texture, does
not have pronounced jawline, does not have pronounced cheekbones, does not have
pronounced brow ridges, thick lips, large eyes, does not have facial hair) were taken from
research on sex differences in facial appearances (Johnson et al., 2012; Rhodes, 2006).
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Participants were also provided with lists of the facial features that allegedly play the
greatest role in determining the perceived attractiveness of one’s appearance. These features
(facial symmetry, feature positioning and alignment, proportionality, ease of processing
[fluency]) were taken from research on physical attractiveness (Abu Arqoub & Al-Khateeb,
2011; Bashour, 2006; Fink et al., 2006; Johnston et al., 2005; Little et al., 2011; Trujillo et al.,
2014). Because we aimed to tease apart the effects of physical femininity feedback and
physical attractiveness feedback, we omitted physically feminine traits from the list of
physically attractive traits and instead focused on traits that are not overtly gendered.
Participants were then presented with the supposed results of the software’s analysis
of their photograph. At this point, they were randomly assigned to the physical femininity
affirmation condition (in which they were told their appearance was “more feminine than
73% of females in [their] age group”9), the physical femininity threat condition (in which
they were told their appearance was “less feminine than 73% of females in [their] age
group”), or the physical femininity control condition (in which they were told that an error
had occurred and their physical femininity could not be analyzed). Results were provided in
both written and graphic form, with participants’ level of femininity placed on a spectrum
that ranged from “masculine appearance” to “feminine appearance.” For participants in the
affirmation condition, the results indicated that their level of femininity was more feminine
than the “average female.” For participants in the threat condition, the results indicated that
their level of femininity was lower than the “average female” but higher than the “average

9

We used the terms “female” (and “male,” in Study 2) rather than “woman” (and “man”) in
our study materials to be inclusive of both participants who identified as “women” (and
“men”) and those who identified as “girls” (and “boys” or “guys”) (Chrisler, 2013).

59
male” (and closer to the “average male” than the “average female”). These results were
modified from those used by Vandello et al. (2008).
Participants were also randomly assigned to the physical attractiveness affirmation
condition (in which they were told their appearance was “more attractive than 85% of
females in [their] age group”) or the physical attractiveness control condition (in which they
were told that an error had occurred and their physical attractiveness could not be analyzed).
Again, results were provided in both written and graphic form, with participants’ level of
attractiveness placed on a spectrum that ranged from “unattractive appearance” to
“attractive appearance.”
After reviewing their results, participants were instructed to complete measures of
state anxiety, state self-esteem, self-perceived attractiveness, gender identity centrality, and
perceived controllability of femininity, as well as a manipulation check, all of which are
described in the Measures section in the order in which they were administered. Participants
also reported demographic information, completed an attention check, and indicated
whether they had intended any of their responses as jokes. Participants were also asked
whether they thought the results they had received were accurate and legitimate. We initially
included questions about accuracy and legitimacy so that we could exclude participants who
were suspicious of their results. However, we later realized that these were leading questions
and thus not a valid measure of suspicion. Thus, we did not use responses to these questions
as a basis for exclusion. We used more nuanced measures of suspicion in the following
studies. (Of the four studies presented in this manuscript, Study 1a was the only one that was
not preregistered.)
After responding to these questions, participants read a debriefing form and
answered a series of question to confirm that they had carefully read and understood the
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form. Finally, they completed a self-affirmation induction exercise (Cohen et al., 2006)
designed to help them psychologically recover from potential threats to their positive sense
of self.
Measures. For all studies, measures are described in the order in which they were
presented to participants. The primary dependent variable of interest was state anxiety. We
intended to measure global state-self-esteem as an exploratory dependent variable, but due
to a programming error, we were unable to do so. (We measured state self-esteem in Studies
1b,1c, and 2). Measures of gender identity centrality and perceived controllability of
femininity were included as exploratory moderators. A measure of self-perceived physical
femininity was included as a manipulation check, and a measure of self-perceived physical
attractiveness was included as both a manipulation check and a covariate. For correlations
among all measured variables, see Table 2.1.

.19**
.85***
.49***

-.25***
-.39***
-.35***

5. Perceived controllability of femininity

6. Self-perceived sexual attractivenessSM
7. Self-perceived attractiveness of
personalitySM
.23***

.30***

.07

.24***

--

3

.14*

.23***

.06

--

4

Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; SM=Measure and results included as Supplemental Materials

.20

.01

4. Gender identity centrality

.33***

-.31***

3. Self-perceived physical femininity
**

--

2

-.36***

--

1

2. Self-perceived physical attractiveness

1. State anxiety

Variables

Table 2.1
Study 1a Correlation Matrix

.17*

.21**

--

5

.47***

--

6

--

7

61

62
State anxiety. Participants completed the 6-item short form version of the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory (Marteau & Bekker, 1992), in which they were asked to indicate, on a 4-point scale
(1=Not at all, 2=Somewhat, 3=Moderately, 4=Very much), the extent to which each of the
following statements represented how they felt at the moment: “I feel calm” (R); “ I am
tense;” “I feel upset;” “I am relaxed” (R); “I feel content” (R); “I am worried.” This scale
demonstrated high internal reliability (α = .87).
Self-perceived physical attractiveness. We measured self-perceived physical attractiveness for three
reasons: (a) to assess the effectiveness of the physical attractiveness manipulation (i.e., as a
manipulation check); (b) to determine whether the physical femininity manipulation had an
effect on self-perceived physical attractiveness; and (c) to use as a covariate in our primary
analyses. Self-perceived physical attractiveness was measured using a single-item, 7-point
measure. Participants rated their physical attractiveness on a scale ranging from “I am not
very physically attractive” to “I am very physically attractive” (Wade, 2000)10. We also
measured self-perceived sexual attractiveness and attractiveness of personality for
exploratory purposes (see Supplemental Materials).
Self-perceived physical femininity. We assessed the effectiveness of the physical femininity
manipulation by asking participants to rate the femininity of their physical appearance,
compared to the average female in their age group, on a 7-point scale ranging from “Much
less feminine” to “Much more feminine.”

10

Participants also completed the Self-Perceived Sexual Attractiveness scale (SPSA; Amos &
McCabe, 2015). However, this measure was included solely for use in an undergraduate
senior thesis and therefore was not analyzed for the current manuscript.
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Gender identity centrality.11 We measured gender identity centrality using a modified version of
the identity subscale of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992).
Participants rated their agreement with the following statements on a 7-point scale ranging
from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree): “Being a female is an important part of my
self image;” “Being a female is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am (R);”
“Being a female is an important reflection of who I am;” “Being a female has very little to do
with how I feel about myself (R);” “Being feminine is an important part of my self image;”
“Being feminine is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am (R);” “Being
feminine is an important reflection of who I am;” “Being feminine has very little to do with
how I feel about myself (R).” We originally intended to analyze items related to “female” and
“feminine” identity separately, with the former items tapping into strength of gender
identification or the “importance of belonging to the category” female (Becker & Wagner,
2009). However, a factor analysis using principal components analysis with varimax rotation
revealed that all of the items loaded onto a single factor (see Supplemental Materials for
factor loadings and correlation matrix). Thus, all eight items were averaged to form a
composite gender identity centrality score with high internal reliability (α = .93).
Perceived controllability of femininity. We were interested in the possibility that perceived
controllability of femininity would moderate the effect of physical femininity feedback on
state anxiety—specifically, that threats to physical femininity would be less anxietyprovoking for women who consider their femininity to be largely under their control than
those who do not. We measured perceived controllability of femininity using items adapted

11

The order in which participants completed the measures of gender identity centrality and
perceived controllability of femininity was randomly assigned, such that half of the
participants completed the gender identity centrality measure first and the other half
completed the perceived controllability of femininity measure first.
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from the Weight Locus of Control Scale (Saltzer, 1982). Participants rated their agreement
with the following items on a scale of 1 (Strongly disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree): “How
feminine I look is entirely up to me;” “Having a feminine appearance is largely a matter of
chance (R);” “No matter what I do, the femininity of my appearance will remain largely
unchanged (R);” “I can control the femininity of my appearance in the way I desire;” “How
feminine I act is entirely up to me;” “Having a feminine personality is largely a matter of
chance (R);” “No matter what I do, the femininity of my personality will remain largely
unchanged (R);” “I can control the femininity of my personality in the way I desire.”
Although we originally intended to analyze items related to appearance and personality
separately, a factor analysis using principal components analysis with varimax rotation
revealed three distinct factors with unexpected loading patterns. The four non-reverse-coded
items loaded onto a distinct dimension, and each pair of reverse-coded items loaded onto a
distinct dimension (e.g., “Having a feminine appearance is largely a matter of chance” and
“Having a feminine personality is largely a matter of chance” loaded onto the same
dimension). Neither all of the appearance-related items considered together (α = .57) nor all
of the personality-related items considered together (α = .42) constituted a reliable scale.
When all of the items were considered together, the scale was slightly more internally reliable
(α = .63). We proceeded with our planned analyses, with all appearance-related and
personality-related items averaged to form a single perceived controllability of femininity
score. These analyses should be interpreted with caution, however, given that the items used
did not constitute a highly reliable scale.
Results
Manipulation Checks. To determine whether we had successfully manipulated selfperceived physical femininity and to examine whether physical attractiveness feedback had
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any effect on self-perceived physical femininity, we conducted a 3 x 2 between-subjects
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness
feedback as the independent variables and self-perceived physical femininity as the
dependent variable. As intended, there was a main effect of physical femininity feedback on
self-perceived physical femininity, F(2, 210) = 68.22, p < .001, f = 0.80, such that participants
in the threat condition perceived themselves as less physically feminine (M = 3.31, SD =
1.20) than participants in the control condition (M = 4.52, SD = 1.04) and participants in the
control condition perceived themselves as less physically feminine than participants in the
affirmation condition (M = 5.34, SD = 1.10; all Tukey’s honestly significant difference
[HSD] test ps < .001). There was no effect of physical attractiveness feedback on selfperceived physical femininity, F(1, 210) = 0.36, p = .550, f = .03, nor an interactive effect of
physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback on self-perceived physical
femininity, F(2, 210) = 1.06, p = .349, f = 0.08.
Next, to determine whether we had successfully manipulated self-perceived physical
attractiveness and to examine whether physical femininity feedback had any effect on selfperceived physical attractiveness, we conducted another 3 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA
with physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback as the independent
variables and self-perceived physical attractiveness as the dependent variable. Unexpectedly,
there was no effect of physical attractiveness feedback on self-perceived physical
attractiveness, F(1, 210) = 3.65, p = .057, f = .13, though the results were trending in the
intended direction, with participants in the affirmation condition perceiving themselves as
more physically attractive (M = 4.54, SD = 1.45) than participants in the control condition
(M = 4.19, SD = 1.51).
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Also somewhat surprisingly, given that femininity constitutes a key component of
attractiveness in women (Penton-Voak et al., 2004; Rhodes et al., 2000), there was no effect
of physical femininity feedback on self-perceived physical attractiveness, F(2, 210) = 0.85, p
= .431, f = .09, nor an interactive effect of physical femininity feedback and physical
attractiveness feedback on self-perceived physical attractiveness, F(2, 210) = 0.56, p = .575, f
= .07.
Self-perceived physical femininity and self-perceived physical attractiveness were
moderately correlated, r(214) = 0.33, p < .001.
Primary Analyses. To determine whether, as predicted, physical femininity
feedback had an effect on state anxiety regardless of physical attractiveness feedback, we ran
an ANOVA with physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback as the
independent variables and state anxiety as the dependent variable. As predicted, there was a
medium-size main effect of physical femininity feedback, F(2, 210) = 4.68, p = .010, f = .21,
such that participants in the threat condition (M = 1.91, SD = 0.67) reported higher levels of
state anxiety than participants in the affirmation condition (M = 1.60, SD = 0.61; Tukey’s
HSD p = .006) (see Table 2.2 for means from all studies). There was no difference in levels
of state anxiety between participants in the threat condition and those in the control
condition (M = 1.71, SD = 0.59; Tukey’s HSD p =.181) nor between participants in the
control condition and those in the affirmation condition (Tukey’s HSD p =.595).
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Table 2.2
Effects of Feedback about Physical Appearance on State Anxiety
Threat
M (SD)

Affirmation
M (SD)

Control
M (SD)

Study 1a
Female participants
1.91 (0.67)a
1.60 (0.61)b
1.71 (0.59)ab
Study 1b
Female participants
1.87 (0.64)a
1.86 (0.62)a
1.94 (0.65)a
Study 1c
Female participants
2.06 (0.72)
1.77 (0.67)
----Study 2
Female participants
2.15 (0.67)
1.83 (0.64)
----Male participants
1.89 (0.62)
1.67 (0.60)
----a
Note. Means that share a superscript (e.g., ) are not significantly different from other means
on the same row
There was also no effect of physical attractiveness feedback on state anxiety, F(1,
210) = 2.67, p = .104, f = .11, nor an interactive effect of physical femininity feedback and
physical attractiveness feedback on state anxiety, F(2, 210) = 0.09, p = .915, f = .03.
Because we sought to determine whether physical femininity threats produced
anxiety even in the presence of affirmations of physical attractiveness, we broke down the
data by physical attractiveness feedback condition. We found that participants whose
physical femininity was threatened reported significantly higher levels of state anxiety than
those whose physical femininity was affirmed within both the physical attractiveness control
condition (M = 1.98, SD = 0.73 vs. M = 1.65, SD = 0.70; t(79) = -2.03, p = .046, d = 0.45)
and the physical attractiveness affirmation condition (M = 1.83, SD = 0.58 vs. M = 1.56, SD
= 0.54; t(81) = -2.20, p = .030, d = 0.49).
For a more conservative analysis, we then re-ran our primary analysis as an analysis
of covariance (ANCOVA) with self-perceived physical attractiveness included as a covariate.
Controlling for self-perceived physical attractiveness, which significantly predicted state
anxiety, F(1, 209) = 31.86, p < .001, f = 0.38, we observed a comparable effect of physical
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femininity feedback on state anxiety, F(2, 209) = 5.43, p = .005, f = 0.21. Again, neither
physical attractiveness feedback, F(1, 209) = 0.99, p = .320, f = 0.06, nor the interaction
between physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback, F(2, 209) = 0.18,
p = .833, f = 0.04, had an effect on state anxiety.12
Exploratory Analyses.
Gender identity centrality. Because we were interested in gender identity centrality as a potential
moderator of the effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety, we first wanted to
confirm that the manipulations had no effect on levels of gender identity centrality. We
found that neither physical femininity feedback nor physical attractiveness feedback—nor
the interaction between the two—had any effect on gender identity centrality (ps > .50).
Thus, we conducted an exploratory analysis to determine whether gender identity centrality
moderated the effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety. We ran a linear
regression with physical femininity feedback (dummy coded with affirmation as the
reference group) and gender identity centrality (mean-centered) as predictors and state
anxiety as the outcome variable. Gender identity centrality did not predict levels of state
anxiety, B = 0.01, SE = 0.03, p = .651, 95% Confidence Interval (CI) [-0.04, 0.07]. We then
added the interactions between these variables to the model. Neither interaction between
physical femininity feedback (dummy coded) and gender identity centrality was significant
(control vs. affirmation: B = -0.02, SE = 0.08, p = .803, 95% CI [-0.17, 0.13]; threat vs.
affirmation: B = 0.11, SE = 0.07, p = .082, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.24]).

12

Because the plurality of participants (n=48; 22.22% of the sample) reported no anxiety and
thus the distribution of state anxiety was positively-skewed, we also transformed state
anxiety into a binary variable with 0=anxiety absent and 1=anxiety present and conducted a
binary logistic regression to determine whether physical femininity feedback had an effect on
whether participants reported any state anxiety. See Supplemental Materials.
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Given that we did not power the current study to detect these interactions and that
the physical femininity feedback (threat vs. affirmation) x gender identity centrality
interaction was in the expected direction, however, we plotted the simple effects that made
up this interaction. As shown in Figure 2.1, the effect of physical femininity feedback (threat
vs. affirmation) on state anxiety appeared to be driven by participants high in gender identity
centrality whose physical femininity was threatened. At low levels of gender identity
centrality (1 SD below the mean), there was no effect of physical femininity feedback on
anxiety (threat vs. affirmation: B = 0.15, SE = 0.14, p = .277, 95% CI [-0.12, 0.42]; control
vs. affirmation: B = 0.14, SE = 0.16, p = .408, 95% CI [-0.19, 0.46]; threat vs. control: B =
0.01, SE = 0.16, p = .934, 95% CI [-0.31, 0.34]). At high levels of gender identity centrality (1
SD above the mean), on the other hand, there was an effect of physical femininity feedback
on anxiety (threat vs. affirmation: B = 0.49, SE = 0.14, p < .001, 95% CI [0.21, 0.76]; control
vs. affirmation: B = 0.08, SE = 0.16, p = .624, 95% CI [-0.23, 0.39]; threat vs. control: B =
0.41, SE = 0.17 p = .016, 95% CI [0.08, 0.74]), such that those whose femininity had been
threatened reported higher levels of anxiety than those whose femininity had been affirmed
and those who received no feedback on their femininity. Furthermore, although there was
no significant effect of gender identity centrality on anxiety among participants in any of the
three femininity feedback conditions, among those in the threat condition, this effect was
trending in the expected direction, with increasing levels of gender identity centrality
predicting increasing levels of anxiety, B = 0.09, SE = 0.05, p = .080, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.20].
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Figure 2.1. State anxiety by femininity feedback condition and gender identity centrality
Perceived controllability of femininity. Again, because we were interested in perceived
controllability of femininity as a potential moderator of the effect of physical femininity
feedback on state anxiety, we first wanted to confirm that the manipulations had no effect
on perceived controllability of femininity. We found that neither physical femininity
feedback nor physical attractiveness feedback—nor the interaction between the two—had
any effect on perceived controllability of femininity (ps > .15). Thus, we conducted an
exploratory analysis to determine whether perceived controllability of femininity moderated
the effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety. We ran a linear regression with
physical femininity feedback (dummy coded, again with affirmation as the reference group)
and perceived controllability of femininity (mean-centered) as predictors and state anxiety as
the outcome variable. Perceived controllability of femininity predicted state anxiety, B = 0.25, SE = 0.06, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.27, -0.14], such that the more participants believed
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their femininity was controllable, the less state anxiety they reported (with a 1-point increase
in perceived controllability on a 6-point scale predicting a 0.25-point decrease in state anxiety
on a 4-point scale). We then added the interactions between these variables to the model.
Neither interaction between physical femininity feedback (dummy coded) and perceived
controllability of femininity was significant (control vs. affirmation: B = 0.08, SE = 0.14, p =
.580, 95% CI [-0.20, 0.36]; threat vs. affirmation: B = 0.08, SE = 0.14, p =.564, 95% CI [0.20, 0.37]).
Study 1b
In Study 1a, before receiving feedback on their physical appearance, all participants
were presented with lists of the facial features said to play the greatest role in determining
the perceived masculinity/femininity and attractiveness of one’s appearance. These lists
made the bipolar nature of facial femininity and masculinity particularly salient and framed
facial femininity as a lack of facial masculinity (with, for example, “facial hair” presented as a
masculine feature and “does not have facial hair” presented as a feminine feature). The
purpose of Study 1b was to test the robustness of the phenomenon established in Study 1a
by examining whether the effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety replicated
when participants were not presented with these lists of facial features.
Method
Hypotheses, methods, and analyses for this study were preregistered (see
https://osf.io/va2fu/?view_only=45c5120cd4d24e6aae56dd25457bbc56).
Participants and Design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six
conditions in a 3 (physical femininity feedback: affirmation, control, threat) x 2 (physical
attractiveness feedback: affirmation, control) design. Participants were recruited through
Prolific Academic and paid $1.84 for their participation.
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As with Study 1a, we sought to include 244 participants in our final sample. Because
we had to exclude 27% of participants from Study 1a, we estimated that 334 participants
would need to be recruited to achieve this sample size. Thus, we recruited 334 participants.
An additional seven participants ended up completing the study for a total sample size of
341.
Ninety-five participants were excluded because they did not identify as a cisgender
female (n=3), did not upload a valid photograph (i.e., did not upload a photograph or
uploaded a photograph without any woman or with more than one woman in it; n=7), failed
one or more attention checks (which, as in Study 1a, required them to accurately recall the
direction of the results they had received—i.e., whether the results indicated that their
physical appearance was more or less feminine [and attractive] than average—or whether
they had not received any results; n=63), indicated that they intended some of their
responses as jokes (n=2), and/or clearly believed that the feedback they received was not
produced by image analysis software (as determined by pre-registered criteria, which are
described in the Procedure section; n=26). Thus, we were left with a sample size of 246 (Mage
= 33.37, SD =11.16; 72.36% heterosexual; 73.17% White; 9.35% Black; 4.07% Hispanic or
Latina; 4.07% East Asian; 0.81% South Asian; 0.41% Native American or Alaskan Native;
8.13 % other or multiracial/ethnic).
Procedure. The procedure was nearly identical to that of Study 1a with a few
exceptions. Most critically, whereas participants in Study 1a were presented with lists of the
facial features said to play the greatest role in determining the perceived facial
masculinity/femininity and attractiveness of one’s appearance, participants in Study 1b were
not. Also, instead of simply reading about the fictitious image analysis software, participants
in Study 1b watched a brief informational video that described it (see Supplemental
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Materials). The video provided a more detailed description of how the software was
developed (using “deep learning”) and used graphics to represent this process. Study 1b also
included a series of “beta testing” questions about the software, which were intended to
bolster the credibility of the manipulation.
Additionally, Study 1b omitted the measures of gender identity centrality and
perceived controllability of femininity, which were included in Study 1a for exploratory
purposes and which were not central to the questions being pursued in this follow-up study.
It included the measure of state self-esteem (described in the Measures section) that was
omitted from Study 1a due to a programming error. For exploratory purposes, it also
included a measure of participants’ desire to switch their photograph (see Supplemental
Materials). This measure was administered following the measures of state anxiety and state
self-esteem, as well as the manipulation checks.
Finally, in this study we probed for participant suspicion using a series of preregistered questions. The first question asked participants to describe their thoughts and/or
feelings about their results. The second asked if they had any reservations about their results.
If they indicated that they had reservations, they were asked to describe these reservations.
They were then asked what they thought the study was testing and were given the
opportunity to provide additional comments. These responses were coded for suspicion by
two coders using the following coding scheme: 0=no indication of suspicion; 1=participant
suspects that the feedback might not have been produced by image analysis software and/or
there is some indication that the participant is suspicious; 2=participant seems certain that
the feedback was not produced by image analysis software. A two-way random effects model
indicated high inter-rater reliability (intraclass correlation coefficient [ICC] = .87, 95% CI
[.76, .85]). Participants were excluded if both coders rated their suspicion level as 2.
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Measures. As in Study 1a, the primary dependent variable of interest was state
anxiety. A measure of state self-esteem was included as an exploratory dependent variable.
Also as in Study 1a, a measure of self-perceived physical femininity was included as a
manipulation check, and a measure of self-perceived physical attractiveness was included as
both a manipulation check and a covariate. For correlations among all measured variables,
see Table 2.3.
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State anxiety. As in Study 1a, participants completed the 6-item short form version of the
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Marteau & Bekker, 1992). The scale demonstrated high
internal reliability (α = .86).
State self-esteem. Participants rated their agreement with the following items, taken and
modified from the State Self-Esteem Scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) on a scale of 1 (Not
at all) to 5 (Extremely): “I feel confident;” “I am worried about how I am regarded;” “I feel
satisfied with myself right now;” “I am dissatisfied with myself;” “I feel self-conscious;” “I
feel displeased with myself;” “I feel good about myself;” “I am pleased with myself right
now;” “I am worried about what other people think of me;” “I feel inferior to others at this
moment;” “I feel concerned about the impression I am making.” This scale demonstrated
high internal reliability (α = .94). State self-esteem was highly correlated with state anxiety,
r(244) = -0.59, p < .001.
Self-perceived physical attractiveness. We measured self-perceived physical attractiveness using the
single-item, 7-point measure used in Study 1a. As in Study 1a, we also measured selfperceived sexual attractiveness and attractiveness of personality for exploratory purposes
(see Supplemental Materials).
Self-perceived physical femininity. We assessed the effectiveness of the physical femininity
manipulation by asking participants to rate their physical femininity using the single-item, 7point scale used in Study 1a.
Results
Manipulation Checks. First, to determine whether we had successfully manipulated
self-perceived physical femininity and to examine whether physical attractiveness feedback
had any effect on self-perceived physical femininity, we conducted a 3 x 2 between-subjects
ANOVA with physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback as the
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independent variables and self-perceived physical femininity as the dependent variable. As
intended, there was a main effect of physical femininity feedback on self-perceived physical
femininity, F(2, 240) = 46.30, p < .001, f = 0.61, such that participants in the threat condition
perceived themselves as less physically feminine (M = 3.35, SD = 1.24) than those in the
control condition (M = 4.52, SD = 1.18) and participants in the control condition perceived
themselves as less physically feminine than those in the affirmation condition (M = 5.08, SD
= 1.19; all Tukey’s HSD test ps < .020).
There was no effect of physical attractiveness feedback on self-perceived physical
femininity, F(1, 240) = 1.30, p = .256, f = 0.06, nor an interactive effect of physical
femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback on self-perceived physical
femininity, F(2, 240) = 0.15, p = .861, f = 0.03.
Next, to determine whether we had successfully manipulated self-perceived physical
attractiveness and to examine whether physical femininity feedback had any effect on selfperceived physical attractiveness, we conducted another 3 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA
with physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback as the independent
variables and self-perceived physical attractiveness as the dependent variable. Surprisingly,
neither physical attractiveness feedback nor physical femininity feedback–nor the interaction
between the two–significantly affected self-perceived physical attractiveness, all ps > .30.
Self-perceived physical femininity and self-perceived physical attractiveness were
moderately to highly correlated, r(244) = 0.42, p < .001.
Primary Analyses. To determine whether, as predicted, physical femininity
feedback had an effect on state anxiety regardless of physical attractiveness feedback, we ran
an ANOVA with physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback as the
independent variables and state anxiety as the dependent variable. Contrary to our
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hypothesis and in contrast with Study 1a, there was no main effect of physical femininity
feedback on state anxiety, F(2, 240) = 0.34, p = .715, f = 0.05 (see Table 2.2 for means).
There was, however, a main effect of physical attractiveness feedback on state anxiety, F(1,
240) = 8.32, p = .004, f = 0.18, such that participants in the attractiveness control condition
(M = 2.00, SD = 0.63) reported higher levels of state anxiety than participants in the
attractiveness affirmation condition (M = 1.75, SD = 0.60). There was no interactive effect
of physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback on state anxiety, F(2,
240) = 1.29, p = .276, f = 0.10.
We re-ran this analysis as an ANCOVA, with self-perceived physical attractiveness
included as a covariate. Controlling for self-perceived physical attractiveness, which
significantly predicted state anxiety, F(1, 239) = 12.49, p < .001, f = 0.22, there was still an
effect of physical attractiveness feedback on state anxiety, F(1, 239) = 7.43, p = .007, f =
0.17. Again, neither physical femininity feedback, F(2, 239) = 0.20, p = .822, f = 0.04, nor the
interaction between physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback, F(2,
239) = 1.10, p = .334, f = 0.09, had an effect on state anxiety.13
Exploratory Analyses.
State self-esteem. To examine whether physical femininity and/or physical attractiveness
feedback influenced levels of state self-esteem, we ran an ANOVA with physical femininity
feedback and physical attractiveness feedback as the independent variables and state selfesteem as the dependent variable. There was no main effect of physical femininity feedback,
F(2, 240) = 0.16, p = .849, f = 0.04, on state self-esteem (see Table 2.4 for means). There was

13

As in Study 1a and as preregistered, we also ran a binary logistic regression to determine
whether physical femininity feedback had an effect on whether participants reported any
state anxiety. See Supplemental Materials.
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also no main effect physical attractiveness feedback, F(1, 240) = 3.13, p = .078, f = 0.11, nor
an interaction between physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback,
F(2, 240) = 2.52, p = .083, f = 0.14.
Table 2.4
Effects of Feedback about Physical Appearance on State Self-Esteem
Threat
M (SD)

Affirmation
M (SD)

Control
M (SD)

Study 1a
Female participants
------------Study 1b
Female participants
4.12 (0.99)a
4.15 (0.89)a
4.05 (1.03)a
Study 1c
Female participants
3.90 (1.01)
4.24 (0.92)
----Study 2
Female participants
3.75 (0.99)
4.20 (0.92)
----Male participants
4.21 (0.91)a
4.33 (0.93)a
----a
Note. Means that share a superscript (e.g., ) are not significantly different from other means
on the same row
We then re-ran this analysis as an ANCOVA, with self-perceived physical
attractiveness included as a covariate. Controlling for self-perceived physical attractiveness,
which significantly predicted state self-esteem, F(1, 239) = 80.10, p < .001, f = 0.57, there
was again no main effect of physical femininity feedback, F(2, 239) = 0.01, p = .994, f = 0.01,
or physical attractive feedback, F(1, 239) = 2.18, p = .141, f = 0.08, on state self-esteem.
Again, there was no interaction between physical femininity feedback and physical
attractiveness feedback, F(2, 239) = 2.53, p = .082, f = 0.12.
Study 1c
In Study 1a, in which participants were presented with lists of features said to
contribute to perceptions of facial masculinity/femininity and attractiveness, we observed an
effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety, such that participants whose physical
femininity was threatened reported higher levels of state anxiety than those whose physical
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femininity was affirmed. In Study 1b, in which participants were not presented with these lists
of features, we did not see this effect. Thus, the purpose of Study 1c was to reconcile these
inconsistent results by systematically manipulating inclusion of these lists of facial features in
the experimental set-up and testing whether physical femininity feedback affected levels of
state anxiety when these lists of features, which framed physical femininity and masculinity
as opposites and femininity as a lack of masculinity, were present but not when they were
absent.
Method
Hypotheses, methods, and analyses for this study were preregistered (see
https://osf.io/krhqx/?view_only=a4db641c11c2415f84a807852e92813f).
Participants and Design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four
conditions in a 2 (physical femininity feedback: affirmation, threat) x 2 (lists of physical
features: present, absent) design. Participants were recruited through Prolific Academic and
paid $1.84 for their participation.
In Study 1a, in which all participants were given the lists of features, those whose
physical femininity was threatened reported higher levels of state anxiety than those whose
physical femininity was affirmed. Because we sought to determine whether excluding these
lists of features “knocked out” this main effect, we powered Study 1c to detect an effect half
the size of the main effect observed in Study 1a (Ledgerwood, 2019, 2020).14

14

This power analysis was based on an effect size obtained through a preliminary analysis of
Study 1a data, which focused on four of the six items in the state anxiety measure and which
was completed before the data were fully cleaned (f = 0.28), rather than final analyses (f =
.21).
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A power analysis using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) determined that a sample of
N=404 would be needed to detect this interaction with 80% power. We anticipated that 20%
of recruited participants would be ineligible, fail an attention check, and/or not upload a
valid photograph. (Because participants in this study were only given one type of feedback,
we anticipated that fewer people would be excluded for failing the attention check than in
Studies 1a and 1b). Therefore, we recruited 505 participants.
Forty-seven participants were excluded because they did not identify as a cisgender
female (n=2), did not upload a valid photograph (i.e., did not upload a photograph or
uploaded a photograph without any woman or with more than one woman in it; n=9), failed
the attention check (which required them to accurately recall whether their results indicated
that their physical appearance was more, less, or as feminine as the average female in their
age group—or whether they did not receive feedback on the femininity of their physical
appearance; n=7), indicated that they intended some of their responses as jokes (n=1),
and/or clearly believed that the feedback they received was not produced by image analysis
software (n=30). Thus, we were left with a sample size of 458 (Mage = 33.43, SD = 11.70;
71.18% heterosexual; 72.49% White; 9.39% Black; 4.59% Hispanic or Latina; 4.37% East
Asian; 1.53% South Asian; 0.22% Middle Eastern or Arab American; 0.22% Native
American or Alaskan Native; 7.21% other or multiracial/ethnic or did not report
race/ethnicity). A sensitivity power analysis (G*Power 3.1; Faul et al., 2007) indicated that
we were powered to detect an effect of f = 0.13 (with 80% power and α = .05).
Procedure. The procedure mirrored that of Study 1b, with a few changes. The
primary change was that participants in Study 1c were randomly assigned to see (as in Study
1a) or not see (as in Study 1b) lists of the facial features that supposedly play the greatest role
in determining the perceived masculinity/femininity of one’s appearance
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Also, in Study 1c, participants only received feedback on the masculinity/femininity
of their facial appearance. They did not receive feedback on the attractiveness of their facial
appearance. Manipulation checks in Studies 1a and 1b indicated that this feedback did not
robustly alter self-perceived physical attractiveness. Furthermore, the reason for including
this manipulation was to determine whether threats to physical femininity produce anxiety
simply because they constitute implied threats to physical attractiveness. However, physical
femininity feedback did not affect self-perceived physical attractiveness in Study 1a or Study
1b. (To ensure that our analyses were maximally conservative, we retained the measure of selfperceived physical attractiveness and controlled for this variable in key analyses.)
Additionally, given that in Study 1a, participants in the control condition reported
levels of anxiety that fell between (though did not significantly differ from) those in the
threat condition and those in the affirmation condition and that our goal was to examine
differences in anxiety between women whose physical femininity was threatened and women
whose physical femininity was affirmed, we omitted the physical femininity control
condition from Study 1c. This omission of a control condition is consistent with previous
studies on threats to gender stereotypicality (Vandello et al., 2008).
Finally, additional measures of attributions for results, perceived bipolarity of
physical femininity and masculinity, importance of results, and feminine identity centrality,
described in the Measures section, were included in Study 1c for exploratory purposes. All
exploratory measures were administered following the measure of state anxiety, and all
exploratory measures other than state self-esteem were administered following the
manipulation checks. We probed for participant suspicion using the same pre-registered
questions used in Study 1b. These responses were again coded for suspicion by two coders.
A two-way random effects model indicated high inter-rater reliability (intraclass correlation
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coefficient [ICC] = .82, 95% CI [.78, .85]). Participants were again excluded if both coders
rated their suspicion level as 2.
Measures. As in Studies 1a and 1b, the primary dependent variable of interest was
state anxiety. As in Study 1b, a measure of state self-esteem was included as an exploratory
dependent variable. Measures of attributions for results, perceived bipolarity of physical
femininity and masculinity, and feminine identity centrality were also included as exploratory
dependent variables. A measure of self-perceived physical femininity was included as a
manipulation check, and a measure of self-perceived physical attractiveness was included as a
covariate. For correlations among all measured variables, see Table 2.5.
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State anxiety. As in Studies 1a and 1b, participants completed the 6-item short form version
of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Marteau & Bekker, 1992). The scale demonstrated high
internal reliability (α = .89).
State self-esteem. As in Study 1b, participants rated their agreement with eleven items taken and
modified from the State Self-Esteem Scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). This scale
demonstrated high internal reliability (α = .94). State self-esteem was highly correlated with
state anxiety, r(456) = -0.65, p < .001.
Self-perceived physical attractiveness. We measured self-perceived physical attractiveness using the
single-item, 7-point measure used in Studies 1a and 1b. As in Studies 1a and 1b, we also
measured self-perceived sexual attractiveness and attractiveness of personality for
exploratory purposes (see Supplemental Materials).
Self-perceived physical femininity. We assessed the effectiveness of the physical femininity
manipulation by asking participants to rate their physical femininity using the single-item, 7point scale used in Studies 1a and 1b.
Attributions for results. We were interested in the possibility that to cope with threats to their
femininity, women who received feedback indicating that they were less physically feminine
than average would make more external, situational attributions for their results than women
who received feedback indicating that they were more physically feminine than average
(Kinderman & Bentall, 2000). Participants therefore responded to the following questions
on a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much): “To what extent do you think the results you
received are based on aspects of your physical appearance that you could change if you
wanted to?” “To what extent do you think the results you received are based on stable
aspects of your physical appearance (R)?” “To what extent do you think the results you
received are based on aspects of the specific photograph you uploaded?” “How much do
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you think your results would change on a day-to-day basis?” Because these items did not
form a reliable scale (α = .47), we analyzed each of them separately.
Perceived bipolarity of physical femininity and masculinity. If women only experience anxiety in
response to threats to their physical femininity when they have viewed lists of the features
said to play the greatest role in determining perceived facial masculinity/femininity, this
might be because viewing these lists makes the bipolar nature of physical femininity and
masculinity particularly salient (with facial femininity defined largely as a lack of facial
masculinity). To explore this possibility, we measured perceived bipolarity of physical
femininity and masculinity by asking participants to respond to the following question on a
scale of 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much): “When it comes to physical appearance, to what
extent do you think masculinity and femininity are opposites?”
Importance of results. We were also interested in the possibility that to cope with threats to their
femininity, women who received feedback indicating that they were less physically feminine
than average would downplay the importance of their results (Frey & Stahlberg, 1986;
Kashima & Triandis, 1986). We therefore asked participants to rate their agreement, on a
scale of 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree), with the following statement: “The results
I received are important to me.”
Feminine identity centrality. Finally, we were interested in the possibility that to cope with
threats to their femininity, women who received feedback indicating that they were less
physically feminine than average would downplay the centrality of femininity to their overall
sense of self. We therefore included a single item from the measure of gender identity
centrality used in Study 1a (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). Participants rated their agreement,
on a scale of 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree), with the statement: “Being feminine
is an important part of my self image.” Although we did not observe an effect of physical
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femininity feedback on gender identity centrality in Study 1a, we included this measure for
exploratory purposes.
Results
Manipulation Checks. To confirm that we successfully manipulated self-perceived
physical femininity and examine whether presence of the lists of physical features affected
self-perceived physical femininity, we conducted a 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA with
physical femininity feedback and lists of physical features as the independent variables and
self-perceived physical femininity as the dependent variable. As intended, there was a main
effect of physical femininity feedback on self-perceived physical femininity, F(1, 454) =
150.29, p < .001, f = 0.57, such that participants in the affirmation condition perceived
themselves as more physically feminine (M = 5.07, SD = 1.21) than participants in the threat
condition (M = 3.55, SD = 1.40). There was no effect of listing physical features on selfperceived physical femininity, F(1, 454) = 0.48, p = .489, f = 0.03, nor an interactive effect of
physical femininity feedback and listing physical features on self-perceived physical
femininity, F(1, 454) = 1.75, p = .186, f = 0.05.
Primary Analyses. To determine whether, as predicted, physical femininity
feedback had an effect on state anxiety and whether this effect was only present when
participants saw lists of physical features that supposedly contribute to overall assessments
of facial masculinity/femininity, we ran a 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA with physical
femininity feedback and lists of physical features as the independent variables and state
anxiety as the dependent variable. Consistent with the results of Study 1a, there was a
medium-size main effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety, F(1, 454) = 20.52,
p<.001, f = 0.21, such that participants in the threat condition reported higher levels of state
anxiety (M = 2.06, SD = 0.72) than participants in the affirmation condition (M = 1.77, SD
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= 0.67) (see Table 2.2 for means from all studies). There was no main effect of listing
physical features on state anxiety, F(1, 454) = 2.55, p = .111, f = 0.07. Contrary to our
prediction, there was no interactive effect of physical femininity feedback and listing physical
features on state anxiety, F(1, 454) = 0.24, p = .622, f = 0.02. Physical femininity feedback
had a significant effect on state anxiety when the lists of physical features were present, F(1,
224) = 7.41, p = .007, f = 0.18, and absent, F(1, 230) = 13.93, p < .001, f = 0.25.
For a more conservative analysis, we re-ran this analysis as an ANCOVA, with selfperceived physical attractiveness included as a covariate. Controlling for self-perceived
physical attractiveness, which significantly predicted state anxiety, F(1, 453) = 12.71, p <
.001, f = 0.16, there was still an effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety, F(1,
453) = 21.28, p<.001, f = 0.21. Again, neither listing physical features, F(1, 453) = 3.57, p =
.060, f = 0.09, nor the interaction between physical femininity feedback and listing physical
features, F(1, 453) = 0.12, p = .724, f = 0.02, had an effect on state anxiety.15
Exploratory Analyses.
State self-esteem. To examine whether physical femininity feedback had an effect on state selfesteem and whether if so, this effect was only present when participants saw lists of physical
features that supposedly contribute to overall assessments of facial masculinity/femininity,
we ran another 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA with physical femininity feedback and lists
of physical features as the independent variables and state self-esteem as the dependent
variable. There was a main effect of physical femininity feedback on state self-esteem (see
Table 2.4), F(1, 454) = 14.91, p<.001, f = 0.18, such that participants in the threat condition

15

As in Studies 1a and 1b and as preregistered, we also ran a binary logistic regression to
determine whether physical femininity feedback had an effect on whether participants
reported any state anxiety. See Supplemental Materials.
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reported lower levels of state self-esteem (M = 3.90, SD = 1.01) than participants in the
affirmation condition (M = 4.24, SD = 0.92). There was no main effect of listing physical
features on state self-esteem, F(1, 454) = 0.35, p = .552, f = 0.03, nor an interaction between
physical femininity feedback and listing physical features, F(1, 454) = 0.18, p = .669, f = 0.02.
For a more conservative analysis, we re-ran this analysis as an ANCOVA, with selfperceived physical attractiveness included as a covariate. Controlling for self-perceived
physical attractiveness, which significantly predicted state self-esteem, F(1, 453) = 93.84,
p<.001, f = 0.45, the effect of physical femininity feedback on levels of state self-esteem
remained significant, F(1, 453) = 18.56, p<.001, f = 0.18. Again, there was no main effect of
listing physical features on state anxiety, F(1, 453) = 1.96, p = .162, f = .06, nor an
interaction between physical femininity feedback and listing physical features, F(1, 453) =
0.75, p = .387, f = 0.04.
Attributions for results. We conducted a series of 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVAs to assess
the effects of physical femininity feedback, lists of physical features, and the interactions
between the two variables on each item. Because we were examining four attribution-related
dependent variables, we set the alpha levels to .0125 for these analyses. We found that
participants whose physical femininity was affirmed attributed their results to stable aspects
of their physical appearance to a greater extent (M = 4.89, SD = 1.41) than participants
whose physical femininity was threatened (M = 4.07, SD = 1.55), F(1, 454) = 35.25, p <
.001, f = 0.28. Additionally, participants whose physical femininity was affirmed thought
their results would change on a day-to-day basis to a lesser extent (M = 3.69, SD = 1.82)
than participants whose physical femininity was threatened (M = 4.08, SD = 1.80), F(1, 454)
= 5.60, p = .018, f = 0.11, though this result did not achieve statistical significance based on
our pre-set alpha level. There was no effect of physical femininity feedback on the extent to
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which participants thought the results they received were based on aspects of their physical
appearance that they could change if they wanted to, nor on the extent to which they
thought the results they received were based on aspects of the specific photograph they
uploaded, ps > .20. There were no main effects of listing physical features ps > .20, nor any
interactions between physical femininity feedback and listing physical features, ps > .20.
Perceived bipolarity of physical femininity and masculinity. We sought to determine whether
participants perceived physical femininity and masculinity as more bipolar when they had
viewed lists of the facial features said to play the greatest role in determining facial
masculinity/femininity, as compared to when they had not viewed such lists. We also sought
to determine whether physical femininity feedback moderated this potential effect. A 2 x 2
between-subjects ANOVA with physical femininity feedback and lists of physical features as
the independent variables revealed no main effects of physical femininity feedback, F(1, 454)
= 1.50, p = .221, f = 0.06, or listing physical features, F(1, 454) = 0.64, p = .426, f = 0.04, on
perceived bipolarity of physical femininity and masculinity. It did, however, reveal a
marginally significant interaction between physical femininity feedback and listing physical
features, F(1, 454) = 3.88, p = .050, f = 0.09. Among participants whose physical femininity
was threatened, perceived bipolarity did not differ between those who saw the lists of
features (M = 4.45, SD = 1.45) and those who did not (M = 4.28, SD = 1.59), F(1, 220) =
0.69, p = .407, f = 0.06. Surprisingly, among participants whose physical femininity was
affirmed, those who saw the lists of features perceived femininity and masculinity as less
bipolar (M = 4.34, SD = 1.60) than those who did not (M = 4.75, SD = 1.57), F(1, 234) =
3.82, p = .052, f = 0.13, though this effect was only marginally significant.
Importance of results. To determine whether participants downplayed the importance of
threatening, as compared to affirming, results, and whether listing physical features

91
moderated this potential effect, we conducted a 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA with
physical femininity feedback and lists of physical features as the independent variables. This
ANOVA revealed a significant effect of physical femininity feedback, such that participants
whose physical femininity was affirmed indeed rated the results as more important to them
(M = 3.55, SD = 1.76) than participants whose physical femininity was threatened (M =
2.99, SD = 1.70), F(1, 454) = 12.30, p < .001, f = 0.16. This main effect was qualified by a
significant two-way interaction, F(1, 454) = 5.57, p = .019, f = 0.11.
Among participants in the lists absent condition, those whose physical femininity
was affirmed rated the results as more important to them (M = 3.81, SD = 1.82) than those
whose physical femininity was threatened (M = 2.86, SD = 1.57), F(1, 230) = 18.25, p<.001,
f = 0.28. Among participants in the lists present condition, those whose physical femininity
was affirmed (M = 3.33, SD = 1.68) did not differ from those whose physical femininity was
threatened (M = 3.14, SD = 1.85) in their ratings of the results’ importance to them, F(1,
224) = 0.62, p = .432, f = 0.05. There was no main effect of listing of physical features, F(1,
454) = 0.40, p = .528, f = 0.03.
Feminine identity centrality. To examine whether participants whose physical femininity was
threatened downplayed the importance of femininity to their self-image, as compared to
those whose physical femininity was affirmed—and whether this potential effect was
moderated by listing physical features, we conducted a 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA with
physical femininity feedback and lists of physical features as the independent variables and
feminine identity centrality as the dependent variable. Neither physical femininity feedback,
F(1, 454) = 2.97, p = .086, f = 0.08, nor listing physical features, F(1, 454) = .005, p = .945, f
= 0.003, had an effect on femininity identity centrality. There was also no interaction
between the two variables, F(1, 454) = 2.17, p = .141, f = 0.07.
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Given that we observed no effect of our manipulations on feminine identity
centrality and that Study 1a provided some evidence that the effect of physical femininity
feedback on state anxiety might be driven by participants high in gender identity centrality,
we conducted exploratory analyses to determine whether feminine identity centrality
moderated the effects of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety and self-esteem. A
linear regression revealed an interaction between physical femininity feedback and feminine
identity centrality, B = 0.12, SE = 0.04, p = .001, 95% CI [0.05, 0.20]. As shown in Figure
2.2, at low levels of feminine identity centrality (1 SD below the mean), there was no effect
of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety, B = 0.09, SE = 0.09, p = .313, 95% CI [0.09, 0.27]. At high levels of feminine identity centrality (1 SD above the mean), however,
there was an effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety, B = 0.51, SE = 0.09, p <
.001, 95% CI [0.33, 0.69], such that participants whose femininity had been threatened
reported higher levels of anxiety than participants whose femininity had been affirmed.
Furthermore, whereas there was no effect of feminine identity centrality on anxiety among
participants in the affirmation condition, B = -0.02, SE = 0.03, p = .444, 95% CI [-0.07,
0.03], there was an effect of feminine identity centrality on anxiety among participants in the
threat condition, B = 0.10, SE = 0.03, p < .001, 95% CI [0.05, 0.15], with increasing levels of
feminine identity centrality predicting increasing levels of anxiety.

93

State Anxiety (1-4)

3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
-1 SD
+1 SD
Feminine Identity Centrality
Threat

Affirmation

Figure 2.2. State anxiety by femininity feedback condition and feminine identity centrality
Next, we turned to state self-esteem. A linear regression again revealed an interaction
between physical femininity feedback and feminine identity centrality, B = -0.20, SE = 0.05,
p < .001, 95% CI [-0.30, -0.09]. As shown in Figure 2.3, at low levels of feminine identity
centrality (1 SD below the mean), there was no effect of physical femininity feedback on
state self-esteem, B = 0.03, SE = 0.13, p = .825, 95% CI [-0.27, 0.22]. At high levels of
feminine identity centrality (1 SD above the mean), however, there was an effect of physical
femininity feedback on state self-esteem, B = -0.69, SE = 0.13, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.94, 0.44], such that participants whose femininity had been threatened reported lower levels of
self-esteem than participants whose femininity had been affirmed. Additionally, whereas
there was no effect of feminine identity centrality on self-esteem among participants in the
affirmation condition, B = 0.05, SE = 0.04, p = .217, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.12], there was an
effect of feminine identity centrality on self-esteem among participants in the threat
condition, B = -0.15, SE = 0.04, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.22, -0.08], with increasing levels of
feminine identity centrality predicting decreasing levels of self-esteem.
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Figure 2.3. State self-esteem by femininity feedback condition and feminine identity centrality
Studies 1a, 1b, & 1c Discussion
Across these studies, we found evidence that cisgender women experience more
anxiety in response to threats to their physical femininity than affirmations of their physical
femininity and that the effect of physical femininity feedback on anxiety cannot be explained
by an assumption that a threat to one’s physical femininity constitutes a threat to one’s
physical attractiveness.
In Study 1a, in which participants were given lists of physical features upon which
assessments of physical femininity were said to be based, women whose physical femininity
was threatened reported higher levels of state anxiety than cisgender women whose physical
femininity was affirmed. This effect held even when participants were told they were highly
physically attractive and even when controlling for self-perceived physical attractiveness.
Levels of state anxiety among women who received no feedback on their femininity fell
between (but did not significantly differ from) levels of state anxiety among women in the
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two experimental conditions, suggesting that the effect of physical femininity feedback was
driven by both women whose physical femininity was threatened and women whose physical
femininity was affirmed. In other words, affirming feedback and threatening feedback
seemed to move women’s levels of state anxiety in opposite directions. Exploratory
moderation analyses, however, revealed that gender identity centrality predicted levels of
anxiety only among women whose physical femininity had been threatened, although this
effect did not reach statistical significance. Furthermore, among participants high in gender
identity centrality, those whose physical femininity had been threatened experienced
heightened levels of anxiety, relative to those who received no feedback on their femininity,
whereas those whose physical femininity had been affirmed did not experience reduced levels
of anxiety, relative to those who received no feedback on their femininity. Together, these
results suggest that physical femininity threats, rather than affirmations, may have been
particularly influential in producing the observed effect of physical femininity feedback on
levels of anxiety.
In Study 1b, in which participants were not given lists of physical features upon
which assessments of physical femininity were said to be based, women whose physical
femininity was threatened did not experience higher levels of state anxiety than those whose
physical femininity was affirmed. Furthermore, physical femininity feedback had no effect
on state self-esteem.
Study 1c sought to reconcile the discrepant results of Studies 1a and 1b by examining
whether physical femininity threats only produce anxiety when women are presented with
lists of the facial features that supposedly play the greatest role in determining assessments of
physical femininity and masculinity and that frame physical masculinity and femininity as
opposites (i.e., as two ends of a single spectrum) and femininity as the absence of masculinity
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(as in Study 1a but not 1b). Contrary to our prediction, women whose physical femininity
was threatened reported higher levels of state anxiety than those whose physical femininity
was affirmed regardless of whether they saw these lists of physical features. As in Studies 1a
and 1b, physical femininity feedback did not affect self-perceived physical attractiveness, and
as in Study 1a, the effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety held even when
controlling for self-perceived physical attractiveness. Thus, this study provided further
evidence that threats to physical femininity in particular—rather than implied threats to
physical attractiveness—produce anxiety in women. Furthermore, moderation analyses
demonstrated that feminine identity centrality predicted anxiety and self-esteem among
women whose femininity had been threatened but not those whose femininity had been
affirmed. This study therefore lent further support to the idea that physical femininity
threats, rather than physical femininity affirmations, affect levels of anxiety, as well as selfesteem.
Exploratory analyses from Study 1c also revealed a number of results worthy of
further investigation. Participants whose physical femininity was threatened reported not
only higher levels of state anxiety than those whose physical femininity was affirmed but also
lower levels of state self-esteem, even when controlling for self-perceived physical
attractiveness, which was highly predictive of state self-esteem. Additionally, women whose
physical femininity was threatened attributed their results to stable aspects of their
appearance to a lesser extent than those whose physical femininity was affirmed. They also
believed, more so than those whose physical femininity was affirmed, that they would get
different results on different days. Unsurprisingly, then, women whose physical femininity
was threatened viewed their results as less important to them. Together, these results, though
exploratory, are suggestive of motivated cognition in the face of threats to gender
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stereotypicality. Women may discredit their results as a means a coping with such threats.
This explanation is speculative at this point, however, and should be systematically examined
in future studies.
Study 2
Studies 1a-c focused exclusively on women and their responses to threats to the
femininity of their physical appearances. In Study 2, we expanded our focus to include both
women and men and threats to both physical and psychological gender stereotypicality. In
doing so, we sought to determine (i) whether, among women, increased anxiety and reduced
self-esteem following gender stereotypicality threats are unique to the domain of physical
appearance and (ii) whether increased anxiety and reduced self-esteem following physical
gender stereotypicality threats are unique to women.
Past research has demonstrated that women do not experience anxiety in response to
threats to their psychological femininity (Vandello et al., 2008). However, this past work
employed a slightly different paradigm than the one we used and was conducted with a
different sample. Therefore, it was unclear whether within the same sample of women and
with comparable paradigms we would observe that women indeed experience anxiety—and
potentially reduced self-esteem—in response to threats to their physical but not their
psychological femininity.
Furthermore, although studies have examined men’s psychological and behavioral
responses to threats to their psychological masculinity (e.g., Dahl et al., 2015; Willer et al., 2013)
and physical strength (Cheryan et al., 2015), they have not, to our knowledge, examined
men’s responses to threats to the masculinity of their physical appearance. Thus, it is unclear
whether men, like women, experience anxiety in response to feedback indicating that their
physical appearance is less gender stereotypical than average. Is increased anxiety following
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physical gender stereotypicality threats, relative to affirmations, a phenomenon unique to
women, whose physical appearances are frequently subjected to commentary and critique
(Heith, 2003, p. 126), or is this a phenomenon experienced by women and men alike?
Some non-experimental evidence suggests that men may, indeed, experience such
anxiety. For example, adolescent boys with high levels of babyfacedness (which largely
overlaps with facial femininity; Dinnerstein & Weitz, 1994; Friedman & Zebrowitz, 1992)
tend to be colder and more academically competent and to engage in more criminal behavior
than peers with more mature (and thus masculine) facial appearances (Zebrowitz,
Andreoletti, et al., 1998; Zebrowitz, Collins, et al., 1998). Behaving in a stereotypically
masculine manner may be a strategy that babyfaced boys and men use to cope with the
anxiety associated with appearing physically feminine. Additionally, when men’s
psychological masculinity is threatened, they have been shown to not only espouse
stereotypically masculine attitudes and behave in a stereotypically masculine manner (Bosson
& Vandello, 2011; Glick et al., 2007; Willer et al., 2013) but also to overestimate their height
(Cheryan et al., 2015)—that is, to exaggerate one component of their physical masculinity.
Together, these findings suggest that men may, indeed, be concerned about appearing
physically masculine and may therefore experience anxiety, just as women do, in response to
threats to their gender stereotypicality within the domain of physical appearance.
However, psychological and behavioral masculinity may be more heavily prescribed
for men than physical masculinity is. In a 2017 nationally representative survey of U.S.
adults, participants were asked “what traits society values most in men and women” (Parker
et al., 2017). In reference to women, the plurality of responses (35%) referred to physical
attractiveness, whereas in reference to men, the plurality (33%) referred to honesty and
morality—and only 11% referred to physical attractiveness. Furthermore, research on
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precarious manhood has suggested that whereas womanhood is a physical status, manhood is
a social status that is only attained when men behave in a sufficiently masculine manner and
take on sufficiently masculine roles—and that can be lost at any moment if men fail to live
up to social expectations (Vandello & Bosson, 2013). Finally, unlike physical femininity in
women, physical masculinity in men is not consistently associated with ratings of physical
attractiveness (Rhodes, 2006). Indeed, in some studies, facially feminine men have been rated
as more attractive than facially masculine men (Penton-Voak et al., 2004). If men are
invested in appearing physically attractive, then, they may not seek to appear particularly
physically masculine. Thus, men may be primarily concerned with being psychologically and
behaviorally masculine, rather than with looking masculine, and may experience anxiety in
response to threats to the gender stereotypicality of their personalities but not their
appearances.
The primary goal of Study 2 was to compare women’s and men’s responses to
threats to the gender stereotypicality of their physical appearances and personalities. We
predicted that among women, those whose physical femininity was threatened would
experience higher levels of state anxiety than those whose physical femininity was affirmed
but that those whose psychological femininity was threatened would not experience higher
levels of state anxiety than those whose psychological femininity was affirmed. We predicted
that among men, those whose psychological masculinity was threatened would experience
higher levels of state anxiety than those whose psychological masculinity was affirmed. We
also predicted that among men, those whose physical masculinity was threatened would not
experience higher levels of state anxiety than those whose physical masculinity was affirmed.
This latter prediction was more tentative than the others, however, because, as described
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earlier, we also had reason to believe that men might, indeed, find threats to their physical
masculinity anxiety-provoking.
A secondary goal of Study 2 was to examine a possible mediator of the predicted
effects of femininity and masculinity threats on state anxiety (and potentially state selfesteem, as in Study 1c, physical femininity threats, relative to physical femininity
affirmations, produced reduced self-esteem in women). Although across Studies 1a-c we
found strong evidence that women experience anxiety in response to physical femininity
threats, compared to affirmations, we did not explore potential mechanisms underlying this
observed effect, and to our knowledge, past research has not explored mechanisms
underlying the relationships between masculinity threats and anxiety in men. To fully
understand experiences with gender stereotypicality threats and eventually pave the way for
interventions to mitigate the harmful consequences of these threats, it is important to
determine why these threats produce anxiety and possibly reduced self-esteem.
Women and men may experience threats to their femininity and masculinity,
respectively, as threats to their identity, and experiences with identity invalidation have been
linked to increased stress and anxiety (Albuja et al., 2019; Murray et al., 2012) and reduced
self-esteem (Garr-Schultz & Gardner, 2019; Townsend et al., 2009). Thus, we examined felt
identity invalidation as a potential mediator of the predicted relationship between gender
stereotypicality threat and state anxiety and the possible relationship between gender
stereotypicality threat and state self-esteem.
We also explored gender identity as a potential alternative mediator. We did not
specifically anticipate that gender identity would vary by condition but sought to consider
this possibility, given that gender identity can be contextually dependent (Mehta, 2015).
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Mediation analysis cannot directly demonstrate that an effect of gender
stereotypicality threat on identity invalidation causes increased anxiety or reduced self-esteem
(MacKinnon et al., 2007). It can, however, provide preliminary evidence for felt identity
invalidation as a mechanism underlying the potential relationships between gender
stereotypicality threat and both anxiety and self-esteem. Thus, it is an important starting
point for investigations into the psychological mechanisms by which gender stereotypicality
threats, relative to affirmations, produce negative psychological consequences.
Method
Hypotheses, methods, and analyses for this study were preregistered (see
https://osf.io/shkn3/?view_only=ccfab0f6cc2e426daa91204fc167fd0d).
Participants and Design
This study utilized a 2 (participant gender: female, male) x 2 (domain: physical
appearance, personality) x 2 (feedback: affirmation, threat) factorial design. Participants were
randomly assigned to a domain condition and a feedback condition. Participants were
recruited through Prolific and paid $2.28 for their participation.
We predicted a three-way interaction, such that women would experience anxiety in
response to threats to the femininity of their physical appearance but not threats to the
femininity of their personality, whereas men would experience anxiety in response to threats
to the masculinity of their personality but not threats to the masculinity of their physical
appearance. In Study 1c, women whose physical femininity was threatened experienced more
anxiety than those whose physical femininity was affirmed. Therefore, to determine whether
this effect would be eliminated when the domain switched from physical appearance to
personality, we powered our study to detect an effect half the size of the main effect from
Study 1c (A. Ledgerwood, personal communication, September 11, 2019; Ledgerwood, 2019,

102
2020).16 A power analysis using G*Power determined that a sample of N=938 would be
needed to detect this interaction with 80% power. We expected the opposite result for
men—that those whose masculinity within the domain of personality was threatened would
experience more anxiety than those whose masculinity within the domain of personality was
affirmed but that this effect would be eliminated when the domain switched from
personality to physical appearance. Thus we needed 938 male participants to detect this
interaction with 80% power, for a total sample size of 1876. Based on Study 1c, we
anticipated that approximately 16% of recruited participants would be ineligible, fail an
attention check, and/or not upload a valid photograph. Therefore, we attempted to enroll
2234 participants.
Thirty-five responses were from participants who had already taken the survey, so
these responses were excluded, leaving us with an initial sample size of 2199 participants. Six
hundred twenty-five participants were then excluded because they did not identify as a
cisgender female or male (n=18), did not submit a valid video (n = 358), failed the attention
check (which required that they accurately recall whether they received feedback on their
physical appearance or their personality and whether that feedback indicated that they were
more, less, or as feminine [or masculine] as the average person in their gender and age group;
n = 294), dropped out before being assigned to a condition (n = 4), and/or clearly believed
that the feedback they received was not produced by video analysis software (n = 87). Thus,
we were left with a sample size of 1574 (822 female, 752 male; Mage = 31.08, SD = 11.00;
76.94% heterosexual; 67.79% White; 8.01% Black; 7.05% Hispanic or Latina; 5.59% East

16

This power analysis was based on an effect size obtained through a preliminary analysis of
Study 1c data, which focused on four of the six items in the state anxiety measure and which
was completed before the data were fully cleaned (f = 0.18), rather than final analyses (f =
0.21).

103
Asian; 3.30% South Asian; 0.70% Middle Eastern or Arab American; 0.19% Native
American or Alaskan Native; 0.13% Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; 7.24% other or
multiracial/ethnic). The number of exclusions was high but not unreasonably so given that
this was an online study in which participants were asked to use an embedded video recorder
on their computer. Because the final sample size was smaller than intended, we conducted
sensitivity power analyses (G*Power 3.1; Faul et al., 2007), which indicated that we were
powered to detect two two-way interactions (in female and male participants) with effect
sizes of f = 0.10 (with 80% power and α = .05).
Procedure
The procedure was similar to that of Study 1c, with a few changes, all of which are
noted here. In this study, participants were instructed to record videos, rather than upload
photographs, of themselves. Specifically, they were instructed to record a 1-2-minute video
in which they introduced themselves as they would to a person they were meeting for the
first time. Videos were recorded using an embedded recorder from addpipe.com.
Additionally, because this study sought to compare responses to feedback about
one’s gender stereotypicality in two distinct domains, participants were told that the software
uses a neural network to assess the femininity/masculinity of either one’s facial appearance,
in the physical appearance condition, or one’s personality, in the personality condition,
compared to others in one’s gender and age group. Participants in this study did not see any
lists of characteristics that supposedly determine masculinity/femininity.
Finally, Study 2 omitted the measures of desire to change photograph, attributions
for results, perceived bipolarity of physical femininity and masculinity, importance of results,
and feminine identity centrality, which were included in Study 1c for exploratory purposes. It
included new measures of felt identity invalidation and gender identity, described in the

104
Measures section. We included measures of felt identity invalidation to examine whether
they mediated the predicted interactive effects of domain and feedback on state anxiety. We
included gender identity to explore it as a potential alternative mediator. The measure of
gender identity was distinct from the measures of gender identity centrality used in Studies 1a
and 1c, as whereas the latter focused on the extent to which being female and/or feminine
was central to one’s overall sense of self, the former focused on the extent to which one felt
female and/or feminine [or male and/or masculine] in the first place. (For example, one
might feel very feminine but not think of femininity as an important part of their overall
identity.) The measures of both felt identity invalidation and gender identity were
administered following the measures of state anxiety and state self-esteem.
We probed for participant suspicion using the same questions used in Studies 1b and
1c. These responses were coded for suspicion by three coders. One coder coded responses
from all participants; the other two coders coded responses from half of the participants.
Two-way random effects models indicated acceptable inter-rater reliability (ICC1 = .72, 95%
CI [.68, .76]; ICC2 = .75, 95% CI [.73, .79]). As in Studies 1b and 1c, participants were
excluded if both coders rated their suspicion level as 2.
Measures
As in Studies 1a-c, the primary dependent variable of interest was state anxiety. As in
Studies 1b and 1c, a measure of state self-esteem was included as an exploratory dependent
variable. Measures of felt identity invalidation and gender identity were also included as
exploratory mediators. For correlations among all measured variables, see Tables 2.6 (for
female participants) and 2.7 (for male participants).
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State anxiety. As in Studies 1a-c, participants completed the 6-item short form version of the
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Marteau & Bekker, 1992). The scale demonstrated high
internal reliability (α = .86).
State self-esteem. As in Studies 1b and 1c, participants rated their agreement with eleven items
taken and modified from the State Self-Esteem Scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). This scale
demonstrated high internal reliability (α = .94). State self-esteem was highly correlated with
state anxiety, r(1571) = -0.67, p < .001.
Felt identity invalidation. We use the term “felt identity invalidation” to refer to the sense that
one’s internal sense of self or membership in a group of which one considers oneself a part
is denied or not recognized by others (Cheryan & Monin, 2005). We measured felt identity
invalidation to determine whether it mediated the predicted interactive effects of domain and
feedback condition on state anxiety and potentially state self-esteem. Participants rated their
agreement with thirteen statements on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). A
factor analysis using principal components analysis with varimax rotation, along with an
examination of the correlations among all felt identity invalidation items (see Supplementary
materials for both), suggested that the felt identity invalidation items tapped into three
underlying constructs: (a) felt gender identity invalidation (i.e., the extent to which participants
felt that their internal sense of femaleness [maleness], womanhood [manhood], and/or
femininity [masculinity] was not recognized by others); (b) felt global identity invalidation (i.e.,
the extent to which participants felt that their overall internal sense of self was not recognized
by others); and (c) results-identity discrepancy (i.e., the extent to which participants felt that
the feedback they had received was inconsistent with their sense of self). Specifically, the
factor analysis indicated that all of the reverse-scored items that asked about gender identity
invalidation loaded onto the first factor, all of the regularly-scored items that asked about
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gender identity invalidation loaded onto the second factor, and all of the items that asked
about global identity invalidation loaded onto the third factor. The results-identity
discrepancy item did not load onto any of these three factors. We did not, however, interpret
the first two factors as necessarily conceptually distinct; rather, it seemed possible that the
distinction between the reverse-scored and regularly-scored gender identity invalidation
items was a result of shared method variance within each of these clusters of items. The
correlation matrix revealed that correlations between the reverse-scored and regularly-scored
gender identity invalidation items ranged from .34 - .50. We thus deemed them sufficiently
correlated to include together in a single scale, which left the felt global identity invalidation
items and the results-identity discrepancy item to be measured separately.
Felt gender identity invalidation. Participants rated their agreement with the following statements:
“I feel validated as a female [male]” (R); “I feel that my identity as a female [male] is
recognized by others” (R); “I am concerned that others do not recognize my ‘femaleness’
[‘maleness’];” “I feel validated as feminine [masculine]” (R); “I feel that my identity as
feminine [masculine] is recognized by others” (R); “I am concerned that others do not
recognize my femininity [masculinity];” “I feel validated as a woman [man]” (R); “I feel that
my identity as a woman [man] is recognized by others” (R); “I am concerned that others do
not recognize my womanhood [manhood].” These nine items demonstrated high internal
reliability (α = .91).
Felt global identity invalidation. Participants rated their agreement with the following statements:
“I feel that my identity is recognized by others” (R); “I do not feel that other people see me
for who I really am;” “Other people’s sense of who I am aligns with who I feel I am” (R).
These items demonstrated acceptable internal reliability (α = .75).
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Results-identity discrepancy. Participants rated their agreement with the statement “I feel like the
results I received are consistent with my beliefs about who I really am” (R) (adapted from
Bosson and colleagues’ [2012] measure of threats to belonging and coherence).
Gender identity. We were interested in gender identity as a potential alternative mediator of the
predicted interactive effects of domain and feedback on state anxiety and potentially state
self-esteem. Participants rated their agreement with the following statements regarding their
identity on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so): “I feel like a female [male];” “On the
inside, I feel feminine” (reverse-scored for men); “On the inside, I feel masculine” (reversescored for women). (Both female and male participants completed the latter two items.)
They also rated their agreement with the statement “I feel like a woman [man],” which we
included in case participants’ level of identification with the term “female [male]” differed
from their identification with the term “woman [man].” Measuring gender identity using this
sort of scale has precedent in the literature (Ho & Mussap, 2019). These items demonstrated
high internal reliability (α = .83).
Self-perceived femininity/masculinity. We assessed the effectiveness of the manipulations by
asking participants to rate the femininity (for women) or masculinity (for men) of their
physical appearance and personality, compared to the average person in their gender and age
group, on 7-point scales ranging from “Much less feminine [masculine]” to “Much more
feminine [masculine].”
Results
For clarity of presentation, we report only those results that are most relevant to the
aims of this study. For example, when main effects are qualified by two-way interactions and
two-way interactions are qualified by three-way interactions, only the highest-order
interactions are reported. Additional results can be found in the Supplemental Materials.

110
Manipulation Checks
To analyze the effectiveness of our manipulations, we began by recoding
participants’ ratings of their gender stereotypicality so that we could analyze female and male
participants’ ratings together. We recoded male participants’ self-perceived masculinity of
appearance and female participants’ self-perceived femininity of appearance as “selfperceived gender stereotypicality of appearance” and male participants’ self-perceived
masculinity of personality and female participants’ self-perceived femininity of personality as
“self-perceived gender stereotypicality of personality.” We then further recoded so that the
ratings of participants in the appearance condition and participants in the personality
condition could be analyzed together. For participants who had received feedback on their
appearance, we recoded self-perceived gender stereotypicality of appearance and for
participants who had received feedback on their personality we recoded self-perceived
gender stereotypicality of personality as “self-perceived gender stereotypicality within the
relevant domain.”
To confirm that we had successfully manipulated self-perceived gender
stereotypicality within the relevant domain, we ran a 2 x 2 ANOVA with domain and
feedback as independent variables. This ANOVA revealed the anticipated main effect of
feedback, F(1, 1570)=113.54, p < .001, f = 0.27, such that participants in the affirmation
condition reported higher levels of gender stereotypicality within the relevant domain (M =
4.70, SD = 1.38) than participants in the threat condition (M = 3.96, SD = 1.43). It also
revealed an unexpected effect of domain, F(1, 1570) = 37.67, p < .001, f = 0.15, such that
levels of self-perceived gender stereotypicality of physical appearance among participants
who received feedback on their physical appearance (M = 4.53, SD = 1.40) were higher than
levels of self-perceived gender stereotypicality of personality among participants who
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received feedback on their personality (M = 4.12, SD = 1.48). However, there was no
interaction between feedback and domain, F(1, 1570) = 0.01, p = .94, f = 0.002, indicating
that the effect of the feedback (affirmation vs. threat) did not significantly differ by domain.
Primary Analyses
To test our primary prediction that women would experience anxiety in response to
threats to the femininity of their appearance but not their personality and that men would
experience anxiety in response to threats to the masculinity of their personality but not their
appearance, we conducted a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with participant gender, domain, and
feedback as the independent variables.
Although this ANOVA did not reveal a significant participant gender x domain x
feedback interaction, F(1, 1566) = 1.87, p = .171, f = 0.03, we broke down our sample by
participant gender, as preregistered, because our sample was powered to detect two two-way
interactions (one within female participants and one within male participants), rather than a
three-way interaction. (Indeed, a sensitivity power analysis [G*Power 3.1; Faul et al., 2007]
indicated that we were only powered to detect a three-way interaction with an effect size of f
= .07 with 80% power and α = .05).
Among male participants, there was no domain x feedback interaction, F(1, 748) =
1.14, p = .286, f = 0.04—only a main effect of feedback, F(1, 748) = 14.04, p < .001, f =
0.14, such that those whose masculinity was threatened reported higher levels of anxiety (M
= 1.87, SD = 0.62) than those whose masculinity was affirmed (M = 1.70, SD = 0.62).
Surprisingly and contrary to our prediction, further pre-registered analyses revealed that the
effect of feedback on anxiety was only significant for participants who received feedback on
the masculinity of their appearance, F(1, 389) = 12.69, p < .001, f = 0.18 (see Table 2.2 for
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means), though the effect for feedback on the masculinity of their personality was in the
predicted direction, albeit not statistically significant, F(1, 359) = 3.28, p = .071, f = 0.10.
Among female participants, we observed the predicted domain x feedback
interaction, F(1, 818) = 8.96, p = .003, f = 0.10. Within the domain of physical appearance,
participants whose femininity was threatened reported levels of anxiety higher (M = 2.15, SD
= 0.67) than those of participants whose femininity was affirmed (M = 1.83, SD = 0.64),
F(1, 425) = 26.30, p < .001, f = 0.25 (see Table 2.2). Within the domain of personality, there
was no effect of feedback, F(1, 393) = 0.58, p = .446, f = 0.04. Within this domain,
participants whose femininity was threatened reported levels of anxiety comparable (M =
1.88, SD = 0.68) to those of participants whose femininity was affirmed (M = 1.83, SD =
0.64).17
Exploratory Analyses
State self-esteem. We conducted another 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA to examine the effects of
participant gender, domain, feedback, and the interactions among these variables on state
self-esteem. This ANOVA revealed a three-way interaction, F(1, 1565) = 5.87, p = .016, f =
0.06. There was a significant domain x feedback interaction among female, F(1, 818) =
14.66, p < .001, f = 0.13, but not male, F(1, 747) = 0.13, p = .716, f = 0.01, participants.
There was also no main effect of feedback among male participants, F(1, 747) = 2.05, p =
.153, f = 0.05. Female participants whose physical femininity was threatened reported lower
levels of state self-esteem (M = 3.75, SD = 0.99) than female participants whose physical
femininity was affirmed (M = 4.20, SD = 0.92), F(1, 425) = 23.15, p < .001, f = 0.23.

17

As preregistered, we also ran two binary logistic regressions, one for female participants
and one for male participants, to examine whether domain, feedback, and/or the interaction
between these variables influenced the likelihood that participants would report any state
anxiety. See Supplemental Materials.
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However, there was no effect of feedback (threat vs. affirmation) on self-esteem among
female participants who received feedback on the femininity of their personality, F(1, 393) =
0.41, p = .525, f = 0.03. Means for self-esteem among participants who received feedback on
their physical appearance are presented in Table 2.4.
Potential Mediators
One aim of Study 2 was to determine whether felt identity invalidation (in the form
of felt gender identity invalidation, felt global identity invalidation, and/or results-identity
discrepancy) and/or gender identity could help to explain the effects of gender
stereotypicality feedback on state anxiety and state self-esteem. We began by looking at the
effects of participant gender, domain, and feedback on the potential mediators.
Felt gender identity invalidation. We conducted a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA to examine the potential
effects of participant gender, domain, and feedback—and the interactions among these
variables—on felt gender identity invalidation. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of
feedback, F(1, 1565) = 26.05, p < .001, f = 0.13, such that those whose gender
stereotypicality was threatened reported higher levels of felt gender identity invalidation (M
= 2.47, SD = 1.24) than those whose gender stereotypicality was affirmed (M = 2.17, SD =
1.02).
There was no participant gender x domain x feedback interaction, F(1, 1565) = 0.07,
p = .795, f = 0.01—and no domain x feedback interaction among female or male participants
(ps > .35).
All other results for felt gender identity invalidation are presented as Supplemental
Materials.
Felt global identity invalidation. We also conducted a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA to examine the potential
effects of participant gender, domain, and feedback—and the interactions among these
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variables—on felt global identity invalidation. This ANOVA revealed no significant effects
(ps > .08). We broke the sample down by gender and found no evidence for domain x
feedback interactions among female or male participants (ps > .75).
Results-identity discrepancy. We conducted another 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA to examine the potential
effects of participant gender, domain, and feedback—and the interactions among these
variables—on participants’ sense that the feedback they received was inconsistent their
beliefs about who they really are. The ANOVA also revealed a three-way participant gender
x domain x feedback interaction, F(1, 1566) =9.99, p = .002, f =0.07.
A two-way ANOVA revealed a domain x feedback interaction among male
participants, F(1, 748) = 11.31, p < .001, f = 0.11. Among male participants who received
feedback on their personality, there was an effect of feedback, F(1, 359) = 43.73, p < .001, f
= 0.35, such that those whose gender stereotypicality was threatened felt a greater
discrepancy between their results and identity (M = 3.97, SD = 1.82) than those whose
gender stereotypicality was affirmed (M = 2.78, SD = 1.59). There was an even stronger
effect of feedback among male participants who received feedback on their appearance, F(1,
389) = 157.90, p < .001, f = 0.64, such that again, those whose gender stereotypicality was
threatened felt a greater discrepancy between their results and identity (M = 4.43, SD = 1.72)
than those whose gender stereotypicality was affirmed (M = 2.44, SD = 1.40).
Another two-way ANOVA revealed an even stronger domain x feedback interaction
among female participants, F(1, 818) = 68.77, p < .001, f = 0.25. Among female participants
who received feedback on their personality, there was an effect of feedback, F(1, 393) =
24.09, p < .001, f = 0.25, such that those whose gender stereotypicality was threatened felt a
greater discrepancy between their results and identity (M = 3.51, SD = 1.83) than those
whose gender stereotypicality was affirmed (M = 2.66, SD = 1.62). There was an even
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stronger effect of feedback among female participants who received feedback on their
appearance, F(1, 425) = 373.44, p < .001, f = 1.07, such that those whose gender
stereotypicality was threatened felt a greater discrepancy between their results and identity
(M = 4.84, SD = 1.59) than those whose gender stereotypicality was affirmed (M = 2.15, SD
= 1.25).
All other results for felt results-identity discrepancy are presented as Supplemental
Materials.
Gender identity. We were also interested in gender identity as a potential alternative mediator
of the effects of feedback (threat vs. affirmation) on state anxiety and state self-esteem. We
conducted a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA to analyze the effects of participant gender, domain, and
feedback—and the interactions among these variables—on gender identity.
This ANOVA revealed a main effect of feedback, F(1, 1565) = 5.80, p = .016, f =
0.06, such that participants whose gender stereotypicality was affirmed reported a more
gender-congruent gender identity (M = 6.01, SD = 0.97) than those whose gender
stereotypicality was threatened (M = 5.89, SD = 1.01). No other effects were significant (ps
> .08).
For exploratory purposes, we broke down the sample by gender and found no
evidence for an effect of feedback, F(1, 748) = 0.32, p = .571, f = 0.02 , or a domain x
feedback interaction, F(1, 748) = 0.07, p = .796, f = 0.01, among male participants. There
was, however, evidence for an effect of feedback among female participants, F(1, 817) =
8.12, p = .004, I= 0.10, such that those whose femininity was affirmed reported a more
gender-congruent gender identity (M = 6.06, SD = 1.01) than those whose femininity was
threatened (M = 5.87, SD = 1.02). There was also some evidence for a domain x feedback
interaction among female participants, though this effect did not reach statistical
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significance, F(1, 817) = 3.57, p = .059, f = 0.07. There was no effect of feedback on gender
identity among women who received feedback on their physical appearance, F(1, 424) =
0.48, p = .490, f = 0.03. There was, however, an effect of feedback on gender identity among
woman who received feedback on their personality, F(1, 393) = 10.83, p = .001, f = 0.17,
such that those whose femininity was affirmed reported a more gender-congruent gender
identity (M = 6.04, SD = 0.96) than those whose femininity was threatened (M = 5.71, SD =
1.06).
Finally, we looked separately at the effects of feedback on each of the four items in
the gender identity measure. We did not observe effects of masculinity feedback on any of
these items among men who received feedback on their physical appearance or men who
received feedback on their personality. Similarly, we observed no effects of femininity
feedback among women who received feedback on their physical appearance. We did,
however, observed effects of femininity feedback on all four items among women who
received feedback on their personality. Descriptive statistics for women in each of the four
conditions are reported in Table 2.8.
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Table 2.8
Effects of Femininity Feedback on Gender Identity
Physical appearance
Threat

Affirmation

M (SD)

M (SD)

I feel like a
female.

6.31 (1.08)

6.38 (1.08)

I feel like a
woman.

6.17 (1.18)

On the inside,
I feel feminine.
On the inside,
I feel
masculine. (R)

Personality
Threat

Affirmation

M (SD)

M (SD)

.485

6.09 (1.22)

6.41 (1.02)

.005

6.20 (1.19)

.807

5.98 (1.27)

6.30 (1.06)

.006

5.80 (1.35)

5.91 (1.27)

.368

5.34 (1.48)

5.71 (1.39)

.011

5.76 (1.32)

5.81 (1.33)

.670

5.42 (1.49)

5.75 (1.32)

.020

p

p

Mediation Analyses
Of the four potential mediators (felt gender identity invalidation, felt global identity
invalidation, results-identity discrepancy, and gender identity), the one with a pattern of
results most similar to that of state anxiety (and self-esteem, in women) was results-identity
discrepancy. Therefore, we ran a series of analyses using the PROCESS Macro for SPSS
(Hayes, 2013a, 2013b) to determine whether results-identity discrepancy mediated (i.e.,
helped to statistically explain) the interactive effects of domain and feedback on both state
anxiety and state self-esteem in female participants and the main effect of feedback on state
anxiety in male participants. We used bootstrapping with 5,000 samples to estimate bias
corrected confidence intervals for the indirect effects.
We began by looking at female participants and tested a moderated mediation model
(Model 7) with feedback (threat=1, affirmation=0) as the predictor variable, state anxiety as
the outcome variable, results-identity discrepancy as the mediator, and domain
(appearance=1, personality=0) as a moderator of the effect of feedback on results-identity
discrepancy. We observed indirect effects of feedback on anxiety through results-identity
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discrepancy among both participants who received feedback on their appearance and
participants who received feedback on their personality, but this indirect effect was stronger
for those in the appearance condition (B = 0.27, 95% CI [0.19, 0.34]) than those in the
personality condition (B = 0.08, 95% CI [0.05, 0.13]), supporting moderated mediation (B =
0.18; 95% CI [0.12, 0.26]). Within the domain of physical appearance, switching from
affirming to threatening feedback resulted in a 0.27-point increase in anxiety on a 4-point
scale, mediated by results-identity discrepancy. Within the domain of personality, switching
from affirming to threatening feedback resulted in a 0.08-point increase in anxiety on a 4point scale, mediated by results-identity discrepancy. There was no direct effect of feedback
on state anxiety (B = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.08, 0.12]), indicating that results-identity discrepancy
fully accounted for the effects of feedback on anxiety.
We then conducted these analyses with state self-esteem, rather than state anxiety, as
the outcome variable. We observed indirect effects of feedback on self-esteem through
results-identity discrepancy among both participants who received feedback on their
appearance and participants who received feedback on their personality, but this indirect
effect was stronger for those in the appearance condition (B = -0.38, 95% CI [-0.51, -0.28])
than those in the personality condition (B = -0.12, 95% CI = -0.19, -0.07), again supporting
moderated mediation (B = -0.26; 95% CI [-0.38, -0.17]). Within the domain of physical
appearance, switching from affirming feedback to threatening feedback resulted in a 0.38point reduction in self-esteem on a 5-point scale, mediated by results-identity discrepancy.
Within the domain of personality, switching from affirming feedback to threatening
feedback resulted in a 0.12-point reduction in self-esteem on a 5-point scale, mediated by
results-identity discrepancy. As with state anxiety, there was no direct effect of feedback on
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state self-esteem (B = 0.05, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.20]), indicating that results-identity discrepancy
fully accounted for the effects of feedback on self-esteem.
We next turned to male participants. Because male participants showed a main effect
of feedback on state anxiety but no moderation of this effect by domain, we tested a simple
mediation model (Model 4) with feedback as the predictor variable, state anxiety as the
outcome variable, and results-identity discrepancy as the mediator. We observed an indirect
effect of feedback on anxiety through results-identity discrepancy (B = 0.10, 95% CI [0.05,
0.15]), supporting mediation. Switching from affirming feedback to threatening feedback
resulted in a 0.10-point increase in anxiety on a 4-point scale, mediated by results-identity
discrepancy. There was no direct effect of feedback on state anxiety (B = 0.07, 95% CI [0.03, 0.17]), indicating that results-identity discrepancy fully accounted for the effect of
feedback on self-esteem.
Because we had not observed an effect of feedback on state self-esteem among male
participants, we did not further probe this relationship.
Discussion
Study 2 replicated and extended the results of Studies 1a and 1c by comparing
women’s and men’s psychological responses to gender stereotypicality threats within the
domains of physical appearance and personality. As predicted, women experienced greater
state anxiety when the femininity of their physical appearance, but not their personality, was
threatened than when it was affirmed. Contrary to our prediction that men would show the
opposite pattern of results for state anxiety—that is, that they would experience heightened
anxiety when the masculinity of their personality, but not their appearance, was threatened—
we found that men experienced state anxiety in response to masculinity threats across
domains. Surprisingly, when we broke down the results by domain (as pre-registered), we
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observed that the effect of feedback on anxiety was only truly significant among men who
received feedback on their physical appearance (though it was also marginally significant
among men who received feedback on their personality). This result should be interpreted
with caution, however, as there was no interaction between feedback and domain among
men—only a main effect of feedback.
Additionally, women experienced lower levels of state self-esteem when the
femininity of their physical appearance, but not their personality, was threatened than when
it was affirmed. Unlike women, men did not report different levels of state self-esteem when
their masculinity was threatened versus when it was affirmed.
A secondary goal of Study 2 was to examine potential mediators of the effects of
gender stereotypicality feedback on state anxiety and state self-esteem in women and state
anxiety in men. We considered felt gender identity invalidation, felt global identity
invalidation, results-identity discrepancy, and gender identity. We found that those whose
gender stereotypicality was threatened reported higher levels of felt gender identity
invalidation and less gender-congruent gender identities than those whose gender
stereotypicality was affirmed.
We also found that among both female and male participants, those whose gender
stereotypicality was threatened reported a discrepancy between their results and their sense
of self across domains, though this effect was stronger among those who had received
feedback on their appearance than those who had received feedback on their personality.
This difference between domains was particularly strong among female participants. Because
this pattern of results mirrored that for state anxiety (and state self-esteem, in women), we
tested results-identity discrepancy as a mediator of the relationships between feedback and
both state anxiety and state self-esteem. We found evidence that among women, the effect
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of feedback on results-identity discrepancy, moderated by domain, mediated the effects of
feedback on both state anxiety and state self-esteem. We also found evidence that among
men, the effect of feedback on results-identity discrepancy mediated the effect of feedback
on state anxiety.
The results of Study 2 demonstrate that both women and men experience anxiety in
response to threats to the gender stereotypicality of their appearances. Furthermore, these
results demonstrate that whereas for men, the effect of masculinity threat on anxiety extends
across domains (both personality and physical appearance), for women, the effect of
femininity threat on anxiety is limited to the domain of physical appearance. For both
women and men, however, the effect of gender stereotypicality threat on anxiety is stronger
within the domain of physical appearance than the domain of personality.
These results also demonstrate that threats to femininity of physical appearance, but
not femininity of personality, produce reduced self-esteem in women. Threats to masculinity
in either domain, however, do not produce reduced self-esteem (or at least self-reported selfesteem) in men, potentially because self-esteem is considered a masculine trait (Prentice &
Carranza, 2002) and thus assertions of self-esteem may serve to restore men’s sense of
masculinity in the wake of such threats (Bosson et al., 2009).
Finally, the results of Study 2 provide preliminary evidence that a sense of identity
invalidation—and specifically, the feeling that the feedback one received does not align with
one’s sense of self—may help to explain the negative psychological consequences (increased
state anxiety and reduced state self-esteem) of gender stereotypicality threats.
Internal Meta-Analysis
Because we observed the predicted effect of physical femininity feedback on state
anxiety among women in Studies 1a, 1c, and 2, but not Study 1b, we conducted an internal
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meta-analysis to assess the robustness of this effect across the four studies (Fabrigar &
Wegener, 2016). We used the procedures outlined by Goh and colleagues (2016) to calculate
mean effect size (Cohen’s d). For Studies 1a and 1b, we limited our analyses to participants
in the physical femininity affirmation and threat conditions and collapsed across physical
attractiveness feedback conditions. For Study 1c, we collapsed across lists of physical
features (present and absent) conditions. As depicted in Figure 2.2, across the four studies,
we found a main effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety among women, d =
0.38, Z = 6.74, p < .001, 95% CI [0.27, 0.50], such that women whose physical femininity
was threatened reported higher levels of state anxiety than women whose physical femininity
was affirmed.

Study 1a
Study 1b
Study 1c
Study 2
Overall
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Figure 2.2. Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) for the effect of physical femininity feedback on state
anxiety among women across studies. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Because we also observed an effect of physical femininity feedback on state selfesteem among women in Studies 1c and 2, but not Study 1b, we conducted an internal metaanalysis to assess the robustness of this effect across the three studies in which state self-
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esteem was measured. As depicted in Figure 2.3, across these three studies, we found a main
effect of physical femininity on state self-esteem among women, d = -0.34, Z = -5.55, p <
.001, 95% CI [-0.46, -0.22], such that women whose physical femininity was threatened
reported lower levels of state self-esteem than women whose physical femininity was
affirmed.

Study 1b
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Figure 2.3. Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) for the effect of physical femininity feedback on state
self-esteem among women across studies. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
For exploratory purposes, we also conducted internal meta-analyses to determine
whether there was any evidence that physical femininity feedback affects state anxiety or
self-esteem among non-heterosexual women, who are often rated as more physically
masculine than heterosexual women (Johnson et al., 2007; Lyons et al., 2014; Rieger et al.,
2010) and who may be more likely than heterosexual women to have an intentionally
masculine gender presentation (Halberstam, 1996; Rubin, 2006). Sensitivity power analyses
indicated that we could detect effect sizes of d = 0.30 for anxiety and d = 0.31 for selfesteem with 80% power. As depicted in Figure 2.4, across the four studies, we observed a
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main effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety among non-heterosexual women
(n = 351), d = 0.25, Z = 3.19, p = .001, 95% CI [0.13, 0.56], such that those whose physical
femininity was threatened reported higher levels of state anxiety than women whose physical
femininity was affirmed.

Study 1a
Study 1b
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Figure 2.4. Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) for the effect of physical femininity feedback on state
anxiety among non-heterosexual women across studies. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.
As depicted in Figure 2.5, we also observed a main effect of physical femininity
feedback on state self-esteem among non-heterosexual women (n = 328), d = -0.43, Z = 3.82, p < .001 , 95% CI [-0.65, -0.21], such that women whose physical femininity was
threatened reported lower levels of state self-esteem than women whose physical femininity
was affirmed.
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Figure 2.5. Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) for the effect of physical femininity feedback on state
self-esteem among non-heterosexual women across studies. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.
General Discussion
Past research has suggested that whereas men experience increased anxiety in
response to threats to their masculinity, women do not experience increased anxiety in
response to threats to their femininity (Vandello et al., 2008). That research, however,
focused on threats to psychological masculinity and femininity. In the current studies, we
examined whether women experience anxiety in response to threats to their physical
femininity.
Across these studies, women indeed experienced higher levels of anxiety when the
femininity of their physical appearance was threatened than when it was affirmed (Studies 1a,
1c, & 2). Whereas threats to physical femininity appeared to produce increases in anxiety
(relative to control), affirmations of physical femininity appeared to produce reductions in
anxiety (Study 1a). Although we did not observe an effect of physical femininity feedback on
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levels of state anxiety in Study 1b, results from an internal meta-analysis revealed that this
effect was robust across the four studies.
Furthermore, we found evidence that this heightened anxiety was not a product of
the threat to physical attractiveness that a threat to physical femininity might be thought to
represent. In other words, women found threats to physical femininity to be anxietyinducing in and of themselves. Additionally, the effect of physical femininity feedback on
state anxiety was not contingent upon participants being given explicit information about the
physical features upon which judgments of physical femininity and masculinity are based
(Study 1c). Threats to physical femininity were anxiety-inducing regardless of whether or not
participants were given information about what constitutes physical femininity.
We also found evidence across these studies that in addition to producing increased
anxiety, threats to physical femininity, relative to affirmations of physical femininity, produce
reductions in self-esteem among women (Studies 1c & 2 and internal meta-analysis with
Studies 1b, 1c, & 2).
Furthermore, we found initial evidence that women who receive feedback indicating
that they are less physically feminine than average may be less inclined than those who
receive feedback indicating that they are more physically feminine than average to view this
feedback as important and stable (Study 1c). These results are preliminary, however, and
must be replicated before any firm conclusions can be drawn from them.
Additionally, in Study 2, which compared women’s and men’s psychological
responses to feedback on the gender stereotypicality of their physical appearances and
personalities, we found evidence that whereas men experience anxiety in response to gender
stereotypicality threats across two different domains (physical appearance and personality),
women’s anxiety response is limited to gender stereotypicality threats within the domain of
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physical appearance. We also found evidence that whereas threats to physical femininity,
relative to affirmations of physical femininity, produce reduced self-esteem in women,
neither threats to physical masculinity nor threats to masculinity of personality produce
reduced self-esteem in men. Explaining this gender difference in the effects of gender
stereotypicality feedback on self-esteem would require more research. Given that having
high self-esteem is a gender-intensified prescriptive stereotype for men (Prentice & Carranza,
2002), it is possible that for men, assertions of self-esteem serve as a form of
compensation—that is, a means of restoring their sense of masculinity after it has been
threatened. This explanation is speculative, however, and must be explored further before
any conclusions about the reasons for this gender difference can be drawn.
Study 2 also provided preliminary evidence that a feeling of identity invalidation—
and more specifically, a discrepancy between the feedback one received and one’s beliefs
about who one really is—may explain why gender stereotypicality threats within the domain
of physical appearance induce anxiety and reduced self-esteem in women and why gender
stereotypicality threats across domains induce anxiety in men. This finding is consistent with
past research on consequences of identity invalidation (Albuja et al., 2019; Murray et al.,
2012) and, as discussed later in this section, should be explored in more depth in future
work.
Given that the only effects we consistently tested and observed across studies were
those of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety and state self-esteem, we focus on
these consistent findings throughout the remainder of our discussion. These findings present
a challenge to the notion that unlike men, women do not experience anxiety in response to
threats to their gender stereotypicality. They suggests that women may not, in fact, be less
concerned with being feminine than men are with being masculine. Rather, whereas men
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seem to be concerned with achieving and maintaining masculinity across domains (i.e., in
terms of both personality and appearance), women may be concerned with achieving and
maintaining femininity within the domain of physical appearance in particular.
At a theoretical level, the current results broaden prevailing understandings of gender
stereotypes—and of femininity in particular. Although nearly forty years ago, Deaux and
Lewis (1984) suggested that gender stereotypes comprise four domains—personality traits,
role behaviors, occupations, and physical appearance—the majority of the literature on
gender stereotypes has continued to focus primarily (albeit not exclusively) on psychological
forms of gender stereotypes. Studies on threats to gender stereotypicality in particular have
given participants feedback on their masculinity and femininity on the basis of their
knowledge, personality, interests, or task performance (Frederick et al., 2017; Hunt et al.,
2016; Lee-Won et al., 2017; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004). Thus, the conclusions that have
been drawn from these studies are limited by their focus on one domain of gender
stereotypicality. Given our finding that women do indeed experience anxiety—and reduced
self-esteem—in response to threats to the gender stereotypicality of their physical appearances,
the current studies serve as a call to gender researchers to expand the scope of their inquiry
to include all four domains of stereotypes that Deaux and Lewis proposed (1984).
Furthermore, they suggest that research on appearance-related gender stereotypes should
move beyond a focus on physical attractiveness (Prentice & Carranza, 2002) to a broader
examination of the pressure on women to appear feminine.
Although the current studies present a new perspective on the previous finding that
men, but not women, experience anxiety in response to threats to their gender
stereotypicality and suggest that women do indeed experience such anxiety, as well as reduced
self-esteem, our findings should not be interpreted as disputing other theories and evidence
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that have sought to explain this earlier finding. Our results are not, for example, inconsistent
with previous accounts suggesting that manhood but not womanhood is a precarious social
status (Vandello & Bosson, 2013), that masculinity within the domains of personality, role
behaviors, and occupations is higher status than femininity (Feinman, 1981), or that
femininity in men is more associated with presumptions of same-gender sexual orientation
than masculinity in women is (McCreary, 1994). Nor, however, do our results directly
support any of these accounts. Rather, they exist in parallel with previous explanations for
men and women’s discrepant responses to feedback indicating that they are counterstereotypical.
At a practical level, the current findings help to elucidate the lived experiences of
women by pointing to a previously underexplored contributor to anxiety and low self-esteem
in women. They may also help to explain the great deal of resources—in terms of both time
(Today/AOL, 2014) and money (Harris Poll, 2014)—that women spend on femininity work,
including facial hair removal (Toerien et al., 2005) and cosmetic application (Today/AOL,
2014). Thus, these results have the potential to inform interventions that can improve
women’s psychological well-being. Specifically, they suggest that discussion of the pressure
on women to appear physically feminine and the negative psychological consequences of
believing one is physically counter-stereotypical should be incorporated into guidelines for
clinical practice with women (American Psychological Association, Girls and Women
Guidelines Group, 2018), just as the pressure on men to act in a sufficiently masculine
manner is addressed in guidelines for clinical practice with men (American Psychological
Association, Boys and Men Guidelines Group, 2018). The current results also suggest that
beyond contributing to women’s insecurities about body shape and size (Grabe et al., 2008),
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advertisements for beauty products and procedures—such as hair removal and cosmetics—
may reinforce women’s anxiety about not appearing sufficiently feminine.
Although the current work has a number of important theoretical and practical
implications, it also has several limitations that highlight key areas for future research. First,
our samples consisted primarily of White women (69%-81%). Thus we cannot assume that
the results from these studies would generalize to women of color. In fact, given that racial
stereotypes are highly gendered (Galinsky et al., 2013; Goff et al., 2008) and that definitions
of femininity in the United States are highly Eurocentric (Cole, 2009; Collins, 2004), we
would expect women’s responses to threats to their femininity to vary as a function of race.
Black women are thought of by many as non-prototypical women (Thomas et al., 2014) and
are often perceived as more physically masculine than White women (Goff et al., 2008; Lei et
al., 2020). Thus, they likely experience more chronic threats to their femininity than women
of other racial groups do. Black women might therefore be sensitized to these sorts of
threats—and thus especially affected by them. On the other hand, they might be desensitized
to these sorts of threats—and thus especially resistant to their negative consequences.
Indeed, evidence suggests that on average Black women are more satisfied with their
appearances than White women are (Jefferson & Stake, 2009; York-Crowe & Williamson,
2005). Because across the current studies only 103 Black women received feedback on the
femininity of their physical appearance, we did not have adequate power to determine
whether this feedback affected their levels of anxiety (we could detect d = 0.55 with 80%
power) or self-esteem (we could detect d = 0.60 with 80% power). Future research should
recruit a more racially diverse sample and oversample Black women to examine how women
of different races respond to threats to their physical femininity. Future research should also
recruit a sample that is more diverse in terms of age, as the mean age for participants in the
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current studies ranged from 33-37. Given the large overlap in what constitutes a “feminine”
appearance and a “youthful” appearance (Dinnerstein & Weitz, 1994; Friedman &
Zebrowitz, 1992), we might also expect to see different responses to physical femininity
threats among women who are older and who might therefore also face more chronic
threats to their femininity. Future research with more diverse samples would benefit from
the use of alternative paradigms, however, as threatening the femininity of women whose
femininity is chronically threatened could cause undue—albeit temporary—psychological
distress.
The current research is also limited by its focus on facial appearances. There are
numerous distinct elements of physical gender stereotypicality, including, but not limited to
facial appearance, overall appearance, hair style, amount of body hair, and body shape (Aube
et al., 1995; Cejka & Eagly, 1999; Deaux & Lewis, 1983; Kagan, 1964; Myers & Gonda, 1982;
Spence & Sawin, 1985). It is certainly possible—and indeed likely—that women would
respond differently to threats to different aspects of their physical femininity. In the current
studies, however, we opted to focus on facial femininity for both theoretical and practical
reasons. To draw a clear distinction between physical and psychological femininity feedback,
we wanted to focus on an aspect of appearance that is not closely tied to one’s personality.
More malleable and thus more controllable components of physical appearance (e.g.,
clothing and hairstyle) are more likely to reflect one’s personality than less malleable and thus
less controllable components (e.g., face and body shape). Additionally, whereas it reasonable
to expect that participants would find randomly assigned feedback on their facial femininity
plausible, it is less reasonable to expect that they would find randomly assigned feedback on,
say, the femininity of their hairstyle or clothing plausible. After all, participants likely have a
strong sense of what the general consensus would be about how feminine those aspects of
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their appearance are. They may have less of a clear sense, however, of how feminine others
believe their face is. Finally, extensive research has been conducted on consequences of
facial femininity and masculinity and has demonstrated that complex inferences and
judgments are often made on the basis of facial appearance (Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2014).
Thus, facial appearance was an ideal target for feedback in these studies. Future research,
however, should expand upon the current studies by examining whether our results extend
to feedback on the femininity of women’s bodily appearances.
Additionally, the current set of studies focused solely on psychological consequences of
gender stereotypicality threats. Future work should build upon this to examine behavioral
consequences of such threats—and, specifically, on potential compensatory assertions of
femininity (Cheryan & Monin, 2005). Just as men engage in traditionally masculine behaviors
following threats to their psychological masculinity (e.g., Berke et al., 2017; Bosson &
Vandello, 2011; Parent et al., 2018; Talley & Bettencourt, 2008), women may engage in
physical feminization (e.g., cosmetic application, use of photo editing applications, etc.)
following threats to their physical femininity. Examinations of potential compensation in the
wake of physical femininity threats can help to elucidate how women cope with this anxietyinducing and self-esteem-diminishing experience.
Furthermore, although Study 2 provided initial evidence that a sense of identity
invalidation may help to explain the effects of threats to gender stereotypicality on state
anxiety and self-esteem, this finding must be explored further before firm conclusions can be
drawn about the psychological mechanisms underlying the observed effects. The measures
of felt identity invalidation used in this study were not validated scales, and the measure of
results-identity discrepancy, which mediated the effect of gender stereotypicality threats on
anxiety and self-esteem, consisted of a single item—“I feel like the results I received are
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consistent with my beliefs about who I really am” (R). Although this item asked participants
to report the extent to which the feedback they received was discrepant with their beliefs
about who they really are (i.e., their identity or sense of self), participants may have
interpreted this item as referring to their beliefs about what their appearance or personality is
like (i.e., whether the results they received were accurate). Future research should therefore
develop and validate a more formal measure of felt identity invalidation to more reliably
establish whether the feeling that one’s internal sense of self or membership in a gender
group is not being recognized can account for the negative psychological effects of gender
stereotypicality threats. Future studies could also directly manipulate identity invalidation in
cisgender women and men (e.g., by leading women to believe they were mistaken for men
and men to believe they were mistaken for women) to help determine whether identity
invalidation indeed produces increased anxiety in women and men and reduced self-esteem
in women.
Finally, the results of Study 2 suggested that gender stereotypicality threats can affect
individuals’ gender identities. In this study, participants whose gender stereotypicality was
threatened reported less gender-congruent gender identities than those whose gender
stereotypicality was affirmed. This effect, however, was driven by women in the personality
condition. Indeed, the pattern of results for gender identity was the exact opposite of the
pattern of results for anxiety. (Whereas women in the personality condition were the only
group that did not experience effects of gender stereotypicality threats on anxiety, they were
also the only group that did experience effects of gender stereotypicality threats on gender
identity.) One possible explanation for these inverse results is that because psychological
femininity threats were not anxiety-inducing for women, those who received feedback
indicating that they were less feminine than average internalized this feedback and
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incorporated it into their sense of self. Indeed, the discrepancy participants felt between their
internal sense of self and the results they received appeared to be lower among women in the
personality threat condition than participants in any of the other threat conditions. It is also
possible that the reverse causal relationship was at play—that because women who received
feedback indicating that they were less feminine than average incorporated that feedback
into their sense of self, they did not find this feedback anxiety-inducing. Additional research
is therefore needed to explain these findings and to examine other ways in which external
feedback about one’s gender stereotypicality might influence one’s internal sense of self.
Conclusions
Although past work has demonstrated that women do not experience anxiety in
response to threats to their psychological femininity, the present studies reveal that women
do, indeed, experience heightened levels of anxiety—as well as reduced levels of selfesteem—in response to threats to the femininity of their physical appearance. Furthermore,
the current studies demonstrate that these effects are not the result of women interpreting
threats to their physical femininity as threats to their physical attractiveness. Rather, they may
result from a sense of identity invalidation that threats to gender stereotypicality evoke.
Finally, these studies reveal that men experience anxiety, but not reduced self-esteem, in
response to masculinity threats across the domains of personality and physical appearance—
but that this effect is particularly strong in the case of threats to physical masculinity.
Overall, this research suggests that conversations about gender stereotyping and the
consequences thereof should be expanded to include expectations about not only women
and men’s psychological characteristics but their physical characteristics, as well.
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Gender stereotypes represent beliefs about both what women and men are like
(descriptive stereotypes) and what women and men should be like (prescriptive stereotypes)
(Burgess & Borgida, 1999; Heilman, 2001; Fiske & Stevens, 1993). A major portion of
literature on the content and consequences of gender stereotypes has focused on what can
broadly be described as psychological characteristics—primarily personality traits but also
interests and cognitive abilities. Gender stereotypes, however, comprise both psychological
and physical attributes (Cejka & Eagly, 1999; Deaux & Lewis, 1983, 1984; Kagan, 1964), and
this dissertation focuses on the latter. Across four studies, I find that whereas men
experience anxiety in response to threats to their masculinity across the domains of
personality and physical appearance, women only experience anxiety (as well as reduced selfesteem) in response to threats to the femininity of their physical appearance. Furthermore, I
find that identity invalidation—and specifically, a sense that one’s internal sense of self is not
externally recognized—may underlie these effects.
Although this dissertation represents an important first step toward understanding
the phenomenon of femininity threat, given the dearth of previous research on this topic,
much work remains to be done. In this concluding chapter, I therefore present a preliminary
agenda for further research on femininity threat. I begin by briefly summarizing the findings
of this dissertation. I then highlight three key contributions of these findings to the broader
field of psychology—and the psychology of gender in particular. Finally, I explore additional
questions about femininity threat that were not answered—or not fully answered—in this
dissertation. By pursuing these questions, future research can develop a richer and more
comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms, consequences, and generalizability of the
negative effects of physical femininity threats on women.
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Summary of Dissertation
In Chapter 1 of my dissertation, I provided an overview of key constructs—namely,
gender stereotypes, gender identity, gender stereotypicality threats, and identity
invalidation—and highlighted several gaps in the literature on gender stereotypes that require
further attention. First, I called for more research on the physical components of gender
stereotypes (Cejka & Eagly, 1999; Deaux & Lewis, 1983, 1984; Kagan, 1964). Second, I
argued that stereotypes about physical appearance are particularly central to how people
think about femininity (Aube et al., 1995; Spence & Sawin, 1985) and therefore that by
neglecting stereotypes within this domain, past work may have overlooked important ways in
which stereotypes harm women. Third, I organized situations in which gender stereotypes
shape impressions of and therefore harm women along two dimensions (perspective:
external vs. internal and stereotype congruence: congruent vs. incongruent) and therefore
four categories: (a) situations in which others believe a woman is stereotypical (Eagly &
Karau, 2002; Heilman, 1983); (b) situations in which others believe a woman is counterstereotypical (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Rudman & Glick, 2001); (c) situations in which a woman
believes she is stereotypical (Spencer et al., 1999); and (d) situations in which a woman
believes she is counter-stereotypical. I noted that extensive research has examined the first
three types of situations but that the final type of situation, in which a women’s femininity is
threatened, has been largely neglected. I also noted that the paucity of research on femininity
threats stands in stark contrast with the abundance of research on masculinity threats. I
argued that although examinations of gender stereotypicality threats in men are important, so
too are examinations of these threats in women. Finally, I asserted that more research is
needed to determine whether gender stereotypicality threats have an effect on identity
and/or the sense that one’s internal identity is not externally recognized (i.e., identity
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invalidation; Campbell & Troyer, 2007; Cheryan & Monin, 2005; Franco & O’Brien, 2018).
As a whole, Chapter 1 laid the foundation for the empirical work presented in Chapter 2.
Chapter 2 sought to address the gaps in research highlighted in Chapter 1 by examining
whether women experience anxiety and/or reduced self-esteem in response to femininity
threats within the domain of physical appearance and if so, whether a sense of identity
invalidation can help to explain these effects. Study 1a, but not 1b, found that women indeed
experience anxiety in response to threats to, as compared to affirmations of, their physical
femininity, even when their physical attractiveness has been affirmed and even when
controlling for self-perceptions of physical attractiveness. Study 1c revealed that women
experience not only anxiety but also reduced self-esteem in response to these threats,
compared to affirmations, regardless of whether or not the characteristics that make up a
“feminine” appearance are laid out for them, and even when controlling for self-perceived
physical attractiveness. In Study 2, which looked at both women and men and randomly
assigned participants to receive feedback on either their physical appearance or personality, I
found that whether women experience anxiety and reduced self-esteem in response to
threats to their femininity, relative to affirmations of their femininity, depends on what
domain of femininity they receive feedback on. Only femininity threats within the domain of
physical appearance produced anxiety and reduced self-esteem. By contrast, Study 2
demonstrated that whether men experience anxiety and reduced self-esteem in response to
threats to their masculinity, compared to affirmations of their masculinity, does not depends
on what domain of masculinity they receive feedback on. Masculinity threats produced
anxiety across domains and had no effect on self-esteem in either domain. Furthermore, a
sense that the results one received were inconsistent with one’s internal sense of self (i.e.,
“results-identity discrepancy”) statistically explained the moderated effects of femininity
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feedback on anxiety and self-esteem in women and the main effect of masculinity feedback
on anxiety in men. Finally, meta-analyses of the studies presented in Chapter 2 indicated that
across studies, women—including sexual minority women—experienced anxiety and
reduced self-esteem in response to threats to their physical femininity, as compared to
affirmations of their physical femininity. Overall, Chapter 2 revealed robust effects of physical
femininity threats on anxiety and self-esteem in women.
Contributions
This research makes several contributions to the literature on the psychology of
gender. First, it challenges the prevailing wisdom that women are not distressed by threats to
their femininity. Second, it uncovers a likely mechanism underlying the effects of gender
stereotypicality threats on anxiety. Additionally, it challenges the idea that femininity and
attractiveness in women are one and the same. Finally, it highlights the consequences of
gender stereotypicality threats within a novel context. In this section, I elaborate on each of
these contributions.
Past work has suggested that men are more constrained by injunctive gender
stereotypes than women are (Sirin et al., 2004) and that as a result, men, but not women,
experience psychological distress in response to gender stereotypicality threats (Vandello et
al., 2008). This dissertation challenges this conclusion by expanding the scope of research on
gender stereotypicality threats to include stereotypes within the domain of physical
appearance and demonstrating that women indeed experience anxiety and reduced selfesteem in response to threats to their physical femininity. Buoyed by Vandello and
colleagues’ (2008) finding that men but not women experience anxiety in response to threats
to their gender stereotypicality, research on masculinity threats has taken off in recent years.
By providing clear evidence, across four studies, that women indeed experience anxiety in
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response to threats their physical femininity, the work presented in this dissertation serves as
a call for more research on this phenomenon.
Relatedly, this work also complicates the prevailing wisdom that manhood is more
“precarious” than womanhood is. The theory of precarious manhood asserts that whereas
womanhood is understood to be a biological status that is inevitably reached with age,
manhood is understood to be a social status that requires constant work to achieve and
maintain—and that can be lost at any time (Vandello & Bosson, 2013). This theory has been
supported by two main types of evidence: (i) evidence that when people think about
manhood and womanhood in general, they tend to think of the former as more social and as
requiring more work than the latter; and (ii) evidence that, as described previously, men, but
not women, experience distress in response to gender stereotypicality threats (Vandello et al.,
2008). One explanation for the first finding might be that apparent effortlessness is a key
component of idealized femininity; women are expected to engage in femininity work
without anyone being aware of it (Clarke & Griffin, 2007; Kwan & Trautner, 2009; Toerien
& Wilkinson, 2003). However, the current research does not directly speak to this piece of
evidence for the theory of precarious manhood. It does, however, directly challenge the
second piece of evidence. Because the final study presented in this dissertation found that
men experienced anxiety in response to threats to the masculinity of both their physical
appearance and their personality, some might argue that it provides additional support for
the idea that men are more readily threatened by gender stereotypicality threats than women
are—and therefore that manhood is indeed particularly precarious. I would assert, however,
that the number of domains in which people negatively respond to gender stereotypicality
threats is not the only reasonable operationalization of precariousness. Indeed, it could just
as easily be argued that because women, but not men, experienced reductions in explicit self-
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esteem in response to gender stereotypicality threats, relative to affirmations, womanhood is
more precarious than manhood is. I would disagree with this assertion, as well. The current
research cannot directly speak to the question of whether manhood is more precarious than
womanhood is. Indeed, this question might not even be an appropriate one, given that
female adults are often labeled as “girls,” rather than “women” (MacArthur et al., 2020) and
frequently do not even identify as “women” themselves (Chrisler, 2013). This research does,
however, suggest that just as men are psychologically invested in their masculinity, so, too,
are women psychologically invested in their femininity. And believing they have failed to
achieve an adequate level of femininity is psychologically distressing. Thus, this research
begins to point to the precariousness of femininity.
The work presented in this dissertation also provides evidence for a mechanism
underlying the effects of gender stereotypicality threats in both women and men. Specifically,
it indicates that a feeling of misalignment between external and internal impressions of
oneself (what we call “results-identity discrepancy” and conceptualize as a component of felt
identity invalidation) can help to explain these effects. In the final study of this dissertation,
we found that this results-identity discrepancy mediated the moderated effects of femininity
threats on anxiety and self-esteem in women and the main effects of masculinity threats on
anxiety in men. We also found that the only instance in which gender stereotypicality
feedback had no effect on anxiety (women who received feedback on their personality) was
also the only instance in which gender stereotypicality feedback had an effect on gender
identity, suggesting that gender stereotypicality threats might only be distressing to the extent
that they contradict one’s deeply held, internal sense of self. Whereas much past work has
focused on documenting the consequences of gender stereotypicality threats (for men in
particular), the current work provides insight into why these threats are hurtful.
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This dissertation also highlights the importance of distinguishing between physical
femininity and physical attractiveness, two constructs that are often conflated in research on
women’s body-related cognition and affect. In the studies presented in this dissertation, selfperceived physical femininity and self-perceived physical attractiveness were indeed
moderately to highly correlated. They were not, however, so highly correlated as to be
redundant with one another, and in none of these studies did physical attractiveness
feedback affect self-perceived physical femininity or did physical femininity feedback affect
self-perceived physical attractiveness. Despite not having any effect on self-perceived
physical attractiveness, however, physical femininity threats consistently produced anxiety
and reduced self-esteem. Thus, this dissertation suggests that fear of looking masculine, much
like fear of looking unattractive, constitutes a key component of feminine gender role
stress—or the stress associated with being a woman (Gillespie & Eisler, 1992). Past work has
highlighted the importance of achieving a feminine physical appearance among transgender
women (that is, women who were assigned to the male sex at birth; Ainsworth & Spiegel,
2010; White Hughto & Reisner, 2016; Plemons, 2017). This dissertation extends this work
and demonstrates that physical femininity—and facial femininity in particular—is important
to cisgender women, as well. By drawing attention to the distinction between femininity and
attractiveness, this dissertation broadens the scope of research on body image—and
particularly appearance (dis)satisfaction—in cisgender women.
Finally, this dissertation illustrates potential harms of software designed to assess
people’s faces and speech. Scientists are increasingly using deep learning to build artificial
neural networks (i.e., networks of algorithms) that can analyze people’s appearances and
behaviors. Researchers have developed networks to classify faces by gender (Jia &
Cristianini, 2015; Shan, 2012) and sexual orientation (Wang & Kosinski, 2018), as well as to
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evaluate people’s attractiveness (Eisenthal et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2019) and personality (Suen
et al., 2020; Wei et al., 2018). As this technology has become more widespread, so too has its
use by private businesses. Smartphone applications like FaceRate use deep learning to rate
users’ attractiveness, and platforms like HireVue use machine learning to evaluate job
applicants’ personalities (Leutner et al., 2020). As this technology becomes increasingly
“social,” it is critical for social scientists to examine not only its benefits but also its
unintended consequences.
In past work on gender stereotypicality threats, participants received feedback that
was supposedly based on their responses to a knowledge test (Lee-Won et al., 2017),
personality test (Willer et al., 2013), or interest or consumer preferences inventory (Cheryan
et al., 2015; Frederick et al., 2017). In the current studies, participants received feedback that
was supposedly based on novel software’s analysis of a photograph or video they had
uploaded. Although no photographs or videos were actually analyzed in these studies, the
description of the software that was supposedly used was based on descriptions of real deep
learning software and therefore allowed us to examine how participants would respond to
judgments that were allegedly derived from algorithms. The results of this dissertation
illuminate how psychologically harmful judgments of femininity and masculinity can be, even
in the absence of other humans. Thus, the current research indicates that before creating
software to provide people with feedback on their femininity or masculinity, researchers and
developers would be advised to consider the likely deleterious consequences of such work.
Limitations and Open Questions
More research is needed to develop a comprehensive understanding of the
phenomenon at the center of this dissertation: femininity threats. The first three studies in
this dissertation focused on documenting and exploring some of the boundary conditions of
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this phenomenon. These studies determined that physical femininity threats, relative to
physical femininity affirmations, produce anxiety and reduced self-esteem in women and
established that these effects can occur even when these threats are not interpreted as threats
to attractiveness and even when physical femininity is not defined for women. The final
study took a broader perspective on femininity threats and confirmed what we expected: that
psychological femininity threats do not produce anxiety or reduced self-esteem in women.
Although research on masculinity threats is plentiful, research on femininity threats is
not. Much additional work is therefore needed to produce a comprehensive body of
literature on this topic—particularly, on when and which women experience (or do not
experience) psychological distress in response to these threats, as well as on the effects of
these threats not only for those who have been threatened but for people in general. In this
section, I begin by considering the methods used in the current studies and provide
suggestions for how future work might expand upon them. I then lay out three urgent
directions for future work on femininity threats.
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Methodological Considerations
To my knowledge, this dissertation represents the first empirical examination of
women’s psychological responses to physical femininity threats. In designing these studies,
my collaborators and I made a number of methodological decisions, each of which had both
benefits and drawbacks. In this section, I explore three of these decisions and provide
suggestions for how future research employing similar paradigms might capitalize upon the
strengths and address the limitations of the methods used here.
In these studies, we were primarily interested in between-group differences—
specifically, differences between women whose femininity was threatened and women whose
femininity was affirmed. Thus, we randomly assigned participants to one of the feedback
conditions and compared levels of anxiety and self-esteem after participants had received
feedback on their appearance. These between-subjects designs enabled us to make the
desired comparisons between participants whose femininity was threatened and participants
whose femininity was affirmed. They did, not, however, allow us to draw definitive
conclusions about which condition(s) drove the observed effects. Although we framed these
studies largely in terms of the effects of femininity threats on anxiety and self-esteem, the
between-group differences that emerged might have also or alternatively resulted from the
effects of femininity affirmations on anxiety and self-esteem.
To gain insight into which condition(s) drove the observed effects, we included
control conditions in the first two studies. In Study 1a, in which we observed the predicted
effect of physical femininity feedback on anxiety, levels of anxiety among participants in the
control condition fell squarely between those of participants in the threat condition and
participants in the affirmation condition, thus suggesting that both feedback conditions
contributed to the observed effects. We also observed, through moderation analyses, that
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gender identity centrality predicted levels of anxiety and self-esteem following physical
femininity threats, but not physical femininity affirmations, suggesting that the effects of
feedback on these outcome variables were driven primarily by participants whose femininity
was threatened. Still, one way to determine which condition(s) produce changes in anxiety
and/or self-esteem would be to add a within-subjects component to these studies—for
instance, to measure anxiety and self-esteem both before and after participants receive
feedback. Therefore, future work examining the psychological consequences of femininity—
or masculinity—feedback would be advised to employ a pretest–posttest design.
Additionally, to gain a clearer sense of whether women’s baseline levels of anxiety
and self-esteem are closer to those reported after experiencing femininity threats or those
reported after experiencing femininity affirmations, future research might make use of
alternative control conditions. The control condition used in the first two studies in this
dissertation provided participants with an error message indicating that their photograph
could not be analyzed. Although this control was appropriate in that it ensured that
participants went through the exact same procedure as those in the experimental conditions,
it might not have been ideal given that receiving an error message about one’s physical
appearance could itself be an anxiety-inducing experience for some people (Hirsh & Inzlicht,
2008). Additionally, because we dropped the control condition in later studies, we were
unable to determine whether levels of anxiety among participants in this condition reliably
fell between those of participants in the two experimental conditions. Future research might
therefore make consistent use of a more neutral control than that used in the studies
presented here. For example, it might inform participants that they are going to receive
feedback about their femininity—but assess their anxiety and self-esteem before providing
them with that feedback.
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Finally, the current studies provided participants with feedback that was supposedly
based on a deep learning analysis of a photograph or video they had uploaded and informed
participants that the software being used to analyze their appearance (or personality, in Study
2) was trained on thousands of photographs (or videos, in Study 2) that had been rated by
panels of human coders. By grounding gender stereotypicality feedback in human ratings, we
aimed to convey to participants that they were indirectly being judged by other people.
Indeed, past research demonstrates that artificial intelligence can be used to create
environments that feel distinctly social (Nash et al., 2018). Furthermore, by providing
feedback that was supposedly derived from an algorithm, rather than a single person, we
aimed to convey to participants that the feedback they received was based on a shared,
rather than an esoteric, understanding of femininity.
It is possible that participants would have responded differently to the feedback they
received had it come from, for example, a human interaction partner. On the one hand, such
feedback might be easier to dismiss, as a single person’s impression is inherently subjective
and likely not representative of most people’s impressions of one’s appearance or
personality. On the other hand, feedback from software might be easier to dismiss, as this
sort of technology is inevitably imperfect and often systematically biased (Danks & London,
2017). Future work might therefore manipulate the source of the feedback participants
receive, such that they are randomly assigned to receive feedback from either from an
algorithm that analyzes femininity on the basis of general consensus or from another person.
Future work exploring the effects of femininity feedback from other people, rather
than algorithms, should also consider the social identities of the people providing this
feedback. As discussed in more depth in the following section, women’s attributions for
femininity feedback might influence their psychological responses to it—and the identities of
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the person or people providing this feedback might influence their attributions. For example,
if a woman’s physical femininity is threatened by a man or group of men, she might be more
inclined to dismiss that threat as the product of harmful gender stereotypes than if her
physical femininity is threatened by another woman or group of women. On the other hand,
given that femininity is often defined by its appeal to the “male gaze” (Berger, 1972; Hoskin,
2019; Mulvey, 1999), a woman might be less inclined to dismiss a physical femininity threat
coming from a man or group of men than a threat coming from a woman or group of
women. These two competing possibilities—as well as other ways in which the source of
femininity feedback might influence women’s psychological wellbeing—ought to be
considered in future work.
In sum, the methods used in the current research allowed us establish that physical
femininity feedback supposedly derived from an algorithmic evaluation of one’s facial
appearance has a reliable effect on anxiety and self-esteem in women. More research is
needed, however, to conclusively determine which type of physical femininity feedback—
threat or affirmation—drives these effects and to elucidate whether and how these effects
would vary with varying sources of feedback.
Directions for Future Research on Femininity Threats
In the previous section, I explored methodological limitations of the current research
that could be addressed with relatively minor changes in future research. In this section, I lay
out three urgent directions for future work on femininity threats, which can, respectively,
deepen, extend, and expand the studies presented here: (i) research on why women do not
appear to be distressed by psychological femininity threats; (ii) research on the direct and
proximal, as well as indirect and more distal, consequences of physical femininity threats;
and (iii) research on the extent to which women of color—particularly Black women—and
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sexual minority women are distressed by physical femininity threats. Together, this work can
help to not only shed further light on the research presented in this dissertation but also
elucidate both its generalizability and reach. These suggested future lines of research are
illustrated in Figure 3.1 and explored in more depth below.

Figure 3.1. Overview of current and suggested research on femininity threat. Research covered in this dissertation is presented in
plain text. Potential directions for future research are presented in bold text.

160

161
Future Line I: Why Are Women Affected by Physical but Not Psychological Femininity
Threats?
The studies in this dissertation revealed that women experience anxiety and reduced
self-esteem in response to threats to the femininity of their physical appearances but not
threats to the femininity of their personalities. Furthermore, these studies revealed that
threats to the femininity of women’s physical appearances produce a greater sense of identity
invalidation than threats to the femininity of their personalities do—and that this sense of
identity invalidation mediates the interactive effect of femininity feedback (threat vs.
affirmation) and domain (physical appearance vs. personality) on anxiety and self-esteem.
Although this moderated mediation begins to suggest that identity invalidation can help to
explain why threats to physical but not psychological femininity are distressing to women, it
does not fully account for these disparate effects. After all, women did report higher levels of
identity invalidation when the femininity of their personality was threatened than when it
was affirmed, but this sense of invalidation did not result in anxiety or reductions in selfesteem. The question therefore remains: If women experience distress in response to threats
to their physical femininity, then why do they not experience distress in response to threats to
their psychological femininity?
Information suggesting that a woman’s personality is counter-stereotypical has two
critical implications: (a) that she possesses traits that are incongruent with beliefs about what
women are like; (b) that she possesses traits that are highly valued and considered high status
(Feinman, 1981; Rudman & Glick, 1999; Cejka & Eagly, 1999) and does not possess traits
that are devalued and considered low status (Hoskin, 2019). It is therefore possible that this
information is simultaneously threatening—of women’s gender stereotypicality—and
affirming—of women’s status. If this is the case, we would expect one of two possibilities:
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(a) this information would produce increased anxiety in women who place high value their
femininity, relative to their status, and reduced anxiety in women who place low value on
their femininity, relative to their status; (b) these two interpretations would produce
contradictory effects in women, essentially canceling each other out.
Testing the first possibility would require measuring additional moderators,
providing women with feedback on the femininity of their personality (threat vs.
affirmation—or perhaps more accurately, counter-stereotypical vs. stereotypical feedback),
and examining whether the measured moderators predict levels of anxiety among women
who are told their personality is counter-stereotypical as compared to women who are told
their personality is stereotypical. Specifically, it would require measuring the extent to which
women value their femininity, relative to their status, and/or their endorsement of traditional
gender roles (Levant et al., 2007). In the final study of this dissertation, we measured gender
identity, and this measure included the items “On the inside, I feel feminine” and “On the
inside, I feel masculine.” These items were completed after the manipulation, however, and
the manipulation had an effect on gender identity. Additionally, this measure did not assess
the extent to which women valued their femininity—only the extent to which they felt
feminine. Therefore, in a follow-up study, prioritization of femininity, versus status, would
need to be measured before the manipulation, as would endorsement of traditional gender
roles, which measures the extent to which people believe that in general, women and men
should behave differently and occupy different social roles. I would predict that the more
women value their femininity over their status and the more they endorse traditional gender
roles, the more anxiety (and potentially reduced self-esteem) they would experience in
response to feedback indicating that their personality is counter-stereotypical (i.e., masculine,
rather than feminine). By examining potential moderators of the effects of psychological
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femininity threats, future research can determine whether it is indeed that case that women
do not experience anxiety or reduced self-esteem in response to such threats or rather,
whether some women experience anxiety and reduced self-esteem in responses to these
threats, whereas others do not.
Testing the second possibility—that the implications of counter-stereotypical
feedback for femininity and status produce contradictory effects, thus canceling each other
out—would require manipulating the framing of this feedback. For example, the
manipulation could frame feminine personality traits as high-status and highly valued in
society (for example, by indicating that research has found that people who possess these
traits are more successful and increasingly sought out in business and politics) or as lowstatus and not particularly valued in society (for example, by indicating that research has
found that people who possess these traits are less successful and not sought out in business
and politics)—or present no information about the status of these traits.
Additionally, because, in the final study of this dissertation, the effect of masculinity
threats within the domain of personality on men’s anxiety was only marginally significant, it
is important to consider the possibility that participants in this study found the feedback
about their appearances more meaningful than the feedback about their personalities. For
example, participants might have been acting differently in the videos they submitted than
they do in their day-to-day lives and therefore more inclined to dismiss the feedback about
their personality than the feedback about their appearance. Therefore, future research could
use a slightly different paradigm to provide this feedback. Although it was important in the
current work to have participants upload videos of themselves so that we could credibly
provide them with feedback about either their physical appearance or their personality, this
would not be necessary in research focused solely on personality feedback. Therefore, in
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future research, rather than uploading videos of themselves speaking, participants could
simply complete personality and/or interest inventories, as they have done in past research
(Frederick et al., 2017; Willer et al., 2013). By strategically manipulating the framing of
psychological femininity threats, future research can help to explain why women—or at least
many women—do not experience these threats as distressing.
Future work could also consider why men are distressed by feedback indicating that
they are less psychologically masculine then average—and, specifically, whether the anxiety
men experience in response to such feedback results from the threat to their identity or the
threat to their status that this feedback represents. Given that status is such a fundamental
element of the male gender role (Moss-Racusin et al., 2010), parsing the distinct
contributions of identity threat and status threat to men’s responses to masculinity threats
would be a difficult endeavor. By framing masculine personality traits as either high-status or
low-status, the two could theoretically be disentangled. For example, similar to that which
was proposed for future studies on femininity threat, participants could be told that people
who possess masculine traits are generally successful and sought out in business and politics
or that people who possess these traits are often unsuccessful and decreasingly sought out in
business and politics. Such a manipulation might not be feasible, however, as informing men
that masculine personality traits are decreasing in status might itself present a group status
threat to men—and this sort of threat is liable to produce the same sorts of effects that a
threat to a man’s individual masculinity would (Willer et al., 2013).
More broadly, given how intimately connected gender and status are, the current
work, in conjunction with past work on masculinity threats, raises questions as to how
unique the observed results are to gender—and how likely they would be to generalize to
other social categories. Social dominance theory (Pratto et al, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001)
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posits the existence of three major types of group-based hierarchies: one based on age (in
which adults hold power over children), one based on gender (in which men have higher
status and hold more power than women), and one based on “arbitrary sets” (such as
religion or race, in which certain groups have higher status and hold more power than
others). Although these three types of hierarchies are unique from one another in several
ways, they also possess similarities. For example, just as threats to the privileged status of
men have been linked to assertions of male superiority and dominance (Willer et al., 2013),
threats to the privileged status of White Americans have been linked to increased prejudice
against racial outgroups and increased support for policies that preserve the status quo (Craig
et al., 2018). The asymmetry in women’s and men’s responses to psychological gender
stereotypicality threats may therefore reflect a broader tendency for high status groups to be
more vulnerable to stereotypicality threats than low status groups are. More research is
needed, however, to test this possibility.
Future Line II: Consequences of Physical Femininity Threats
In this dissertation, I demonstrated that women experience anxiety and reduced selfesteem in response to threats to the femininity of their physical appearances. Furthermore, I
found that a sense of identity invalidation statistically explained this effect. It is possible,
however, that the psychological consequences of physical femininity threats extend beyond
these specific constructs. Furthermore, the question remains: How do women cope with the
feelings of identity invalidation and psychological distress that physical femininity threats
produce? And what are the consequences of these coping strategies? Here, I lay out three
avenues for future research that can begin to answer these questions. The first avenue
focuses on expanding the focus of research on psychological responses to physical
femininity feedback by considering not only anxiety and self-esteem but also other emotions
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and elements of the self-concept. The second avenue focuses on moving beyond women’s
psychological responses to physical femininity threats to explore their behavioral responses to
these threats. Finally, the third avenue focuses on examining potential consequences of these
behavioral responses.
How Else Do Women Psychologically Respond to Physical Femininity
Threats?. In the current set of studies, we were primarily interested in the effects of physical
femininity threats on anxiety, which past work has demonstrated masculinity threats produce
in men (Vandello et al., 2008). Future work, however, would benefit from also considering
the effects of femininity threats on other forms of emotional distress—and on anger in
particular (Spielberger et al., 1983). Although anxiety and anger are similar in terms of both
valence (negative) and arousal (high), they differ from one another in several important ways.
Whereas anxiety has been described as involving a feeling of submissiveness, anger has been
described as involving a feeling of dominance (Russell & Mehrabian, 1974). Whereas anxiety
has been described as being avoidance-oriented, anger has been described as being
approach-oriented (Mauss & Robinson, 2009). And whereas anxiety has been described as a
response to hazards, anger has been described as a response to moral transgressions
(Petersen, 2010). Furthermore, when it comes to interpersonal rejection (a phenomenon that
is distinct from but likely related to gender stereotypicality threats), anxiety, more so than
anger, tends to follow from self-blame (internal attributions), whereas anger, more so than
anxiety, tends to follow from other-blame (external attributions) (Zimmer-Gembeck et al.,
2016).
Causal attributions for femininity threats—which likely vary as a function of both the
situation and the individual—may therefore influence the extent to which women respond to
these threats with anxiety versus anger. To the extent that women make internal attributions
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for these threats (i.e., attribute them to a true lack of femininity), they may respond with
anxiety. To the extent that they make external attributions (e.g., attribute threats to raters’
narrow, misguided understandings of what is means to look “feminine”), however, they may
respond with anger. Future research is therefore needed to determine whether and if so when
and in whom physical femininity threats produce anger, as opposed or in addition to anxiety.
This research could begin by assessing participants’ attributions for femininity threats and
examining whether these attributions predict emotional responses (with more internal
attributions producing more anxiety and more external attributions producing more anger).
It could also experimentally manipulate the source of feedback and, as a result, attributions
for feedback. For example, participants could be randomly assigned to learn that the
software evaluating their appearance was developed based on the ratings of either a diverse
group of women and men or a homogenous group. I would anticipate that participants in
the former condition would be more likely than those in the latter to make internal
attributions for the feedback and to experience anxiety and that participants in the latter
condition would be more likely than those in the former to make external attributions and to
experience anger.
Additionally, given that anxiety tends to involve avoidance motivation whereas anger
tends to involve approach motivation (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009), future work might
consider differences in the behavioral consequences of anxiety and anger in the wake of
femininity threats. To the extent that they are motivated to act, women who make internal
attributions for femininity threats—and who are therefore likely to experience anxiety—may
attempt to cope by increasing the femininity of their physical appearance, as described in the
following section. On the other hand, women who make external attributions for femininity
threats—and who are therefore likely to experience anger—may attempt to cope by targeting
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the source of the feedback. For example, if a woman attributes such a threat to narrow,
misguided understandings of what is means to look “feminine” and becomes angry as a
result, she might be inclined to take action—either individually or collectively—to address
what she views as harmful gender stereotypes. Future research could test this possibility
using both correlational and experimental methods. First, it could examine whether different
emotional responses to femininity threats predict divergent behavioral responses. Next, if
causal attributions for threats indeed inform emotional responses (as predicted above), it
could experimentally manipulate these attributions and examine not only state anxiety and
anger but also behavioral intentions and actions.
Future work also ought to examine the effects of physical femininity threats on
elements of the self-concept other than self-esteem (Campbell et al., 1996). In the current
studies, we opted to focus on self-esteem, an evaluative component of self-concept, as
experiences with identity denial have been linked to reductions in self-esteem, or negative
evaluations of the self. Future research, however, would benefit from taking a broader
perspective on self-concept and considering the extent to which these threats affect selfconcept clarity, defined as “the extent to which the contents of an individual’s selfconcept…are clearly and confidently defined, internally consistent, and temporally stable”
(Campbell et al., 1996). Experiences with rejection or failure in valued domains have been
linked to reductions in self-concept clarity (Ayduk et al., 2009; Lavallee & Campbell, 1995;
Nezlek & Plesko, 2001), as have the imagined loss of a valued social identity (Slotter et al.,
2015) and the disconfirmation of self-beliefs (Hertel, 2017). Thus, threats to physical
femininity are likely to have a destabilizing effect on self-concept, particularly among women
who think of themselves as feminine and/or see their femininity as central to their overall
sense of self. In other words, physical femininity threats might lead women to question or

169
doubt who they are as people. Measuring self-concept clarity in future studies would
contribute to a more thorough understanding of the effects of physical femininity threats on
women’s sense of self.
How Do Women Behaviorally Respond to Physical Femininity Threats?.
Experiences with actual or anticipated invalidation have been linked to the pursuit of
external identity affirmation (e.g., Sevelius, 2013). For example, transgender women who
have few opportunities for such affirmation have reported that sex with men can validate
their gender identity (Melendez & Pinto, 2007; Nemoto et al., 2004) and that they may
engage in sexual activity that they otherwise would not if it affirms their sense of
womanhood (Bockting et al., 1998; Edwards et al., 2007). Experimental work has also
demonstrated that experiences with identity invalidation can lead to compensatory assertions
of identity. When Asian Americans experience challenges to their American identity, for
example, they have been shown to put extra effort into demonstrating their knowledge of
American culture (Cheryan & Monin, 2005). Research on masculinity threat has revealed
similar results. When men’s masculinity is threatened, they tend to assert it through
traditionally masculine behaviors and attitudes, including violence and aggression, support
for war, homophobia, and interest in buying a sports utility vehicle (Bosson & Vandello,
2011; Bosson et al., 2009; Glick et al., 2007; Talley & Bettencourt, 2008; Willer et al., 2013).
Although the ways in which transgender women feminize their physical appearances in the
pursuit of identity recognition has been preliminarily considered (e.g., Plemons, 2017), to my
knowledge, research has yet to consider femininity work as a strategy by which cisgender
women seek to obtain identity affirmation in the wake of threats to their physical femininity.
Future work might consider examining whether cisgender women engage in
compensatory behavior in response to threats to their physical femininity. Additionally,

170
given that past work has suggested that such “recovery strategies” may not, in fact, restore
self-esteem (Rudman & Fairchild, 2004), future research should investigate whether these
assertions of femininity are psychologically effective as coping mechanisms.
I began testing the first question—whether women “compensate” in response to
physical femininity threats—in a pilot study that was interrupted by the COVID-19
pandemic and which can serve as a model for future research. In this study, we gave
participants feedback on their physical femininity and then instructed them to create a social
media profile by taking a photograph of themselves (i.e., a “selfie”), editing and applying
filters to the photograph as desired, and reporting on their personality traits and interests.
Participants were not given specific instructions for taking the photographs, as we wanted
them be free to make their own decisions about their facial expression, bodily posture, and
positioning, all of which can serve specific impression management goals (e.g., appearing
more feminine; Krämer & Winter, 2008; Smith & Sanderson, 2015).
In future studies, to determine whether women indeed present themselves as more
feminine after their physical femininity has been threatened, participants’ photographs can
be coded on a number of different dimensions, such as: self-touching (i.e., touching one’s
face, hair, or clothing, which is more common in women’s selfies than men’s; Döring et al.,
2016); head and body cant (which are also more common in women’s selfies than men’s;
Döring et al., 2016); smiling (which tends to be more expansive in women’s Facebook
profile pictures than men’s; Tifferet & Vilnai-Yavetz, 2014); use of filters (which tends to be
more frequent among women than men; Dhir et al., 2016); and angle (i.e., taken from above,
which is more common in women’s selfies than men’s; taken from below, which is more
common in men’s selfies than women’s; or taken from the front; Sedgewick et al., 2017).
Personality traits and interests would not need to be manually coded if, as in our pilot study,
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they are taken from previous studies of gender stereotypes (Deaux & Lewis, 1984; Haines et
al., 2016; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Spence et al., 1974, 1975; Zinkhan et al., 2004).
Analyses of these data could reveal not only if women compensate for threats to their
physical femininity but also how women compensate—that is, whether they assert their
femininity in the domain in which they were threatened (physical appearance) or in another
domain (personality or interests).
To answer the question of whether such compensation serves as an effective coping
strategy, future studies could also measure anxiety, self-esteem, and identity invalidation
again, after participants have had the opportunity to assert their femininity, to determine
whether such assertions reduce anxiety and restore self-esteem and if so, whether reductions
in participants’ sense of identity invalidation can explain these effects.
Future work should also examine alternative coping strategies that women may use
to reduce anxiety and restore their self-esteem in the wake of threats to their physical
femininity—particularly mechanisms that do not require women to devote time, energy, or
money to increasing their adherence to gender stereotypes. When people experience threats
to their self-integrity (i.e., their positive sense of self), they can restore it by engaging in selfaffirmation (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Importantly, such self-affirmation does not need to
pertain to the same domain in which their sense of self was threatened to be effective
(Sherman & Cohen, 2002; Steele, 1988). Therefore, self-affirmation exercises, in which
individuals reflect on their personal values and/or skills and why these values and skills are
important to them, can serve as a psychological buffer in threatening situations—particularly
among people who are low in trait self-esteem (Cohen et al., 2006; Creswell et al., 2005).
In the studies in this dissertation, all participants completed such a self-affirmation
exercise (Cohen et al., 2006); however, they completed it after they were thoroughly debriefed

172
on the deception involved in the study (i.e., informed that the feedback was bogus).
Furthermore, anxiety and self-esteem were not measured again after participants completed
the self-affirmation exercise. Therefore, future research is needed to determine whether
engaging in a self-affirmation exercise can reduce women’s anxiety and restore their selfesteem following experiences with physical femininity threats.
Do Behavioral Responses to Femininity Threats Maintain Physical Gender
Stereotypes?. The studies presented in this dissertation focused on the experiences of
women whose physical femininity had been threatened. The pressure on women to appear
physically feminine, however, may have broader implications—including implications for the
maintenance of descriptive gender stereotypes. As discussed, when their physical femininity
has been threatened, women may put effort into “recovering” that femininity (Rudman &
Fairchild, 2004) by, for example, presenting themselves in a stereotypical fashion. Similarly,
women whose physical femininity has not been threatened may put effort into ensuring that
they appear adequately stereotypical so as to avoid experiencing femininity threats. The more
women feminize their appearances—to either recover from or avoid femininity threats—the
less visible their “natural” appearances (i.e., their appearances in the absence of photograph
editing, facial and body hair removal, cosmetic application, hair styling, etc.) become.
Humans are generally considered a sexually dimorphic species (cf. Blackless et al.,
2000), and in the absence of any femininity work, women and men, on average, would no
doubt look different from one another. The femininity work that women engage in,
however, certainly exaggerates these differences. When women apply cosmetics, they
generally darken their eyes and lips, thus increasing average gender differences in facial
contrast (Etcoff et al., 2011; Russell, 2010). And when they shave, wax, or undergo
electrolysis or laser hair removal (which nearly all women do; Lesnik-Oberstein, 2006;
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Tiggemann & Hodgson, 2008; Toerien et al., 2005), they increase average gender differences
in amount of facial and body hair. As Friedman (2013) puts it: “Polarizing grooming
practices create sex differences where there are none ‘naturally’ or significantly exaggerate
subtle differences, thus reducing the proportion of human commonalities male and female
bodies would otherwise share…” (p. 82). Being unaware of these practices—or the extent to
which women tend to engage in them—may lead people to believe that women and men
look more different than they naturally do. As Chrisler (2013) has noted:
Most men have no idea until they live with a woman (and maybe not even then
because most of this work is done in private) how much time and effort it takes
women to tame their natural bodies and shape them into an ‘acceptable’ look…
To test this possibility, future research could adapt a paradigm developed by Rudman
and Fairchild (2004), who found that after their psychological gender stereotypicality had
been threatened, men and, to a lesser extent, women expressed concerns about others’
reactions to their counter-stereotypicality, engaged in attempts to conceal their counterstereotypicality, and understood that through that concealment, they were contributing to
the maintenance of gender stereotypes. To determine whether similar processes occur within
the domain of physical appearance, future research could have women upload photographs
of themselves (as they did in the studies in this dissertation), provide them with feedback
about their physical femininity, give them the opportunity to upload either their original
photograph or a new or edited photograph to a social media website, and then ask them how
feminine future visitors to the social media website would expect women, in general, to look.
I would predict that women who uploaded new or edited photographs of themselves, as
compared to those who did not, would think future visitors to the website would expect
women to look more feminine.
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Future studies could also investigate the extent to which lack of awareness of
femininity work reinforces descriptive gender stereotypes about physical appearance. For
example, correlational research could examine whether the amount of time people believe
the average woman devotes to femininity work predicts the extent to which they believe
women and men naturally look different. I would predict that the less femininity work
people believe women engage in, the more different they would believe women and men
naturally look.
The results of such future work could inform interventions to buffer against the
deleterious consequences of physical femininity threats, as well as the broader pressure to
appear feminine. Given that women are inundated with images of other women whose
appearances have been altered (via makeup, hair styling, and photograph editing; Wolf,
1990), they may falsely believe that most women naturally look more feminine than they
actually do. This belief could produce unrealistic expectations about their own
appearances—and lead them to chronically feel like they do not “measure up.” Informing
women about the amount of work that goes into feminizing other women’s appearances
might therefore alter their expectations for their own appearances and make them less
vulnerable to physical femininity threats.
Such interventions could make use of existing media, such as Dove’s Evolution video
(Nelson, 2013; Piper, 2006), which depicts a model undergoing a dramatic physical
transformation before appearing on a billboard advertisement and which concludes with the
message “No wonder our perception of reality is distorted.” Although this video was
developed as part of Dove’s “Campaign for Real Beauty” and focuses on attractiveness,
rather than femininity, given how closely connected these two constructs are (Penton-Voak
et al., 2004; Rhodes et al., 2000), videos like this one would also likely be effective at
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correcting misconceptions about typical levels of physical femininity. By correcting these
misconceptions, interventions could begin to not only alter descriptive gender stereotypes
but also mitigate the negative consequences of gender stereotypicality threats.
Future Line III: Intersectional Perspectives
Gender, race, and sexual orientation all intersect with one another to form unique
identities and experiences, and none of these dimensions can be fully understood in isolation
from the others (Cole, 2009; Crenshaw, 1994; Essed, 1991, p. 5; Ghavami & Peplau, 2013;
Rosette et al., 2018; Shields, 2008). In the research presented in this dissertation, however,
which relied upon online convenience samples, the majority of women who participated
were White (69%-81% across studies) and heterosexual (68%-86% across studies). In this
section, I therefore propose two directions for future research that center the experiences of
women who were not adequately represented in the current work and whose relationships
with femininity and femininity threats may vary substantially from those of White,
heterosexual women. The first proposed direction focuses on how Black and sexual minority
women respond to physical femininity threats. The second considers Black and sexual
minority women’s relationships with femininity more broadly. The conclusions that can be
drawn from the studies presented in this dissertation are limited by these studies’ samples.
By taking an intersectional perspective, future research can gain a more complete
understanding of women’s relationships with femininity and femininity threats.
Do Femininity Threats Differentially Affect Women with Different
Intersecting Identities?. Additional research is needed to establish if and how women of
other demographic groups respond to and cope with physical femininity threats—or, in
other words, to determine how generalizable the results of this dissertation are. Here, I focus
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on two groups of women—Black women and sexual minority women—who may be
particularly likely to experience femininity threats in their daily lives.
Black Women. Future work might examine how Black women respond to physical
femininity threats, which they may experience more often than women of other racial groups
do, as well as how their attributions for these threats influence their psychological and
behavioral responses. In past work with predominantly White samples, participants
perceived Black women’s faces as more masculine than White women’s faces (Goff et al.,
2008; Lei et al., 2020). Participant comments from the studies presented in this dissertation
reveal that at least some of the Black women who participated were acutely aware of these
biased perceptions and were concerned about their implications for how the software had
evaluated their femininity. (Participants provided these comments before being debriefed.) For
example, a 23-year-old Black heterosexual participant from Study 1b whose physical
femininity and attractiveness had both been affirmed commented: “I mean, I was very happy
that I was rated as attractive and feminine. Especially being black, I thought I would have
bad results but I was shocked to see my rating was pretty good.” On the flip side, a 20-yearold Black heterosexual participant from Study 1c whose femininity had been threatened asked:
I was wondering who the model of femininity and masculinity is for your study and
who (as in the culture and race) made this program. I know that people of certain
culture view others as a more or less masculine than a person of another culture.
For example, white people will find black characteristics on women more masculine,
and it is difficult for people to recognize the ages of people from differing cultures.
So who are we being judged by?
Additionally, a 21-year-old Black heterosexual participant from Study 1c whose femininity
had been threatened explained:
I have heard of similar software before and how it fails when it comes to classifying
black women....I am constantly reminded that I am not 'feminine' in the way that I
should be and I don't need a beta version software to use my face to reaffirm the
same terrible dynamic.
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It is unclear, however, how Black women’s awareness of White people’s biased
perceptions of their femininity influenced their psychological responses to the feedback they
received. Attributions for this feedback might have influenced participants’ responses.
Attributing interpersonal rejection to discrimination, rather than one’s own
deficiencies, can buffer against the negative effects of rejection on self-esteem (Crocker et al.,
1991; Major et al., 2003). Attributing physical femininity threats to racism could similarly
protect Black women from the self-esteem-diminishing consequences of such threats. This
protection, however, would not necessarily mean that these threats are less globally harmful
to Black women than they are to White women—only that they might be less harmful to
their self-esteem in the moment. Indeed, a large body of literature demonstrates that chronic
experiences with discrimination can result in negative mental health outcomes (Banks et al.,
2006; Hatzenbuehler, 2009; Pascoe & Smart Richman, 2009), suggesting that frequent
femininity threats could be detrimental to Black women’s psychological wellbeing.
Attributing femininity threats to racism could also potentially produce anger and
physiological activation (Mendes et al., 2008), both of which can be productive, in terms of
facilitating approach-oriented coping and collective action (Stürmer & Simon, 2009; Van
Zomeren et al., 2012), but also damaging, in terms of long-term mental health consequences
(Pittman, 2011).
Examining the effects of attributions for physical femininity threats on Black
women’s responses to these threats would require manipulating the source of the feedback
they receive. For example, participants could be randomly assigned to either a condition in
which they are told that they are being evaluated by White raters (and/or that the software
assessing their appearance was tested on White women) or a condition in which they are told
that they are being evaluated by Black raters (and/or that the software was tested on other
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Black women). Participants could then report not only their levels of anxiety and self-esteem
but also their attributions for the feedback, their levels of anger, and their desire to engage in
collective action. Among participants whose femininity is threatened, I would expect those
evaluated by White raters to be more likely than those evaluated by Black raters to attribute
their results to racism or racial biases. I would also expect them to consequently report
higher levels of self-esteem, more anger, and a greater desire to engage in collective action. I
would have no a priori predictions about the effects of evaluator race on levels of anxiety,
given that both femininity threats and experiences with racial discrimination can produce
anxiety (Graham et al., 2015). It is possible, however, that participants in the “White
evaluator” condition would attribute their feedback to both their racial group membership and
their actual physical femininity—or in other words, that they would believe that because they
are Black, they truly look masculine. If this were the case, I would expect participants who
receive femininity threats from a White evaluator to experience particularly high levels of
anxiety (Graham et al., 2016; Sosoo et al., 2019).
Alternatively, to avoid potential ethical concerns about subjecting Black women to
unnecessary psychological risks, future studies could make use of paradigms that do not
involve directly threatening individual participants’ femininity. For example, rather than
providing participants with feedback about their own appearance, researchers could
manipulate the salience of beliefs about the appearances of Black women in general (Neel et
al., 2013). They could then examine not only anxiety, self-esteem, and anger but also
impression management strategies to determine whether Black women who are reminded of
beliefs about their ingroup experience negative psychological consequences (Jerald et al.,
2017) and/or attempt to present themselves as particularly feminine (Neel et al., 2013).
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Additionally, future correlational and qualitative studies could explore potential long-term
consequences of frequent physical femininity threats.
Finally, future research should also consider how other women of color respond to
physical femininity threats—and femininity threats more generally. Their responses might
also differ from those of participants in the current studies, the majority of whom were
White. For example, Asian women, who are often stereotyped as hyperfeminine (Pyke &
Johnson, 2003), might be particularly distressed by femininity threats, which would suggest
that they are not only counter-stereotypical women but also highly counter-stereotypical
Asian women. These threats might also be particularly upsetting if they come as a surprise
(Wirth et al., 2017). On the other hand, to the extent that Asian women have internalized
stereotypes about their ingroup and perceive themselves as highly feminine as a result, they
might be less likely than other women to interpret femininity threats as meaningful
reflections of reality (Feather & Simon, 1971). Additional research is clearly needed to
understand how experiences with femininity threats differ among women with different
racial identities.
Sexual Minority Women. Future work would also be advised to examine sexual
minority women’s experiences with and responses to physical femininity threats. On average,
lesbians are perceived as more physically masculine than heterosexual women (Lyons et al.,
2014; Rieger et al., 2010; Johnson et al., 2007), and in some cases, lesbians intentionally
present themselves as masculine as a form of identity expression (Halberstam, 1996; Rubin,
2006). Lesbians are also often stereotyped as having masculine personalities (Blashill &
Powlishta, 2009; Kite & Deaux, 1987; Taylor, 1983). Nonetheless, an internal meta-analysis
revealed that non-heterosexual women in our samples (which included women who
indicated that their sexual orientation was “gay/lesbian/homosexual,” “bisexual,” “unsure,”
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or “other”) indeed experienced increased anxiety in response to physical femininity threats,
as compared to physical femininity affirmations. And a number of non-heterosexual
participants discussed their sexual identity when commenting on the feedback they had
received.
For example, a 39-year-old White lesbian from Study 1c whose physical femininity
had been threatened noted that the results she had received were consistent with her
expectations and gender presentation, saying:
I am a very masculine looking middle-aged lesbian, so I wasn't surprised at all. If
anything I kind of expected it to say that I was even more masculine looking than it
did. I often get mistaken as a man and even when I was a little girl people thought I
was a little boy.
On the other hand, a 38-year-old White bisexual participant from Study 2 whose physical
femininity had also been threatened noted that that her results were unexpected and
questioned whether her sexual orientation had contributed to them:
I guess I was a little surprised that the software did not see me as feminine. I feel
like I am definitely recognized as female and feminine. I am bisexual so I am not
sure if that has anything to do with my being less feminine or not but this is
something that I now will think about. I generally feel pretty good about myself and
the results will not change that, however it was a little surprising and made me think
about how i present myself.
An 18-year-old Black lesbian from Study 1c whose physical femininity had been affirmed
expressed both surprise and satisfaction with her results:
I've never really perceived myself as a very feminine or even remotely attractive
person. Especially as a gay woman on the larger side...who doesn't wear makeup or
typically feminine clothing. I've always thought others - both men and women perceived me as much more masculine and unattractive than the average female,
which I've never really liked very much. I just wear clothes that are comfortable and
practical and I don't feel like wearing makeup would be me being my authentic self.
These results were a complete surprise and a nice confidence boost that made me
feel better about myself, especially considering that I (as usual) was wearing no
makeup at all in the picture. Admittedly, the angle of the picture makes me look
better than I think I usually do (hides some of the fat under my chin), but the picture
is pretty close to what I actually look like in real life.
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Finally, an 18-year-old White bisexual participant from Study 1c whose physical femininity
had also been affirmed noted that the results she had received were reassuring, given her
sexual identity:
I am in a lesbian relationship currently and I hate doubting my appearance because
one of us will be labeled the boy in the relationship. My results were me being 73%
more feminine than other women, which made me happy but after a few minutes
guilty. It should not matter and yet because of the stigma, I don't want to look at all
masculine.
Together, these comments highlight the variation in gender expression—and
responses to physical femininity feedback—that exists among sexual minority women. They
also suggest that in some cases, physical femininity feedback may be particularly meaningful
for sexual minority women, who may interpret this feedback as a reflection of either their
confirmation or their refutation of stereotypes about their sexual orientation group—or in
other words, who may experience stereotype threat in contexts in which their femininity is
evaluated. Future work is needed to compare the extent to which heterosexual and nonheterosexual women experience anxiety in such contexts, as well as to explore individual
differences that predict sexual minority women’s psychological responses to physical
femininity threats.
(How) Do Women with Different Identities Develop Different Definitions of
Femininity?. Finally, future research might explore alternative constructions of femininity
among women with different identities. Throughout this dissertation, I have focused on
understandings of femininity that are both Eurocentric and heteronormative (Collins, 2004).
Black and queer women, however, may have more diverse understandings of what it means
to be feminine.
Black Women. Although Black women are aware of Eurocentric standards of
physical femininity, they may not value them to the same extent that White women do (Cole
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& Zucker, 2007; Sekayi, 2003)—and therefore might not be as harmed by them. Indeed,
exposure to “mainstream” (i.e., White) television appears to have negative consequences for
body image among White but not Black women (Schooler et al., 2004). Furthermore, despite
being exposed to White people’s negative stereotype about their group (Jerald et al., 2017),
initial evidence indicates that Black women are either as satisfied or more satisfied with their
bodies than White women are (Grabe & Hyde, 2006; Smith et al., 1999). Although both
Black and White women might value physical femininity to the same extent, their
understandings of what constitutes physical femininity might differ. For example, one study
found that wearing makeup is more important to White women than Black women but that
wearing feminine clothing is more important to Black women than White women (Cole &
Zucker, 2007). Future research is needed to determine whether, when, and how Black
women resist understandings of femininity that reinforce racial hierarchy and claim
alternative femininities (Eko, 2018).
Sexual Minority Women. Just as White and Black women might, on average, define
femininity differently, so, too, might heterosexual and sexual minority women. Although
sexual minority women might be more likely than heterosexual women to identify as
masculine (Lippa, 2000), even those who identify as highly feminine might be less
constrained by hegemonic understandings of femininity than heterosexual women who
identify as highly feminine are. This possibility is exemplified by a comment from a 44-yearold Hispanic/Latina bisexual participant from Study 1c whose physical femininity had been
affirmed, who said:
Gender binaries are social constructs that are not only fluid but on a spectrum. I am
Queer cis-woman who plays with gender but presents as femme. The results I
received seemed to follow this but I have no investment either way.
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Femme-identified queer women and other femme-identified individuals (i.e.,
“femmes”) provide examples of challenges to dominant understandings of what it means to
be feminine (Blair & Hoskin, 2015). Although relatively few psychological studies have
explored the identities and experiences of individuals who identify as femme, those that have
have noted several themes that distinguish what it means to be femme from what it means to
be hegemonically feminine. In one study focused on a community of sexual minority
women, for example, femmes were described as rebellious, courageous, powerful, strong,
open, honest, sexual, and aesthetically feminine (Levitt et al., 2003). In another study of
femme-identified individuals of a variety of gender identities and sexual orientations,
participants described strength, agency, rebellion, and self-actualization as key characteristics
associated with femme identity (Blair & Hoskin, 2015).
Femme identity is characterized by its resistance to externally-imposed
understandings of what it means to be feminine (i.e., to be assigned female and to be
hairless, thin, able-bodied, and White) and by a rejection of femininity in the service of the
male gaze (Hoskin, 2019). It is femininity defined and expressed by those who, by virtue of
their bodies and/or desires, have been told they are not and never can be sufficiently
feminine (Blair & Hoskin, 2015; Hoskin, 2017). Not all queer women or LGBT individuals
who identify or present themselves as feminine, however, identify as femme, and even
among those who do, restrictive understandings of femininity persist (Taylor, 2018). Further
research is therefore needed to explore experiences and traits that predict whether, when,
and to what extent non-heterosexual women develop narrow versus inclusive
understandings of femininity, as well as the extent to which more expansive
conceptualizations of femininity protect women from the negative consequences of
femininity threats.
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Concluding Thoughts
This dissertation expands research on gender stereotypicality threats by focusing on
threats to women’s femininity within the domain of appearance. In doing so, it challenges
the assumption that men are more constrained by the pressure to be masculine than women
are by the pressure to be feminine—and provides a new perspective on how gender
stereotypes harm women.
As detailed in this chapter, additional research is needed to answer several questions
about femininity and femininity threats that remain unanswered, namely: why women are not
distressed by psychological femininity threats; how women behaviorally respond to physical
femininity threats; whether physical femininity threats indirectly reinforce stereotypes;
whether women of different races and sexual orientations respond differently to physical
femininity threats; and when and how women develop different understandings of what it
does—and does not—mean to be feminine. Answering these questions will provide a more
comprehensive and inclusive understanding of women’s experiences with hegemonic
femininity, as well as alternative femininities. It will also pave the way for interventions that
can support women in coping with threats to their femininity and potentially engaging in
collection action to challenge harmful media messages.
Although this chapter laid out several recommendations for future research on
femininity threat, it should not be interpreted as a comprehensive list of directions for future
research on this topic. More than a call to answer specific questions about how women react
when they are told they are not feminine, this dissertation should serve as a broader appeal
to social scientists to prioritize research on femininity. The research here focused on one
highly consequential aspect of physical femininity, facial femininity, which plays a central
role in gender categorization and impression formation (Hester et al., 2020; Oosterhof &
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Todorov, 2008; Plemons, 2017; Walker & Wänke, 2017; Wild et al., 2000). However, future
research might also consider other aspects of physical appearance, such as hair and body
shape, that also inform gender categorization (Goshen-Gottstein & Ganel, 2000; Johnson &
Tassinary, 2005; Macrae & Martin, 2007; Martin & Macrae, 2007) and influence women’s
self-concepts (LaFrance, 2000; Overstreet et al., 2010; Webster & Tiggemann, 2003).
Additionally, while the research here focused on one critical but underexamined domain of
femininity, physical appearance, future research might consider other consequential domains
that have yet to be sufficiently explored—particularly reproductive capacity and
motherhood.
In her commentary on the theory of precarious manhood, Chrisler (2013) asserted
that womanhood, like manhood, is an achieved status and that this status is earned through
both physical beauty and self-sacrificial motherhood. And indeed, decades of theorizing and
qualitative research, particularly by sociologists, have lent support to the notion that
womanhood and adult femininity are defined largely in terms of motherhood and fertility
(Gillespie, 2000, 2003; Letherby, 1999; Wells & Heinsch, 2020). Infertility may be particularly
distressing for women (compared to men) because women have relatively few domains other
than motherhood in which they can “prove” their femininity or womanhood (Choi et al.,
2005; Ying et al., 2015). And women who experience infertility and possess physical features
that are typically considered masculine (e.g., thick facial and body hair) have described
feeling like “freaks” as a result (Kitzinger & Willmott, 2002). Some women who have not
had children, however, express concerns that childbirth is inherently unfeminine (Malacrida
& Boulton, 2012). Therefore, more research is needed to understand how physical
appearance, fertility, and motherhood all factor into understandings of femininity and
womanhood, as well as how women respond to information indicating that they are either
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infertile or inadequately maternal. By prioritizing research on femininity more broadly,
psychologists will be able to address the manifold ways in which gendered expectations and
pressures shape women’s lives.
Finally, the work presented in this dissertation speaks to the question of what
femininity and masculinity are—and what they are not. Over the course of the 20th century,
the relative associations between feminine personality traits and women, compared to
feminine personality traits and men, weakened (Bhatia & Bhatia, 2020). In recent decades,
women have decreasingly reported possessing feminine personality traits and increasingly
reported possessing masculine personality traits (Bem, 1974; Prentice & Carranza, 2002;
Donnelly & Twenge, 2017; Twenge, 1997). And in a series of studies published twenty years
ago, participants predicted that by the year 2050, women and men would possess
comparable levels of masculine personality traits (Diekman & Eagly, 2000). Furthermore, in
Chapter 2 of this dissertation, as in past work (Vandello et al., 2008), I found that women
did not experience anxiety in response to threats to the femininity of their personalities.
If women are decreasingly describing themselves in terms of feminine personality
traits and increasingly describing themselves in terms of masculine personality traits, and if
they are not bothered by information suggesting that they lack feminine personality traits
and possess masculine personality traits, then in what sense are these traits really “feminine”
and “masculine”? The most recent research suggests that women still describe their
personalities as more feminine than masculine (Donnelly & Twenge, 2017) and that both
descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes about women’s personalities endure (Prentice &
Carranza, 2002; Eagly et al., 2020; Haines et al., 2016). However, given that perhaps the
strongest prescriptive stereotypes about women focus on physical appearance (Parker et al.,
2017), that the relative associations between women and feminine personality traits are
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weakening (Bhatia & Bhatia, 2020), that the gap between women’s identification with
feminine and masculine personality traits is shrinking (Donnelly & Twenge, 2017), and that
women and men are expected to have comparable levels of masculine personality traits in
thirty years (Diekman & Eagly, 2000), it may eventually be the case that using the terms
“feminine” and “masculine” when referring to personality traits no longer makes sense.
Women and men are still expected to look quite different in thirty years, however
(Diekman & Eagly, 2000), and as this dissertation makes clear, the pressure on women to
look feminine—and not look masculine—remains strong. Fully understanding the harm that
gender stereotypes cause clearly requires attending to physical appearances. Men may be
similarly impacted by threats to their physical and psychological gender stereotypicality, but
women are not. If we are to understand the unique experiences of women, we must consider
how they respond to and cope with the pressure to appear physically feminine. This
dissertation serves as a call to action and as a jumping-off point for this work.
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Appendix A
Supplemental materials for Chapter 2 are presented here.
Study 1a
Measures
Table A1
Study 1a Gender Identity Centrality Items Correlation Matrix
Variables
1. Being a female is an important
part of my self image
2. Being a female is unimportant
to my sense of what kind of
person I am (R)
3. Being a female is an important
reflection of who I am
4. Being a female has very little
to do with how I feel about
myself (R)
5. Being feminine is an
important part of my self image
6. Being feminine is unimportant
to my sense of what kind of
person I am (R)
7. Being feminine is an
important reflection of who I am
8. Being feminine has very little
to do with how I feel about
myself (R)
*

**

***

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

-.57***

--

.85***

.56***

--

.57***

.71***

.52***

--

.68***

.44***

.67***

.48***

--

.62***

.63***

.60***

.64***

.70***

--

.75***

.49***

.69***

.55***

.89***

.74***

--

.56***

.50***

.48***

.59***

.64***

.68***

.68***

Note. p < .05; p < .01; p < .001

--
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Table A2
Study 1a Loadings of Gender Identity Centrality Items onto Factor Identified in Principal
Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation
Gender
identity
centrality
Being feminine is an important reflection of who I am
Being feminine is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am (R)
Being a female is an important part of my self image
Being feminine is an important part of my self image
Being a female is an important reflection of who I am
Being feminine has very little to do with how I feel about myself (R)
Being a female has very little to do with how I feel about myself (R)
Being a female is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am (R)

0.892
0.857
0.856
0.847
0.822
0.779
0.762
0.736

Supplemental Measures
Self-perceived sexual attractiveness and attractiveness of personality. We measured self-perceived sexual
attractiveness and attractiveness of personality for exploratory purposes. Both forms
attractiveness were measured using single-item, 7-point measures. Participants rated their
sexual attractiveness on scales ranging from “I am not very sexually attractive” to “I am very
sexually attractive” (Wade, 2000) and the attractiveness of their personality on a scale ranging
from “My personality is not very appealing” to “My personality is very appealing.”
Results
Supplemental Primary Analyses
Because the plurality of participants (n=48; 22.22% of the sample) reported no
anxiety and thus the distribution of state anxiety was positively-skewed, we also transformed
state anxiety into a binary variable with 0=anxiety absent and 1=anxiety present. We then
ran a binary logistic regression to determine whether physical femininity feedback had an
effect on whether participants reported any state anxiety. We dummy coded physical
femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback with affirmation as the reference
group for both variables. We found that participants in the physical femininity threat
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condition were more likely to report any state anxiety (87.18%) than those in the physical
femininity affirmation condition (67.44%), B = 1.19, SE = 0.41, p = .004, OR = 3.28 [1.47,
7.34]. In other words, the odds of reporting any anxiety (probably of reporting
anxiety/probably of reporting no anxiety) were 3.28 times greater among those in the
physical femininity threat condition (6.80 odds) than those in the physical femininity
affirmation condition (2.07 odds). Participants in the physical femininity control condition
were not more likely to report any state anxiety (80.77% or 4.20 odds) than those in the
physical femininity affirmation condition, B = 0.71, SE = 0.42, p = .095, OR = 2.03 [0.88,
4.64]. Physical attractiveness feedback had no effect on likelihood of reporting any state
anxiety, B = 0.01, SE = 0.34, p = .988, OR = 1.01 [0.52, 1.95]. There were no interactions
between physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback (ps > .70).
Supplemental Exploratory Analyses
Self-perceived attractiveness. For exploratory purposes, we examined whether the manipulations
affected self-perceived sexual attractiveness and attractiveness of personality. Neither
physical femininity feedback nor physical attractiveness feedback—nor the interaction
between these two variables—affected self-perceived sexual attractiveness or attractiveness
of personality, ps > .07.
Study 1b
Measures
Supplemental Measures
Self-perceived sexual attractiveness and attractiveness of personality. We measured sexual attractiveness
and attractiveness of personality using the same single-item, 7-point measures used in Study
1a.

203
Desire to change photograph. Participants indicated whether, if given the opportunity, they would
want to replace the photograph they uploaded with a different one.
Results
Supplemental Primary Analyses
Because the modal state anxiety score was 1 (n=30; 12.20% of the sample),
indicating no anxiety, and the distribution of state anxiety was positively-skewed, we also
transformed state anxiety into a binary variable with 1=anxiety present and 0=anxiety
absent. We then ran a pre-registered binary logistic regression, as pre-registered, to determine
whether physical femininity feedback had an effect on whether participants reported any
state anxiety. We dummy coded physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness
feedback with affirmation as the reference group for both variables. None of the dummy
variables, nor the interactions among them, predicted likelihood of reporting any state
anxiety, ps>.20.
Supplemental Exploratory Analyses
Self-perceived attractiveness. For exploratory purposes, we examined whether the manipulations
affected self-perceived sexual attractiveness and attractiveness of personality. Neither
physical femininity feedback nor physical attractiveness feedback—nor the interaction
between them—affected self-perceived sexual attractiveness, ps > .30.
Neither physical femininity feedback nor physical attractiveness feedback affected
self-perceived attractiveness of personality, ps > .45. Surprisingly, there was a significant
interactive effect between physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback
on self-perceived attractiveness of personality, F(2, 240) = 3.05, p = .049, f = 0.16. When we
broke down this interaction, however, we found that there was not a significant effect of
physical femininity feedback on self-perceived attractiveness of personality in either the
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physical attractiveness affirmation condition, F(1, 110) = 0.74, p = .480, f = 0.12, or the
physical attractiveness control condition, F(1, 130) = 2.70, p = .071, f = 0.20.
Desire to change photograph. We sought to determine whether participants whose physical
femininity (or attractiveness) was threatened would be more likely than those whose physical
femininity (or attractiveness) was affirmed to want to replace the photograph they had
uploaded with a new one. We dummy coded physical femininity feedback and physical
attractiveness feedback with affirmation as the reference group for both variables and then
ran a binary logistic regression with these dummy-coded variables and the interactions
between them as predictors. This analysis revealed a main effect of physical attractiveness
feedback, B = -0.76, SE = 0.29, p = .008, OR = 0.47 [0.27, 0.82], such that the percent of
participants who would want to replace their photograph was smaller among those who
physical attractiveness was affirmed (24.78%) than those who did not receive feedback on
their physical attractiveness (40.60%). The odds of wanting to replace one’s photograph
among participants whose physical attractiveness was affirmed (0.33) were about half the
odds of wanting to replace one’s photograph among participants who did not receive
feedback on their physical appearance (0.68).
There was no effect of physical femininity feedback on participants’ desire to replace
their photograph (threat vs. affirmation: B = -0.22, SE = 0.32, p = .486, OR = .80 [0.43,
1.49]; control vs. affirmation: B = -0.12, SE = 0.36, p = .729, OR = .88 [0.44, 1.79]), nor any
interactions, ps>.07.
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Study 1c
Measures
Supplemental Measures
Self-perceived sexual attractiveness and attractiveness of personality. We measured self-perceived sexual
attractiveness and attractiveness of personality using the single-item, 7-point measures used
in Studies 1a and 1b.
Desire to change photograph. As in Study 1b, participants indicated whether, if given the
opportunity, they would want to replace the photograph they uploaded with a different one.
Results
Supplemental Primary Analyses
Because the modal state anxiety score was 1 (n = 65; 14.19% of the sample) and the
distribution of state anxiety was positively-skewed, we also transformed state anxiety into a
binary variable with 1=anxiety present and 0=anxiety absent. We then ran a pre-registered
binary logistic regression to determine whether physical femininity feedback had an effect on
whether participants reported any state anxiety. We dummy coded physical femininity
feedback, with affirmation as the reference group, and lists of physical features, with absence
of these lists as the reference group. We found that participants in the physical femininity
threat condition were more likely to report any state anxiety (90.99%) than those in the
physical femininity affirmation condition were (80.93%), B = 0.87, SE = 0.29, p = .003, OR
= 2.38 [1.35, 4.19]. In other words, the odds of reporting any anxiety were 2.38 times greater
among those in the physical femininity threat condition (10.10 odds) than those in the
physical femininity affirmation condition (4.24 odds). There was no effect of listing physical
features on presence of anxiety, B = 0.003, SE = 0.27, p = .993, OR = 1.00 [0.59, 1.71], nor
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an interaction between listing physical features and physical femininity feedback, B = -0.33,
SE = 0.57, p = .564, OR = 0.72 [0.23, 2.21].
Supplemental Exploratory Analyses
Self-perceived attractiveness. For exploratory purposes, we examined whether the manipulations
affected self-perceived physical attractiveness, sexual attractiveness, and attractiveness of
personality with three 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVAs with physical femininity feedback
and lists of physical features as the independent variables. There was an effect of listing
physical features on self-perceived sexual attractiveness, F(1, 454) = 6.86, p = .009, f = 0.12,
such that those in the lists present condition perceived themselves as more sexually attractive
(M = 4.32, SD = 1.48) than those in the features absent condition (M = 3.94, SD = 1.64).
There were no other main or interactive effects on any of the measures of self-perceived
attractiveness, ps ≥ .10.
Desire to change photograph. As in Study 1b, we considered whether participants whose physical
femininity was threatened would want to replace the photograph they had uploaded with a
new one. We were also interested in whether this effect, if present, would be limited to
participants who saw lists of physical features that supposedly contribute to overall
assessments of facial masculinity/femininity. We dummy coded physical femininity feedback
(with affirmation as the reference group) and lists of physical features (with absence of these
lists as the reference group) and then ran a binary logistic regression with these dummycoded variables and the interaction between them as predictors. This analysis revealed a
main effect of physical femininity feedback, B = 1.26, SE = 0.21, p < .001, OR = 3.53 [2.34,
5.32], such that the percent of participants who would want to replace their photograph was
smaller among those who physical femininity was affirmed (21.19%) than those whose
physical femininity was threatened (49.10%). The odds of wanting to replace one’s
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photograph among participants whose physical femininity was threatened (0.96) were 3.53
the odds of wanting to replace one’s photograph among participants whose physical
femininity was affirmed (0.27). There was no effect of listing physical features on desire to
change photograph, B = -0.25, SE = 0.21, p = .233, OR = 0.78 [0.52, 1.17], nor an
interaction between physical femininity feedback and listing physical features, B = 0.40, SE
= 0.42, p = .342, OR = 1.49 [0.66, 3.39].
Study 2
Measures
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Table A3
Study 2 Loadings of Felt Identity Invalidation Items onto Factors Identified in Principal
Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation

I feel validated as a female [male]
(R)
I feel validated as a woman [man]
(R)
I feel validated as feminine
[masculine] (R)
I feel that my identity as a woman
[man] is recognized by others (R)
I feel that my identity as feminine
[masculine] is recognized by
others (R)
I feel that my identity as a female
[male] is recognized by others (R)
I am concerned that others do not
recognize my womanhood
[manhood]
I am concerned that others do not
recognize my femininity
[masculinity]
I am concerned that others do not
recognize my “femaleness”
["maleness"]
Other people’s sense of who I am
aligns with who I feel I am (R)
I do not feel that other people see
me for who I really am
I feel that my identity is
recognized by others (R)
I feel like the results I received are
consistent with my beliefs about
who I really am (R)

Felt gender
identity
invalidation
(reversescored
items)

Felt gender
identity
invalidation
(regularly
scored
items)

Felt global
identity
invalidation

0.827

0.131

0.21

0.825

0.16

0.202

0.82

0.165

0.202

0.736

0.294

0.231

0.73

0.285

0.239

0.727

0.308

0.202

0.236

0.843

0.165

0.205

0.833

0.169

0.287

0.815

0.147

0.244

0.027

0.811

0.046

0.285

0.786

0.437

0.128

0.694

0.17

0.092

0.258

**

Note. p < .05; p < .01;

*

-.50***
.55***
.67***
.40***
.58***
.73***
.42***
.51***
.28***
.35***
.155**

.40***
.73***
.56***
.34***
.78***
.58***
.35***
.48***
.28***
.38***
.21***

2

.61***

--

1

p < .001

***

Variables
1. I feel validated as a female
[male] (R)
2. I feel that my identity as a
female [male] is recognized by
others (R)
3. I am concerned that others do
not recognize my “femaleness”
["maleness"]
4. I feel validated as feminine
[masculine] (R)
5. I feel that my identity as
feminine [masculine] is recognized
by others (R)
6. I am concerned that others do
not recognize my femininity
[masculinity]
7. I feel validated as a woman
[man] (R)
8. I feel that my identity as a
woman [man] is recognized by
others (R)
9. I am concerned that others do
not recognize my womanhood
[manhood]
10. I feel that my identity is
recognized by others (R)
11. I do not feel that other people
see me for who I really am
12. Other people’s sense of who I
am aligns with who I feel I am (R)
13. I feel like the results I received
are consistent with my beliefs
about who I really am (R)
.15***

.26***

.33***

.33***

.70***

.45***

.39***

.65***

.44***

.40***

--

3

.20***

.37***

.28***

.47***

.37***

.58***

.74***

.38***

.68***

--

4

Table A4
Study 2 Felt Identity Invalidation Items Correlation Matrix

.185**

.37***

.31***

.51***

.41***

.68***

.58***

.44***

--

5

.15***

.23***

.35***

.31***

.68***

.39***

.35***

--

6

.21***

.36***

.30***

.47***

.40***

.62***

--

7

.18***

.36***

.29***

.55***

.46***

--

8

.17***

.23***

.34***

.34***

--

9

.16***

.57***

.50***

--

10

.13***

.47***

--

11

.19***

--

12

--

13
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Supplemental Measures
Self-perceived attractiveness. We measured self-perceived physical attractiveness, sexual
attractiveness, and attractiveness of personality using the single-item, 7-point measures used
in Studies 1a-c.
Results
Supplemental Primary Analyses
A 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with participant gender, domain, and feedback as the
independent variables and state anxiety as the dependent variable revealed a main effect of
participant gender, F(1, 1566) = 16.98, p < .001, f = 0.10, such that female participants
reported higher levels of state anxiety (M = 1.93, SD = 0.67) than male participants (M =
1.79, SD = 0.63). It also revealed a main effect of domain, F(1, 1566) = 3.10, p = .079, f =
0.04, such that participants who received feedback on their appearance reported higher levels
of anxiety (M = 1.89, SD = 0.66) than those who received feedback on their personality (M
= 1.83, SD = 0.65). Additionally, we observed a main effect of feedback, F(1, 1566) = 30.63,
p < .001, f = 0.14, such that participants whose gender stereotypicality was threatened
reported higher levels of anxiety (M = 1.95, SD = 0.66) than those whose gender
stereotypicality was affirmed (M = 1.77, SD = 0.63).
These main effects were qualified by two two-way interactions—one between
participant gender and domain, F(1, 1566) = 5.67, p = .017, f = 0.06, and one between
domain and feedback, F(1, 1566) = 8.24, p = .004, f = 0.07.
Among female participants, there was a significant effect of domain, F(1, 820) =
8.96, p = .003, f = 0.10, such that those who received feedback on their appearance reported
higher levels of anxiety (M = 1.99, SD = 0.67) than those who received feedback on their
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personality (M = 1.85, SD = 0.66). Among male participants, there was no effect of domain,
F(1, 750) = 0.19, p = .664, f = 0.02.
Furthermore, among participants who received feedback on their appearance, there
was a significant effect of feedback, F(1, 816) = 38.09, p < .001, f = 0.22, such that those
whose gender stereotypicality was threatened reported higher levels of anxiety (M = 2.03, SD
= 0.66) than those whose gender stereotypicality was affirmed (M = 1.75, SD = 0.62).
Among participants who received feedback on their personality, the effect of feedback on
anxiety was not significant, though it was trending in the same direction, F(1, 754) = 3.13, p
= .078, f = 0.06, such that those whose gender stereotypicality was threatened reported
marginally higher levels of anxiety (M = 1.87, SD = 0.65) than those whose gender
stereotypicality was affirmed (M = 1.79, SD = 0.65).
There was no participant gender x feedback interaction, F(1, 1566) = 0.07, p = .790, f
= 0.01.
Because as in Studies 1a-c the modal anxiety score was 1 (n = 192; 12.20% of
sample), indicating no anxiety, and the distribution of anxiety scores was positively-skewed,
we transformed state anxiety into a binary variable with 1=anxiety present and 0=anxiety
absent and ran two binary logistic regressions, one for female participants and one for male
participants, to examine whether domain, feedback, and/or the interaction between these
variables influenced the likelihood that participants would report any state anxiety.
The binary logistic regression for female participants revealed a marginally significant
effect of domain (appearance = 1; personality = 0), B = 0.43, SE = 0.22, p = .058, OR =
1.53 [0.99, 2.37], no significant effect of feedback (threat = 1; affirmation = 0), B = 0.27, SE
= 0.22, p = .224, OR = 1.31 [0.85, 2.03], and a significant domain x feedback interaction, B =
1.16, SE = 0.47, p = .013, OR = 3.20 [1.28, 8.00]. Among those who received feedback on

212
their appearance, there was a significant effect of feedback, B = 0.95, SE = 0.36, p = .009,
OR = 2.57 [1.27, 5.23], such that those whose physical femininity was threatened were more
likely (94.52%) than those who physical femininity was affirmed (87.02%) to report any
anxiety. In other words, the odds of reporting any anxiety were 2.57 times greater among
those in the physical femininity threat condition (17.25 odds) than those in the physical
femininity affirmation condition (6.70 odds). Among those who received feedback on their
personality, there was no effect of feedback, B = -0.22, SE = 0.30, p = .460, OR = 0.80
[0.45, 1.44].
The binary logistic regression for male participants revealed no effect of domain B =
-0.05, SE = 0.22, p = .828, OR = 0.95 [0.62, 1.46], a significant effect of feedback, B = 0.72,
SE = 0.22, p = .001, OR = 2.05 [1.32, 3.18], and no interaction between domain and
feedback, B = 0.72, SE = 0.45, p = .111, OR = 2.06 [0.85, 5.00]. Those whose masculinity
was threatened were more likely (90.72%) than those whose masculinity was affirmed
(82.67%) to report any state anxiety. In other words, the odds of reporting any anxiety were
2.06 times greater among those in the masculinity threat condition (9.78 odds) than those in
the masculinity affirmation condition (4.77 odds).
Supplemental Exploratory Analyses
State self-esteem. Another 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA examining the effects of participant gender,
domain, feedback, and the interactions among these variables on state self-esteem revealed a
main effect of participant gender, F(1, 1565) = 14.85, p < .001, f = 0.10, such that female
participants reported lower levels of state self-esteem (M = 4.06, SD = 0.96) than male
participants (M = 4.25, SD = 0.92). It also revealed a main effect of feedback, F(1, 1565) =
9.40, p = .002, f = 0.08, such that those whose gender stereotypicality was threatened
reported lower levels of state self-esteem (M = 4.07, SD = 0.97) than those whose gender
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stereotypicality was affirmed (M = 4.23, SD = 0.92). There was no effect of domain on state
self-esteem, F(1, 1565) = 2.03, p = .154, f = 0.04.
The main effects of participant gender and feedback were qualified by two two-way
interactions—one between participant gender and domain, F(1, 1565) = 6.33, p = .012, f =
0.06, and one between domain and feedback, F(1, 1565) = 8.65, p = .003, f = 0.07. There
was no participant gender x feedback interaction, F(1, 1565) = 1.06, p = .304, f = 0.03.
A pair of one-way ANOVAs revealed a significant effect of domain on state selfesteem among female participants, F(1, 820) = 8.11, p = .005, f = 0.10, but not male
participants, F(1, 749) = 0.58, p = .446, f = 0.03. Among female participants, those who
received feedback on their appearance reported lower levels of state self-esteem (M = 3.97,
SD = 0.98) than those who received feedback on their personality (M = 4.16, SD = 0.93).
Another pair of one-way ANOVAs revealed a significant effect of feedback on state
self-esteem within the appearance condition, F(1, 815) = 19.32, p < .001, f = 0.15, but not
the personality condition, F(1, 754) = 0.001, p = .980, f = 0.001. Within the appearance
condition, those whose gender stereotypicality was threatened reported lower levels of state
self-esteem (M = 3.97, SD = 0.98) than those whose gender stereotypicality was affirmed (M
= 4.26, SD = 0.93).
Self-perceived attractiveness. We conduced three 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVAs to examine the effects of
participant gender, domain, and feedback—and the interactions among these variables—on
self-perceived physical attractiveness, sexual attractiveness, and attractiveness of personality.
No significant effects emerged (ps > .06). However, we broke down the sample by
participant gender to examine potential two-way interactions. The only significant two-way
interaction that emerged was an interactive effect of domain and feedback on self-perceived
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physical attractiveness among female participants, F(1, 818) = 4.37, p = .037, f = 0.07 (all
other interaction ps > .15).
Surprisingly, follow-up one-way ANOVAs revealed an effect of feedback on selfperceived physical attractiveness among female participants who received feedback on the
femininity of their personality, F(1, 393) = 5.56, p = .019, f = 0.12, but not female
participants who received feedback on the femininity of their appearance, F(1, 425) = 0.37, p
= .545, f = 0.03. Among female participants who received feedback on the femininity of
their personality, those whose femininity was threatened reported that they were more
physically attractive (M = 4.61, SD = 1.34) than those whose femininity was affirmed (M =
4.27, SD = 1.45).
Supplemental Potential Mediators
Felt gender identity invalidation. A 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA examining the potential effects of
participant gender, domain, and feedback—and the interactions among these variables—on
felt gender identity invalidation revealed a main effect of participant gender, F(1, 1565) =
8.92, p = .003, f = 0.07, such that female participants reported lower levels of felt gender
identity invalidation (M = 2.25, SD = 1.17) than male participants (M = 2.41, SD = 1.10).
There was no effect of domain, F(1, 1565) = 0.72, p = .396, f = 0.02, nor interactions
between participant gender and feedback, F(1, 1565) = 3.35, p = .068, f = 0.05, or domain
and feedback, F(1, 1565) = 0.94, p = .333, f = 0.02.
There was, however, a participant gender x domain interaction, F(1, 1565) = 4.95, p
= .026, f = 0.06. Among male participants, a one-way ANOVA revealed an effect of domain,
F(1, 749) = 4.77, p = .029, f = 0.08, such that those in the personality condition reported
higher levels of felt gender identity invalidation (M = 2.50, SD = 1.13) than those in the

215
appearance condition (M = 2.33, SD = 1.07). Among female participants, there was no
effect of domain, F(1, 820) = 1.22, p = .270, f = 0.04.
Results-identity discrepancy. The 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA examining the potential effects of participant
gender, domain, and feedback—and the interactions among these variables—on resultsidentity discrepancy revealed a main effect of feedback, F(1, 1566) = 427.72, p < .001, f =
0.50, such that those whose gender stereotypicality was threatened felt a greater discrepancy
between their results and identity (M = 4.22, SD = 1.81) than those whose gender
stereotypicality was affirmed (M = 2.50, SD = 1.48). It also revealed a main effect of domain,
F(1, 1566) = 8.37, p = .004, f = 0.06, such that those who received feedback on their
appearance felt a greater discrepancy between their results and identity (M = 3.49, SD =
1.91) than those who received feedback on their personality (M = 3.22, SD = 1.79). There
was no main effect of participant gender, F(1, 1566) = 2.11, p = .146, f =0.03.
The main effect of domain was qualified by two two-way interactions—a participant
gender x domain interaction, F(1, 1566) =4.67, p = .031, f =0.05, and a domain x feedback
interaction, F(1, 1566) = 65.77, p < .001, f = 0.18. There was no participant gender x
feedback interaction, F(1, 1566) =1.18, p = .278, f =0.02.
To probe the first interaction, we broke the sample down by participant gender and
conducted a one-way ANOVA with domain as the independent variable. Among female
participants, there was an effect of domain, F(1, 820) = 12.41, p < .001, f = 0.12, such that
those who received feedback on their appearance felt a greater discrepancy between their
results and identity (M = 3.53, SD = 1.96) than those who received feedback on their
personality (M = 3.07, SD = 1.77). Among male participants, there was no effect of domain,
F(1, 750) = 0.20, p = .652, f = 0.02.
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We then broke down the sample by domain and conducted another one-way
ANOVA with feedback as the independent variable. Among those in the personality
condition, there was an effect of feedback, F(1, 754) = 66.14, p < .001, f =0.30, such that
those whose gender stereotypicality was threatened felt a greater discrepancy between their
results and identity (M = 3.74, SD = 1.84) than those whose gender stereotypicality was
affirmed (M = 2.72, SD = 1.60). Among those in the appearance condition, there was an
even stronger effect of feedback, F(1, 816) = 498.11, p < .001, f = 0.78, such that those
whose gender stereotypicality was threatened felt a greater discrepancy between their results
and identity (M = 4.65, SD = 1.66) than those whose gender stereotypicality was affirmed
(M = 2.29, SD = 1.33).
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